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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 July 2024
The slightest reflection shows that the conceptual material employed in writing history is that of the period in which a history is written. There is no material available for leading principles and hypotheses save that of the historic present. As culture changes, the conceptions that are dominant in a culture change. Of necessity new standpoints for viewing, appraising and ordering data arise. History is then rewritten.
The problem referred to in this passage is well known both from the literature on the subject and the practice of historiography: historical works get old, the development of science—particularly of historical science—determines a new approach to old problems, and, consequently, history is rewritten in a different way. The fact is incontestable. But how should it be interpreted? Why is it so?
1. John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York, 1949), p. 233.
2. American Historical Review, Vol. XLI, No. I (1935).
3. Ibid., Vol. XXXI, No. 2 (1934).
4. American Historical Review, Vol. LV, No. 3 (1950).
5. Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XLII, No. 2 (1955).
6. London, 1914.
7. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946.
8. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957.
9. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1952. 10. Leipzig: Reinicke, 1927.
11. American Historical Review, Vol. LV, No. 2 (1950).
12. The Case for Modern Man (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956).
13. Theory and Practice in Historical Study: A Report of the Committee on Historiog raphy (Social Science Research Bull. 54 [New York, 1946]), pp. 19-20.
14. E.g., "On Understanding the History of Philosophy," Journal of Philosophy, XXXVI, No. 17 (1939), 462.