Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 March 1967
It maybe thought that it is no longer important to understand what Rousseau meant by the General Will. It might be argued that since the term is not used by contemporary political writers it can be assumed that the concept has nothing 10 contribute to the understanding of present-day problems. Or, it might be urged that the meaning given to the General Will by such a disciple as Bosanquet is richer and more useful than what Rousseau himself meant by it. Even if both of these claims can be justified, there is still a need, as long as Rousseau remains prominent in political thought, to try to understand what he meant by his chief concept. Thus, my aim in almost all of this paper is to expound and interpret.
1 I have used G. D. H. Cole's Everyman edition. But since several others are now available, references are given in terms of book and chapter with abbreviations as follows: Book I, Chapter 6 is written as (1.6).
2 Bosanquet, B., The Philosophical Theory of the State, p. 96Google Scholar. Bosanquet's views are summarized from chapters 4, 5 and 9.
3 Sec: Weklon, T. D., States and Morals, p. 46Google Scholar; Popper, K. R., The Open Society, II, 37 and 52Google Scholar; Mabbott, J. D., The State and the CitizenGoogle Scholar, Chapter 14.
4 Plamenatz, J. P., Man and Society, I. p. 399.Google Scholar
5 Cassirer, E.: The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, p. 96Google Scholar.
6 Vaughan, C. E., ed. The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau. I, 447–454.Google Scholar
7 Rawls, J., “Justice as Fairness” in Philosophy, Politics and Society, II, 132.Google Scholar
8 I am not here arguing that Rousseau advocates a natural right to liberty, or even that he is a forceful champion of personal liberties. In regard to rights, Rousseau's principal view is that the individual's right to be a legislator is inalienable; what I am trying to show is that his theory of law permits personal liberty.