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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 May 2010
Keynes introduces three different principles under the single title “the principle of indifference”. The first is Bernoulli's princple of non-sufficient reason.
If there is no known reason for predicating of our subject one rather than another of several alternatives, then relatively to such knowledge the assertions of each of these alternatives have an equal probability. Thus equal probabilities must be assigned to each of several arguments, if there is an absence of positive ground for assigning unequal ones.
1 Keynes, J.M., A Treatise on Probability (London, 1921), Ch. 4, p. 42Google Scholar. References to Keynes are all to this chapter.
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3 Blackburn, Compare Simon, Reason and Prediction (Cambridge, 1973), Ch. 6.Google Scholar
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