Since philosophers began thinking seriously about the moral status of non-human animals, many of the practices we once took for granted have come to be condemned as unjustifiable, among them our reliance on animals as a food source. While the arguments which have been adduced in support of moral vegetarianism invoke quite different (indeed incompatible) moral frameworks, they begin with a common concern for the welfare of animals. In the real world of practising vegetarians, this concern tends to be subordinated to considerations of health or food scarcity. Philosophical vegetarians need not deny, and have not denied, the importance of these further considerations. But among philosophers the case for moral vegetarianism has rested primarily on arguments from animal welfare.

Le long débat sur le « problème de la transformation », qui a marqué si profondément le développement de la pensée marxiste depuis cent ans, est probablement l'un des plus étranges mais peut-être aussi Fun des plus instructifs parmi ceux que l'histoire encore jeune des sciences sociales peut offrir à l'attention croissante que lui porte l'analyse épistémologique.

Determinism in one sense is the theory that all events, including human actions, are governed by laws and hence are necessary. Some think that it can be refuted simply by identifying entrenched beliefs that contradict it, i.e., simply by establishing incompatibilism. Others think that this is not enough, that if determinists uncover the right sort of evidence, they can use that evidence against any contrary beliefs, however well entrenched. In that case, attention must be paid to contingent facts about human behaviour. Probably a combination of the two approaches is the best strategy. Obviously, ascertaining what the facts are, and what their relevance is, cannot be done independently of analysis and logic. Yet a concentration on incompatibilism seems particularly vulnerable to stalemate. Hence the need arises to investigate whether concepts formed during the analytical inquiry are actually true of anything, independently of questions of entrenchment. To confirm this suspicion about the limitations of analysis, I shall consider two perceptive and well-regarded arguments for thinking that determinism clashes with a belief in alternate possibilities.

Kant's aim in Section III of the Groundwork is to establish the supreme principle of morality. To accomplish his aim he finds it necessary to present a justification of freedom. Commentators generally regard Kant's overall argument as a failure, because they regard his justification of freedom as a failure. In this paper I shall present three arguments. First, I shall argue that commentators, for the most part, look to the wrong text for Kant's Groundwork justification of freedom. They look to pars. 10–16 for an argument for freedom, but the collection of propositions, which Kant presents there, is aimed at showing something other than freedom. Second, I shall argue that to the extent that they look to the correct text, namely, par. 4, they misinterpret Kant. Third, I shall set out and evaluate the actual justification of freedom which Kant presents in par. 4.

Maurice Lagueux's new book, winner of the Governor General's Award, is a collection of essays on different topics in Marxist philosophy and social thought. Often very critical of the ideas and theses he examines, the unifying theme of the collection is indicated by the subtitle, “une saison dans l'histoire de la pensée critique”. Lagueux's efforts are largely devoted to evaluating the ideas that captured the imagination of much of the left, especially in Quebec, during the sixties, “une saison où la gauche avait le vent dans les voiles”.

In this paper I shall first expose a weakness shared by several philosophical discussions of self-deception: I shall show that these discussions have failed to give it a complete analysis. The apparent phenomenon of self-deception is all too familiar, and yet its adequate characterization in general terms is wanting. More exactly, I shall argue that to understand self-deception statically, as these accounts have done, has been—and must be—to fail to give a characterization of it as a state of mind, sufficient to distinguish it from other mental states not born of self-deception.

Recent interpretations of Locke's primary/secondary quality distinction have tended to emphasize Locke's relationship to the corpuscularian science of his time, especially to that of Boyle. Although this trend may have corrected the unfortunate tendency to view Locke in isolation from his scientific contemporaries, it nevertheless has resulted in some over- simplifications and distortions of Locke's general enterprise. As everyone now agrees, Locke was attempting to provide a philosophical foundation for English corpuscularianism and one must therefore look not only at the current scientific hypotheses but also at the nature of the philosophical foundation Locke was attempting to erect. In particular, Locke made an attempt, based on epistemological principles, to give a philosophical justification of atomistic corpuscularianism. Moreover, he was not content to give this justification post hoc—the epistemological foundation was prior to, and determined the framework for, the details of the correct scientific theory. Locke's epistemology made legitimate an atomistic theory, one making crucial use of the notion of solidity in the definition of the elementary particles, although it did not prejudge the details of this theory.

In his previous papers written on the topic of animal rights, Tom Regan argued that on the assumption that certain human beings have moral rights then so do certain animals. Here the argument is carried a stage further; Regan argues that some animals have certain moral rights. For the most part the book is taken up with criticizing alternative views concerning our moral obligations to animals and explaining and defending “The Rights View”. In the final chapter, Regan draws out the implications ofthe rights view. These include arguing for an obligation to be a vegetarian, moral condemnation of hunting and trapping of wild animals as well as of most of the uses of animals for scientific purposes. Animals are not to be used for toxicity tests, in education contexts or in scientific research even though this may produce beneficial consequences for humans and other animals. The book is very clearly written and well argued. It covers all important positions and arguments related t o the question of our moral obligations to animals. It is, I believe, the best book to appear on this subject to date.

Karl Popper is certainly one of the major philosophers of the century, and in working through the near thousand pages of his newly published Postscript one can see why. Only the big issues are dealt with; they are always treated with great clarity; and the conclusions are profound. In spite ofthis, however, these three volumes are ultimately disappointing, since they tell us little new about Popper's thinking.

Maurice Lagueux est allé à l'école de Merleau-Ponty. Il en a gardé une grande méfiance pour les catégories rigides, les étiquettes définitives et les distinctions tranchées. Dénonçant déjà, il y a plus de dix ans, « l'usage abusif du rapport Science/Idéologie », il évoquait en conclusion de sa contribution au collectif Culture et langage « le pouvoir incantatoire des formules toutes faites ». C'est encore cette fascination magique de la formule toute faite, du déjà dit, du déjà tranché, qu'il tente sans relâche de conjurer, aussi bien dans ses articles du Devoir sur le « plagiat inconscient » qu'au long de l'ouvrage qui lui a mérité le prix du Gouverneur général et auquel sera consacrée la présente etude critique, Le marxisme des années soixante

Reading Charles Taylor's Hegel, one is quite struck by his view that Hegel's Logic offers us an ontology. To some degree this is an obvious observation in that the Logic certainly pretends to speak regarding “all that is”. Within the optic of Taylor's suggestion, it is possible to explore the primacy of the ontological claim for Hegel's work, the possibility of nihilism consequent upon its collapse, and an access to a post-Hegelian and post-nihilistic future for human thought and activity.

One reason why religious intolerance is so widespread, according to Newman, is that many people do not understand what tolerance means. Thus, “many intolerant people actually think that they are tolerant, and liberal people usually have trouble explaining to them why they are wrong” (147). Newman therefore begins his book with an analysis of the concept of tolerance. “Tolerance involves tolerating, that is, accepting, enduring, bearing, putting up with; it involves acceptance in the sense of refraining from any strong reaction to the thing in question; it is half hearted, an attitude towards something that is not liked, loved, respected, or approved of; and it is often, though not always, understood as a praiseworthy act or virtue” (6).

C'est un avantage appréciable, pour un auteur, que de voir son livre recensé simultanément par deux lecteurs aussi attentifs que Christopher Morris et Claude Panaccio. Les divers aspects de l'ouvrage ont alors d'autant plus de chances d'être mis en relief que chacun des lecteurs adopte habituellement une stratégie différente pour en rendre compte. C'est ainsi que, dans le cas présent, le souci d'équilibre qui semble avoir guidé Morris dans sa patiente description de chacun des chapitres du livre se trouve heureusement complété par la volonté manifeste, chez Panaccio, de faire plutôt ressortir, à partir de quelques exemples, le style d'argumentation qui le caractérise.

A force de lire à chaud les débats actuels de la philosophie et s'habituer aux diverses technicalités d'interprétation s'alimentant de la structure ouverte du texte philosophique; à force de dépouiller catalogues (prestigieux) d'éditeurs et programmes de congrès avec la rapidité de celui qui se sait dans le coup de la contemporanéité la plus sophistiquée, nous oublions parfois la pertinence et le sens de l'étrangeté radicale des classiques. Nous préférons croire que de leur hauteur à première vue inaccessible, un peu surannée, les philosophes de cette époque et—par une métonymie à la limite typographique—les textes classiques modélent des paysages intérieurs révolus, raffinent la quintessence d'une civilisation qui aurait manqué (de) nos propres moyens d'action « plus réels », plus appropries à la conscience foncièrement progressiste qui nous tenaille.

As a distinct academic subdiscipline medical ethics is only about fifteen years old, but during that brief lifespan it has managed to generate a literature so vast that only specialists and speedreaders can now hope to keep up with more than a small fraction of it. When a literature has achieved this density new contributions must bear the burden of showing that they advance the existing state of the art. Eike-Henner W. Kluge's book joins a well-established continuing debate on the morality of euthanasia. Unfortunately, however, it fails to add much of importance to that debate.

The general subject of Professor Bond's book, Reason and Value, is, as the title implies, the relation between reason and value, or more precisely the connections between concepts of motivation and value, with reasons as the contested notion in between. Bond offers a thesis that at least appears to go very much against the current trend on these matters. Whereas most recent theorists of note have tied justificatory reasons as well as explanatory reasons to desire, thus holding, in effect, that values are somehow a function of desire, Bond wishes to cut the link between value and desire altogether. The first three chapters are devoted to developing this argument, mainly negatively. He distinguishes between “motivating” and “grounding” (or “justifying”) reasons in the customary way (e.g., Baier distinguishes “explanatory” from “justificatory” reasons to much the same effect'), and argues that “whereas desire or wanting and the reasons tied to it belong to the theory of motivation, where they are central, reason, in the sense of the reason(s) that a person has for or against doing a thing, is tied essentially to value, and the two are not to be confused” (9). “… The existence of grounding reasons (though not of motivating reasons) has no internal or necessary connection with desires of any kind” (37). “… All value is necessarily objective, in the sense that it is never a function of desire (or will); nothing is ever valuable or desirable in virtue of being desired” (84). “Value is not to any extent whatever a function or product of desire” (155).