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The Scientific Explanation of Colour Qualia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 September 2009

Jeff Foss
Jeff Foss*
Affiliation:
University of Victoria
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Abstract

ABSTRACT: Qualia, the subjectively known qualities of conscious experience, are judged by many philosophers and scientists to lie beyond the domain of scientific explanation, thus making the conscious mind partly incomprehensible to the objective physical sciences. Some, like Kripke and Chalmers, employ modal logic to argue that explanations of qualia are impossible in principle. I argue that there already exist perfectly normal scientific explanations of qualia, and rebut the arguments of those who deny this possibility.

RÉSUMÉ: Les qualia, ces qualités connues subjectivement au cours d’une expérience consciente, sont jugées par plusieurs philosophes et savants comme situées hors du domaine de l’explication scientifique. Les qualia rendraient ainsi la conscience partiellement incompréhensible pour les sciences physiques. Kripke et Chalmers, par exemple, emploient la logique modale pour soutenir que les explications en termes de qualia sont impossibles en principe. Je soutiens qu’il y a des explications scientifiques de qualia parfaitement ordinaires, et je repousse les arguments de ceux qui nient cette possibilité.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 48 , Issue 3 , September 2009 , pp. 479 - 512
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2009

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