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How Things Seem to Higher-Order Thought Theorists

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 July 2017

JACOB BERGER
JACOB BERGER*
Affiliation:
Idaho State University
*
*<jfberger@gmail.com>
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Abstract

According to David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, a mental state is conscious just in case one is aware of being in that state via a suitable HOT. Jesse Mulder (2016) recently objects: though HOT theory holds that conscious states are states that it seems to one that one is in, the view seems unable to explain how HOTs engender such seemings. I clarify here how HOT theory can adequately explain the relevant mental appearances, illustrating the explanatory power of HOT theory.

Selon la théorie de la conscience des pensées d’ordre supérieur de David Rosenthal («higher-order thought»), un état mental est conscient seulement dans les cas où l’on est conscient d’être dans cet état par l’intermédiaire d’une pensée d’ordre supérieur appropriée. Jesse Mulder (2016) a récemment émis l’objection suivante : si la théorie des pensées d’ordre supérieur maintient que les états de conscience sont des états pour lesquels il semble à la personne qui s’y trouve qu’elle s’y trouve, le point de vue ne semble pas pouvoir expliquer de quelle manière les pensées d’ordre supérieur engendrent ces impressions. Je précise ici comment la théorie des pensées d’ordre supérieur peut expliquer de manière adéquate les apparences mentales pertinentes, illustrant le pouvoir explicatif de la théorie des pensées d’ordre supérieur.

Keywords

HOT theoryconsciousnessseemingsawarenessthought
Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 56 , Issue 3 , September 2017 , pp. 503 - 526
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Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2017 

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