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Occam’s Razor and Non-Voluntarist Accounts of Political Authority

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2017

LUKE MARING
LUKE MARING*
Affiliation:
Northern Arizona University
*
*<luke.maring@nau.edu>
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Abstract

Certain non-voluntarists have recently defended political authority by advancing views with a two-fold structure. First, they argue that the state, or the law, is best (or uniquely) capable of accomplishing something important. Second, they defend a substantive normative principle on which being so situated is sufficient for de jure authority. Widely accepted tenets undermine all such views.

Certains non-volontaristes ont récemment défendu l’autorité politique en avançant des points de vue en deux parties. D’abord, ils soutiennent que l’état, ou la loi, est la plus (ou la seule) capable d’accomplir quelque chose d’important. Deuxièmement, ils défendent un principe substantif et normatif selon lequel être dans une telle position de pouvoir est suffisant pour l’autorité de jure. Cet article utilise des principes largement acceptés pour montrer que tous ces points de vue échouent.

Keywords

political authorityphilosophical anarchismOccam’s Razornon-voluntaristSamaritanismnormative consent
Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 56 , Issue 1 , March 2017 , pp. 159 - 173
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Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2017 

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