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Departmental Boundaries within the Corporate Body of Theory: Quine on the Holistic Foundations of Logic

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2009

David M. Godden
David M. Godden
Affiliation:
McMaster University
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Abstract

This article argues that Quine's holistic and naturalized semantics provides an inadequate account of the foundations of logical expressions and misrepresents the internal structure of theories. By considering a Quinean model of theoretical revision, I identify the status and foundation holism provides to the propositions of logic. I contend that a central tenet of Quinean holism—the Revisability Doctrine—cannot be held consistently, and that the inconsistencies surrounding it mark a series of pervasive errors within naturalized holism. In response, I propose that semantic theories must reflect the different linguistic functions of different types of expressions and the specific relationships that individual concepts within a theory or language have to one another.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 45 , Issue 3 , Summer 2006 , pp. 505 - 528
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2006

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