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Philosophy of Science circa 1950–2000: Some Things we (should have) Learned

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2024

Harold I. Brown
Harold I. Brown*
Affiliation:
Northern Illinois University, USA
*
Harold I. Brown, 541 N 7th Street, DeKalb, IL 60115, USA. Email: hibrown@niu.edu
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Articles
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Diogenes , Volume 61 , Issue 2: Trends and Debates in Contemporary Epistemology , May 2014 , pp. 45 - 58
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Copyright © ICPHS 2016

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