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Remarks on Bertoldi's Time in the Phenomenology of Perception

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2010

Ernest Joos
Ernest Joos
Affiliation:
Concordia University, Loyola Campus
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Extract

In the Dialogue of December 1974, Eugene F. Bertoldi presents an analysis of Merleau-Ponty's dialectic of time. His article is stimulating and I am tempted to raise several issues, but in the context of this discussion I would limit myself to the dialectic of time only. Bertoldi concludes his investigation with the following criticism: “…Merleau-Ponty's investigation fails to achieve its stated goals: more specifically, as a result of the foregoing criticism, it becomes evident that the dialectical form of the investigation should be abandoned in favour of a rigorous phenomenological explication of temporal ex- perience…” (p. 785)

Type
Discussion/Note
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 15 , Issue 1 , March 1976 , pp. 113 - 117
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1976

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References

1 Numbers in brackets refer to Bertoldi's article in Dialogue, vol. XIII, 1974, No. 4Google Scholar.

2 The famous saying “zw den Sachen selbst” (to the things themselves) in its literal English translation may suggest a “realism” which is not at all the case. Sache is not Ding in the sense of res and Husserl's remarks on transcendence clarify this ambiguity, cf. Ideen I, p. 89.

3 I maintained elsewhere. It may sound paradoxical, that in Heidegger for example, even space is absorbed in time. Cf. my article Langage et Mythe ou le Temps à trois dimensions chez Heidegger, in Dialogue, vol. X, 1971. No. 1. p. 47–59Google Scholar.

4 Merleau-Ponty, , Le philosophe et son ombre, in Signes, Gallimard 1960, p. 202Google Scholar: “Quand il s'agit du penser, écrit à peu prés Heidegger, plus grand est I'ouvrage fait, — qui ne coincide nullement avec l'étendue et le nombre des écrits. — plus riche est, dans cet ouvrage, I'impensé, c'est-à-dire ce qui, à travers cet ouvrage et par lui seul, vient vers nous comme jaraais encore pense. Quand Husserl termine sa vie, il y a un impensé de Husserl, qui est bel et bien à lui, et qui pourtant ouvre sur autre chose. Penser n'est pas posseder des objets de pensée, c'est circonscrire par eux un domaine à penser, que nous ne pensons pas encore.”

5 R. C. Kwant, From Phenomenology to Metaphysics; an inquiry into the last period of Merleau-Ponty's philosophical life, Pittsburgh, Duquesne Press, 1966.

6 Cf. Sein u. Zeit, p. 132; Holzwege, p. 88.