Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-8bhkd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-13T02:10:19.298Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Idealism, Scepticism, and Internal Relations: Remarks on Hymers's Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Philip P. Hanson
Philip P. Hanson
Affiliation:
Simon Fraser University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Interventions/Discussions
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 43 , Issue 3 , Summer 2004 , pp. 577 - 586
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2004

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Notes

1 Hymers, Michael, Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000)Google Scholar. This is a substantial revision of a critical commentary presented at the Western Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings in Edmonton in October 2000. I would like to thank those present on that occasion, and especially Michael Hymers, for their helpful feedback and clarification. This version has also benefited from Jill Mclntosh's close reading. All page references appearing in the main body of the text are to Hymers's book.

2 Lewis, C. I., Mind and the World Order (New York: Dover, 1929)Google Scholar; Goodman, N., Ways of World Making (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1978)Google Scholar; and McDowell, John, Mind and World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).Google Scholar

3 This distinction is introduced in Sosa's, Ernest “The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge,” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol.5: Studies in Epistemology (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), pp. 3–25.Google Scholar

4 Presumably by “an” understanding, Hymers means “my” understanding.

5 See, for instance, AQ: The Magazine of Simon Fraser University (October 2000), Frontispiece, and the article by Yosef Wosk, “The Philosopher's Cafe: A Conversation Whose Time Has Come.”

6 See Cohen, Stewart, “How to Be a Fallibilist,” Philosophical Perspectives, 2, Epistemology (1988): 91–123CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lewis, David, “Elusive Knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, 4 (December 1996): 549–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and de Rose, Keith, “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” The Philosophical Review, 104, 1 (January 1995): 1–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7 The term is borrowed from James, William, The Will to Believe (New York: Longmans, Green, 1897).Google Scholar

8 Elgin, Catherine, “The Epistemic Efficacy of Stupidity,” Synthese, 74 (1988): 297–311.CrossRefGoogle Scholar