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How Can a Symbol System Come into Being?1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

David Lumsden
David Lumsden
Affiliation:
University of Waikato
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Abstract

One holistic thesis about symbols is that a symbol cannot exist singly, but only as apart of a symbol system. There is also the plausible view that symbol systems emerge gradually in an individual, in a group, and in a species. The problem is that symbol holism makes it hard to see how a symbol system can emerge gradually, at least if we are considering the emergence of a first symbol system. The only way it seems possible is if being a symbol can be a matter of degree, which is initially problematic. This article explains how being a cognitive symbol can be a matter of degree after all. The contrary intuition arises from the way a process of interpretation forces an all-or-nothing character on symbols, leaving room for underlying material to realize symbols to different degrees in a way that Daniel Dennett's work can help illuminate. Holism applies to symbols as interpreted, while gradualism applies to how the underlying material realizes symbols.

Résumé

Selon une thèse holistique sur les symboles, un symbole nepeut exister isolément mais doit faire partie d'un système symbolique. Une opinion, elle aussi plausible, veut que les systémes symboliques émergent graduellement chez un individu, un groupe ou une espéce. Le problème c'est qu'on voit mal, si le holisme des systémes symboliques tient, comment un système symbolique peut émerger graduellement, du moins pour la première fois. Ce n'est possible, semble-t-il, que si être un symbole est affaire de degré, thèse au départ problématique. Cet article explique comment être un symbole cognitif peut après tout être affaire de degré. L'intuition contraire vient de ce que le processus d' interprétation nous force au tout ou rien, ce qui laisse unjeu dans la façon dont le matériel sous-jacent réalise les symboles à des degres divers. Les travaux de Daniel Dennett sont à cet égard éclairants. Le holisme vautpour les symboles tels qu'ils sont interprétés, tandis que le gradualisme vaut pour la façon dont le matériel sous-jacent réalise les symboles.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 44 , Issue 1 , Winter 2005 , pp. 87 - 96
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2005

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