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Moral Nativism: Some Controversies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 December 2016

ROGER V.V. REX Open the ORCID record for ROGER V.V. REX [Opens in a new window]  and
PAULO C. ABRANTES
ROGER V.V. REX*
Affiliation:
University of Brasília
PAULO C. ABRANTES
Affiliation:
University of Brasília
*
*<rogervargasrex@yahoo.com.br>
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Abstract

This paper scrutinizes two research programs that advocate respectively for the existence of a universal moral grammar and a predisposition to moralize behaviours with certain contents. It focuses on how the arguments commonly used to ground each program fare at relevant contemporary research in cognitive science and how well they meet constructivist arguments proposed by Jesse Prinz and Kim Sterelny, among others. We argue that there is little evidence that our moral judgements follow the model of principles and parameters. At the same time, ‘ease of learning’ suggests that the human brain is somehow prepared to learn moral rules.

Cet article analyse deux programmes de recherche qui soutiennent, respectivement, l’existence d’une grammaire morale universelle et d’une prédisposition à assigner des valeurs morales à des comportements liés à certains contenus. Nous proposons d’évaluer les arguments utilisés par chaque programme en regard de la recherche contemporaine en sciences cognitives, et aussi de vérifier s’ils répondent aux objections constructivistes proposées entre autres par Jesse Prinz et Kim Sterelny. Nous montrons qu’il n’y a pas de preuves suffisantes comme quoi nos jugements moraux suivent le modèle des principes et des paramètres. La «facilité d’apprentissage» suggère, néanmoins, que le cerveau humain est en quelque sorte préparé à apprendre les règles morales.

Keywords

moral nativisminnatenessuniversal moral grammarmoral foundations theoryaffective resonanceDarwinism
Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 56 , Issue 1 , March 2017 , pp. 21 - 44
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Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2016 

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