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Stable Cooperation in Iterated Prisoners' Dilemmas

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Elliott Sober
Elliott Sober
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin, Madison
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Extract

When does self-interest counsel cooperation? This question pertains both to the labile behaviors produced by rational deliberation and to the more instinctive and fixed behaviors produced by natural selection. In both cases, a standard starting point for the investigation is the one-shot prisoners' dilemma. In this game, each player has the option of producing one or the other of two behaviors (labeled “cooperate” and “defect”). The pay-offs to the row player are as follows:

Type
Essays
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 8 , Issue 1 , April 1992 , pp. 127 - 138
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1992

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References

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