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Kantian Constructivism and the Normativity of Practical Identities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 August 2018

ÉTIENNE BROWN
ÉTIENNE BROWN*
Affiliation:
Centre de recherche en éthique (CRÉ), Université de Montréal
*
*<etienne.c.brown@gmail.com>
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Abstract

Many neo-Aristotelians argue that practical identities are normative, that is, they provide us with reasons for action and create binding obligations. Kantian constructivists agree with this insight but argue that contemporary Aristotelians fail to fully justify it. Practical identities are normative, Kantian constructivists contend, but their normativity necessarily derives from the normativity of humanity. In this paper, I shed light on this underexplored similarity between neo-Aristotelian and Kantian constructivist accounts of the normativity of practical identities, and argue that both ultimately fail. I end by suggesting an alternative justification of the claim that practical identities are normative.

Plusieurs néo-aristotéliciens contemporains soutiennent que nos identités pratiques sont normatives, c’est-à-dire qu’elles sont une source de raisons d’agir et d’obligations contraignantes. Les constructivistes kantiens partagent ce constat, mais estiment que les aristotéliciens contemporains n’en offrent pas une justification philosophique satisfaisante. À leurs yeux, nos identités pratiques sont normatives, mais ce fait dérive nécessairement du caractère normatif d’une identité plus fondamentale : notre identité d’être humain rationnel. Cet article se propose de mettre en lumière cette similarité rarement conceptualisée entre les théories néo-aristotéliciennes et constructivistes kantiennes de la normativité des identités pratiques, puis d’en offrir une critique. Après avoir dirigé une série d’objections contre ces deux théories, j’esquisse une justification alternative du caractère normatif des identités pratiques.

Keywords

neo-AristotelianismKantian constructivismpractical identitiespractical reasonsmoral obligationstranscendental arguments
Type
Dossier : Le constructivisme métaéthique / Metaethical Constructivism
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 57 , Issue 3 , September 2018 , pp. 571 - 590
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2018 

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