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Public Justification, Inclusion, and Discursive Equality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 September 2017

THOMAS M. BESCH*
Affiliation:
Wuhan University

Abstract

The paper challenges the view that public justification sits well with emancipatory and egalitarian intuitions. I engage political liberalism’s view of public justification. A standard objection to this view is that public justification should be more inclusive in scope. This is both plausible and problematic in emancipatory and egalitarian terms. If inclusive public justification allocates discursive standing that has much discursive purchase, as seems desirable in emancipatory terms, it is unable to allocate equal discursive standing within relevant scopes. And, if it must allocate equal discursive standing, discursive equality should be construed in terms that allow for unequal discursive purchase.

Cet article remet en question les supposés rapports entre justification publique et toute intuition émancipatrice et égalitaire. Je m’y confronte à l’idée de justification publique selon le libéralisme politique. On lui objecte habituellement que la justification publique devrait être plus inclusive. Ceci est plausible autant que problématique en termes d’émancipation et d’égalité. Si une justification publique inclusive rend possible une posture ayant un fort poids discursif («discursive purchase»), tel qu’on le voudrait du point de vue de l’émancipation, elle ne peut étendre cette posture à tous les domaines pertinents. De plus, si la justification inclusive doit offrir des postures discursives équivalentes, cette égalité discursive devrait être conçue en des termes qui permettent des poids discursifs inégaux.

Type
Original Article/Article original
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2017 

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