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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 October 2022
This article inquires into the ideological circumstances behind Wang Mang's 王莽 seizure of power, to examine how he built legitimacy at every stage of his career, by establishing a political and symbolic continuum between the role of the minister and that of the sovereign, rather than suddenly wresting power from the Liu clan. His classical learning in general and his references to Zhougong 周公 in particular were fundamental to the success of the process, which took place in three important stages: first, the offering of a white pheasant to the court; second, the bestowal of “Nine Conferrals” 九錫, and third, the composition of “Wang Mang's declaration” 莽誥. However, although the Classics constituted common references for Wang Mang and the scholars supporting him, the Classics were also used by some opponents objecting to the concentration of power in the hands of Wang Mang.
本文探究王莽奪權的思想背景，以縷析其在每一階段如何構建合法性。王莽並非驟取劉氏之權，而是在臣與君的角色間建立了連續與統一性。他漸取勝利的關鍵是對於經典的總體學習以及對周公的特意比照，這一過程有三個重要階段：一，獻白雉；二，加九錫；三，作《莽誥》。不過，經典雖然是王莽及其支持者的共同參考，卻也被一些反對者用以攻駁權力集於王莽手中。
1. All dates b.c.e. unless otherwise noted. The reasons for this rapid fall of Wang Mang’s regime have been debated by historians, H. Bielenstein and Yü Ying-shih among others, especially regarding the respective roles played by human factors and by natural factors, such as the floods provoked by two changes in the course of the Yellow River. See below note 7.
2. Loewe, Michael, “Wang Mang and His Forbears: The Making of the Myth,” T’oung Pao 80.4–5 (1994), 197–222CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3. Han shu 漢書 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1962), 99A.4093: “This year [8 c.e.] the Marquis of Guangrao, Liu Jing, Battalion Commander to the General of Chariots and Cavalry Hu Yun, and a subordinate under the Senior Tutor, Zhang Hong, presented memorials reporting more divine omens.” See Clyde B. Sargent, Wang Mang: A Translation of the Official Account of His Rise to Power as Given in the History of the Former Han Dynasty (Shanghai: Graphic Art Book Company, 1947), 173 (mod.). NB: in all citations of earlier works, Wade-Giles has been changed to pinyin, for consistency.
4. For a collective reflection about the role played by one particular Classic, the Zhou li 周禮, in government conception and organization in East Asia, see Elman, Benjamin A. and Kern, Martin, eds., Statecraft and Classical Learning: The Rituals of Zhou in East Asian Society (Leiden: Brill, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Michael Puett’s chapter in that book, “Centering the Realm: Wang Mang, the Zhouli, and Early Chinese Statecraft,” 129–54, deals with the use of the Zhou li as an effort to centralize the Han. Here I focus more on the rhetorical uses of the Documents classic as it relates to Wang Mang’s rise to power.
5. The notion of a radical division between guwen 古文 (an intellectual trend characterized by a strong interest for texts in an older script) and jinwen 今文 (which roughly designates the officially sponsored texts written in the current script) has been challenged by several important studies, namely, van Ess, Hans, “The Old Text/New Text Controversy: Has the Twentieth Century Got It Wrong?” T’oung Pao 80.1–3 (1994), 146–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nylan, Michael, “The chin wen/ku wen (New Text/Old Text) Controversy in Han Times,” T’oung Pao, 80.1–3 (1994), 83–145CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
6. Lu Zhao, “In Pursuit of the Great Peace: Han Dynasty Classicism and the Making of Early Medieval Classicist Culture,” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2013), 111. A book based on the dissertation was published in 2019, but I was unable to consult it.
7. See especially the debate between Hans Bielenstein and Yü Ying-shih. According to Bielenstein, the direct cause for Wang Mang’s fall was not the failure of his ambitious reforms but a series of natural disasters, particularly the successive floods of the Yellow River. See Hans Bielenstein, “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty, with Prolegomena on the Historiography of the Hou Han shu,” Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities 26.1 (1954), 1–209, esp. 150. According to Yü, Wang Mang’s reforms were the main cause for his downfall, since they deprived him of the vital support of the most powerful families (which he seems to equate with the classicists) who had brought him to power. See Yü Ying-shih 余英時, “Dong Han zhengquan zhi jianli yu shizu daxing zhi guanxi” 東漢政權之建立與士族大姓之關係, Xinya xuebao 新亞學報 2 (1965), 216–47.
8. Jiegang, Gu 顧頡剛, Qin Han de fangshi yu rusheng 秦漢的方士與儒生 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 2005), 60–65Google Scholar.
9. The ambiguities inherent in the figure of Zhougong, especially as regards his loyalty to his sovereign, are analyzed by Michael Nylan in her chapter “The Many Dukes of Zhou in Early Sources,” in Statecraft and Classical Learning, ed. Elman and Kern, 94–128.
10. In his Xinlun 新論, Huan Tan gives various reasons that contributed to the fall of Wang Mang’s dynasty. Among them are his very solitary exercise of power and his fondness for omens. See Timoteus Pokora, Hsin-lun (New Treatise) and Other Writings by Huan T’an (43 B.C.–28 A.D.) (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, 1975), 10, 25–27, 30–31, 45–50. Huan Tan does not mention the great support by the classicists during Wang Mang’s accession to power, nor does he mention Wang Mang’s public emulation of Zhougong. For a contemporaneous accusation, see also the “pamphlet” published by Wei Ao 隗囂 (d. 33 c.e.) and his group during the last rebellion against Wang Mang. This pamphlet, which is referred to in Han shu 99C.4187 and quoted in extenso in the Hou Han shu 後漢書 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1965), 13.515, focuses on two main accusations, the regicide and the forgery of omens. See Bielenstein, “The Restoration of the Han Dynasty,” 124: “The former Marquis of Xindu, Wang Mang, has treated rudely and insulted Heaven and Earth, acted contrary to principles, and opposed order. He poisoned and killed Emperor Ping and snatched away his throne. He pretended to have received the mandate of Heaven and forged writings about verifications [of his receipt of the mandate by auspicious omens]. He cheated and misled the masses and aroused to anger the Lord on High. He turned and twisted ornamental expressions in order to fabricate auspicious omens. He made game of the Spirits of Heaven and Earth and praised misfortunes and calamities in song. The bamboos of Ch’u and Yüe are not sufficient to write down his wickedness” (trans. Bielenstein).
11. Hou Han shu, 28A.956: “When Wang Mang was on the verge between regency and regicide, all the classicists in the empire competed to praise him and offer auspicious omens, in order to attract his favor. Only Huan Tan remained in the background, calm and without speaking. Wang Mang appointed him as an official in charge of music, and when Gengshi took the imperial throne, he was appointed Palace Counsellor.” 當王莽居攝篡弒之際，天下之士，莫不競襃稱德美，作符命以求容媚，譚獨自守，默然無言。莽時為掌樂大夫，更始立，召拜太中大夫。
12. Han shu, 84.3435: 乃遣大夫桓譚等班行諭告當反位孺子之意. A similar mission of propaganda is mentioned in Han shu, 99A.4987.
13. On Zhai Yi, see below, note 48.
14. Bielenstein, Hans, “Pan Ku’s Accusations against Wang Mang,” in Chinese Ideas about Nature and Society: Studies in Honour of Derk Bodde, ed. Blanc, Charles Le and Blader, Susan (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1987), 270Google Scholar.
15. Wang, Aihe, Cosmology and Political Culture in Early China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 168CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
16. Han shu, 88.3612: 冠雖敝必加於首，履雖新必貫於足. In this passage, Master Huang strongly opposes Yuan Gu 袁固, a specialist in the Odes classic who argued that a transfer of the ming 命 (here, the legitimacy to govern) could occur, thus provoking dynastic change. According to Sima Tan 司馬談 and Sima Qian’s 司馬遷 biography in the Han shu, a Master Huang (probably the same) taught the “Discourse on the Way” to Sima Tan. See Shi ji 130.3288: 太史公 … 習道論於黃子.
17. Han shu, 26.2504. On Dong Zhongshu, see Gary Arbuckle, “Inevitable Treason: Dong Zhongshu’s Theory of Historical Cycles and Early Attempts to Invalidate the Han Mandate.” Journal of the American Oriental Society 115.4 (1995): 585–97.
18. Han shu, 75.3154. On the ancient notion of abdication in favor of a virtuous minister, see note 32 below.
19. Han shu, 27B.1457.
20. After recording this prediction, Ban Gu adds his proof: 其後三世亡嗣，王莽篡位 “After this earthquake, there happened to be three successive emperors who had no heirs, and Wang Mang then assumed the throne.”
21. On this subject, see also the contributing essays by Liu Tseng-kuei, Shao-yun Yang, and Michael Loewe to Chang’an 26 BCE: An Augustan Age in China, ed. Michael Nylan and Griet Vankeerberghen (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2015).
22. Empress Lü 呂雉 (d. 180) took control of imperial power after Gaozu’s death and elevated to the rank of king a number of men of her own clan while eliminating kings of the Liu clan and old companions of Gaozu. Huo Guang 霍光 (d. 68) was an important adviser to Emperor Wu who was appointed regent of his young successor, the future Emperor Zhao. Huo managed to have both a daughter and a granddaughter married to emperors, and he exerted control over the imperial succession. After his death, his family, suspected of entertaining imperial ambitions, was destroyed.
23. Han shu, 98.4035. Wang Zhengjun survived four emperors: Yuan, her husband, Cheng, her son, Ai, and Ping.
24. The balance of power between Wang Feng and Emperor Cheng was unfavorable for the latter, partly because of Wang Feng’s control over omens and over their interpretation.
25. See Han shu, 99A.4039.
26. Hou Han shu, 44.1500; 36.1230: 莽從欽受左氏學，以欽為猒難將軍.
27. Han shu, 99A.4039.
28. Vermander, Benoît, “Du rite, de sa production et de ses usages: pratiques et spéculations rituelles en Chine ancienne,” Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 172 (2015), 147–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar, here 150: “La maîtrise du discours, une fois qu’elle est usurpée par le souverain, fait de ce dernier la source de tout magistère.”
29. As stated in Ban Gu’s autobiography, initially Wang Mang considered Ban Zhi 穉, one of the most brilliant classicists of the time, to be a virtual brother, along with Ban’s elder and younger brothers. But later when Ban Zhi failed (or was unwilling) to gather eulogies in praise of Wang Mang among the population of the commandery he governed, Zhi lost Wang Mang’s favor and only barely escaped punishment, thanks to an intervention by Empress Dowager Wang. See Han shu, 100A.4204.
30. See below the case of Shentu Gang.
31. Xunzi jijie 荀子集解 (Beijing: Zhonghua, 1988), 115–16. Knoblock’s translation proposes a very different reading: “Since he (Zhougong) formerly had the empire and he now no longer held it, his actions did not constitute a ‘usurpation.’ King Cheng formerly had no empire, whereas now he had an empire; hence the Duke’s actions had not constituted a ‘seizure of power.’” See Knoblock, John, Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), vol. 2, 69Google Scholar. I follow Eric Hutton, Xunzi: The Complete Text (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), p. 53, and the commentator Yang Jing 楊倞 who remarks here: “Shan 擅 means shan 禪. The sentence thus means that Zhougong did not abdicate to King Cheng” 擅與禪同。言非禪讓與成王也.
32. On the ancient notion of abdication in favor of a virtuous minister, see Angus C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (La Salle, IL: Open Court Press, 1989), 292–99. The understanding we have of this notion during the pre-imperial period has been deeply transformed by the discovering of a new set of manuscript texts from the ancient state of Chu, in which the theme of abdication is of particular importance: see Sarah Allan, Buried Ideas: Legends of Abdication and Ideal Government in Early Chinese Bamboo-Slip Manuscripts (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2015).
33. Gu Jiegang, “Zhou Gong zhizheng chengwang: Zhou Gong dong zheng shishi kaozheng zhi er” 周公執政稱王: 周公東征事實考證之二 [That Zhougong held the government and was called king], Wen shi 文史 23 (1984), 1–30. For this argument, see also Edward L. Shaughnessy, “The Duke of Zhou’s Retirement,” in Before Confucius: Studies in the Creation of the Chinese Classics (Albany: State University of New York, 1997), 102.
34. Huo Guang’s biography reports that in his final days (in 88 or 87 b.c.e.), Emperor Wu, worried about his young successor’s ability to exercise power, encouraged Huo Guang to accept the post of regent, by giving Zhougong’s portrait of the earlier sage supporting his young king Cheng. See Han shu, 68.2932.
35. Shang shu dazhuan zhuzi suoyin 尚書大傳逐字索引 (Hong Kong: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1994), 17 (assigned by editors to the “Jia he” 嘉禾 chapter). This work is usually attributed to Fu Sheng 伏勝 (second century b.c.e.), the first classical master to transmit the Han-era Shang shu, though it bears clear signs of reworking in Eastern Han.
36. The same verb feng 風, indicating a manipulation, is used on at least two other occasions with Wang Mang as subject: Han shu, 81.3363; 99A.4049.
37. Han shu, 99.4046.
38. Han shu, 99A.4046.
39. Han shu, 99A.4046.
40. The report of an auspicious omen could prove to be very beneficial for the administrator who was at the origin of it. One must therefore remain cautious as to the attribution of the forging to Wang Mang himself.
41. Although Huo Guang was considered an exemplary regent who successfully protected the continuity of the dynastic line by governing well for the young Emperor Zhao (94–74), he was nonetheless a controversial figure, since members of his clan fomented treason and his clan was eliminated only three years after Huo Guang’s death.
42. The number twelve is symbolic of a full totality, as the memorial itself (Han shu, 99A.4060) points out: “All these deeds were rarely seen in the past, and even Yu the Great and Hou Ji (Shun’s minister) would have found them difficult to accomplish, and yet the Duke [Protector of Han, Wang Mang] has accomplished them in their totality, with an unique and pervasive principle [一以貫之]. This is full completion indeed!”
43. See Chauncey S. Goodrich, “The Nine Bestowals During the Han-Wei Period: A Study of a Ritual Donation as a Prelude to Dynastic Change,” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1957).
44. On the contrary, this reward had a great success during the medieval period, when it was frequently used to prepare for a change of regime. On this subject, see Martin, François, “Des Faux qui ne trompent personne. Les textes d’abdication sous les Six Dynasties,” Extrême-Orient Extrême-Occident 32 (2010), 13–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Leban, Carl, “Managing Heaven’s Mandate: Coded Communications in the Accession of Ts’ao P’ei, A.D. 220,” in Ancient China: Studies in Early Civilization, ed. Roy, David T. and Tsien, Tsuen-hsuin (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1978)Google Scholar.
45. Han shu, 99.4053–64.
46. After Wang Mang had banned from court the relatives of the young Emperor Ping, Wang Mang’s elder son, Wang Yu 王宇, probably concerned about the long-term consequences for their family of such an extreme decision, wanted him to reconsider. He was nevertheless unwilling to remonstrate directly and, knowing his father’s faith in auspicious and inauspicious signs, he ordered Lü Kuan 呂寬 to sprinkle his father’s doors with blood. The whole plot was discovered, and Wang Yu was forced to commit suicide.
47. Son of Zhai Fangjin 翟方進, an important statesman and classicist, Zhai Yi was the first to accuse Wang Mang of having murdered Emperor Ping. According to his biography in the Han shu, he was well aware that the regency of Wang Mang was only the first step towards the overthrow of the dynasty and said so to his nephew (“He now uses the deeds of Zhougong when he was regent for King Cheng, in order to test reactions in the empire. He will necessarily overthrow the House of Han, we can already see the signs”). See Han shu, 84.3426.
48. Zhai Yi’s biography gives a description of the turmoil caused by this revolt. The crowd of rebels numbered more than one hundred thousand people, local officers were killed, and fires nearly consumed the imperial palace: Han shu, 84.3437.
49. Han shu, 84.3428–37. This declaration is only referred to in Wang Mang’s biography (Han shu, 99A.4087).
50. Han shu, 84.3428.
51. Qu Wanli 屈萬里, Shangshu jinzhu jinyi 尚書今註今譯 (Taibei: Taiwan Shangwu, 1969), 89. James Legge (trans.), The Shoo King or the Book of Historical Documents (Taipei: SMC, 1991), 362, mod. after the forthcoming translation of the Documents classic by Michael Nylan and He Ruyue.
52. Han shu, 84.3429.
53. According to Sun Bao’s biography, Wang Mang himself had the Empress Dowager recall him to the high administration after Emperor Ai’s death; Han Shu, 77.3262.
54. A descendant of Confucius and an important dignitary during the reigns of Emperors Cheng and Ai, Kong Guang gave crucial support to Wang Mang, but after 1 c.e., he seems to have been increasingly distant (Han shu, 81.3362–63). He left the court and died in 5 c.e. His father Kong Ba 孔霸, grandfather Kong Yannian 孔延年, and great-grandfather Kong Anguo 孔安國, were all eminent specialists of the Documents traditions. Kong Guang became Academician during the reign of Emperor Cheng, due to his deep knowledge of the Classics, as well as of Han institutions. He then became Imperial Counsellor (Yushi dafu), Chancellor (Chengxiang), and from 2 to 1 b.c.e., Grand Tutor (Taishi).
55. Ma Gong, a specialist of the Gongyang commentary to the Annals classic, became Chancellor in 1 b.c.e. and Grand Tutor in 5 c.e.
56. Here, Sun Bao might refer to chapter “Jun shi” 君奭 in the section “Zhou Shu” 周書, which is introduced as a text composed by Zhougong to answer the Duke of Shao’s criticism. Both were in charge of assisting King Cheng, according to the Documents traditions: 召公為保，周公為師，相成王為左右，召公不說，周公作君奭.
57. Han shu, 77.3263.
58. Michael Nylan, “The Documents Classic as Guide to Political Philosophy in the Early Empires,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 48.1 (2021), 16.
59. Hou Han shu, 29.1011–17. A useful piece of research is Rao Zongyi 饒宗頤, “Xi Han fankang Wangshi zhe liezhuan” 西漢反抗王氏者列傳 [Biographies of those who resisted the power of the Wang clan]. Rao wrote this text to recover the lost “Xi Han jieyi zhuan” 西漢節義傳 [Biographies of the principled and dutiful during Western Han] originally written by the Ming loyalist Li Yesi 李鄴嗣 (1622–1680). Rao gathered 132 biographies, from diverse sources (Han shu, Hou Han shu, Huayang guozhi 華陽國志, Gaoshi zhuan 高士傳, among others), organized by four categories (1) “Gentlemen who offered loyal remonstrances” (忠諫之士); (2) “Those Wang Mang dismissed or eliminated” (為莽所黜戮者); (3) “Those who died because of their daring resistance” (舉義抗莽而死事者); and (4) “Officials who refused to serve Wang Mang” (清節之士不仕莽者). See Rao Zongyi ershi shiji xueshu wenji 饒宗頤二十世紀學術文集, vol. 6, devoted to Historiography (史學) (Taipei: Xinwenfeng, 2003), 693–747.
60. Hou Han shu, 29.1012. Translated by Lu Zongli, Rumor in the Early Chinese Empires (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 220), 15 (mod.).
61. Hou Han shu, 29.1013.
62. Hou Han shu, 29.1014.