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Gauthier, Equilibrium, and the Emergence of Morality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 January 2017

BRETT MULLINS
BRETT MULLINS*
Affiliation:
Miami University
*
*<brettcmullins@gmail.com>
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Abstract

David Gauthier develops morality in the social contract tradition as an emergent property rationally necessitated by the presence of inefficiency. To demarcate situations in which morality arises from those in which it does not, two principles, Strategic Emergence and Market Emergence, are motivated and assumed by Gauthier to be equivalent. Following the work of Bob Bright, this paper formalizes and expands upon a demonstration of the inconsistency of the two principles. Eliminating each of the emergence conditions is considered to resolve the inconsistency. Additionally, the Kantian equilibrium is examined in place of the Nash equilibrium; however, Gauthier’s approach resists such amendments.

David Gauthier présente la moralité dans la tradition du contrat social en tant que propriété dont l’émergence est rendue rationnellement nécessaire par la présence de l’inefficacité. Pour distinguer les situations dans lesquelles la moralité apparaît de celles où elle n’apparaît pas, Gauthier présente deux principes réputés équivalents, l’émergence stratégique et l’émergence de marché. Cet article formalise et poursuit, à la suite des travaux de Bob Bright, la démonstration du caractère contradictoire de ces deux principes. Je considère que la contradiction peut être résolue en éliminant chacune des conditions d’émergence. De plus, j’examine la possibilité de remplacer l’équilibre de Nash par l’équilibre kantien; l’approche de Gauthier, cependant, ne souffre pas de ce type de modification.

Keywords

formal ethicsDavid Gauthierequilibriumstrategycontractarian
Type
Special Topic: Gauthier’s Contractarian Project
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 55 , Issue 4 , December 2016 , pp. 677 - 693
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Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2017 

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