Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-dzt6s Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T12:53:58.417Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

EXTENDED PREFERENCES AND INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS: A NEW ACCOUNT

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 June 2014

Matthew D. Adler
Matthew D. Adler*
Affiliation:
Duke University, USAadler@law.duke.edu
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This paper builds upon, but substantially revises, John Harsanyi's concept of ‘extended preferences’. An individual ‘history’ is a possible life that some person (a subject) might lead. Harsanyi supposes that a given spectator, formulating her ethical preferences, can rank histories by empathetic projection: putting herself ‘in the shoes’ of various subjects. Harsanyi then suggests that interpersonal comparisons be derived from the utility function representing spectators’ (supposedly common) ranking of history lotteries. Unfortunately, Harsanyi's proposal has various flaws, including some that have hitherto escaped scholarly attention. In particular, it ignores the limits of personal identity. If the subject has welfare-relevant attributes that the spectator cannot acquire without changing who she is, full empathetic identification of the latter with the former becomes impossible. This paper proposes instead to use sympathy as the attitude on a spectator's part that allows us to make sense of her extended preferences. Sympathy – an attitude of care and concern – is a psychological state quite different from empathy. We should also allow for hetereogeneity in spectators’ extended preferences. Interpersonal comparisons emerge from a plurality of sympathetic spectators, not (as per Harsanyi) from a common empathetic ranking.

Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 30 , Issue 2 , July 2014 , pp. 123 - 162
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Abdellaoui, M., Barrios, C. and Wakker, P. P.. 2007. Reconciling introspective utility with revealed preference: experimental arguments based on prospect theory. Journal of Econometrics 138: 356–378.Google Scholar
Adler, M. D. 2012. Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Adler, M. D. Forthcoming. Extended preferences. In Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy, ed. M. D. Adler and M. Fleurbaey. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Arneson, R. J. 1999. Human flourishing versus desire satisfaction. In Human Flourishing, ed. Paul, E. F., Miller, F. D. and Paul, J., 113–142. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Arrow, K. J. 1977. Extended sympathy and the possibility of social choice. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 67: 219–225.Google Scholar
Bernstein, M. 1998. Well-being. American Philosophical Quarterly 35: 39–55.Google Scholar
Brandt, R. B. 1998. A Theory of the Good and the Right. Amherst, MA: Prometheus Books.Google Scholar
Broome, J. 1995. Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Broome, J. 1998. Extended preferences. In Preferences, ed. Fehige, C. and Wessels, U., 271–287. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brown, M. 2003. The elimination of personal identity. Southwest Philosophy Review 19: 239–247.Google Scholar
Casati, R. and Tappolet, C., eds. 1998. European Review of Philosophy, vol. 3: Response-Dependence. Stanford: CSLI Publications.Google Scholar
Darwall, S. L. 1998. Empathy, sympathy, care. Philosophical Studies 89: 261–282.Google Scholar
Darwall, S. L. 2002. Welfare and Rational Care. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Darwall, S. L., Gibbard, A. and Railton, P.. 1992. Toward fin de siècle ethics: some trends. Philosophical Review 101: 115–189.Google Scholar
Donaldson, D. and Weymark, J. A.. 1998. A quasiordering is the intersection of orderings. Journal of Economic Theory 78: 382–387.Google Scholar
Eisenberg, N. 2000. Empathy and sympathy. In Handbook of Emotions, ed. Lewis, M. and Haviland-Jones, J. M., 677–691. 2nd edition. New York, NY: Guilford Press.Google Scholar
Evren, Ö. and Ok, E. A.. 2011. On the multi-utility representation of preference relations. Journal of Mathematical Economics 47: 554–563.Google Scholar
Feit, N. 2008. Belief about the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Fleurbaey, M. Forthcoming. Equivalent income. In Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy, ed. M. D. Adler and M. Fleurbaey. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Fleurbaey, M. and Blanchet, D.. 2013. Beyond GDP: Measuring Welfare and Assessing Sustainability. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Fleurbaey, M. and Mongin, P.. 2012. The utilitarian relevance of the aggregation theorem. Working paper, October 2012.Google Scholar
Fontaine, P. 1997. Identification and economic behavior: sympathy and empathy in historical perspective. Economics and Philosophy 13: 261–280.Google Scholar
Gajdos, T. and Kandil, F.. 2008. The ignorant observer. Social Choice and Welfare 31: 193–232.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gibbard, A. 1986. Interpersonal comparisons: preference, good, and the intrinsic reward of a life. In Foundations of Social Choice Theory, ed. Elster, J. and Hylland, A., 165–193. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Gordon, R. M. 1995. Sympathy, simulation, and the impartial spectator. Ethics 105: 727–742.Google Scholar
Grant, S., A. Kajii, B. Polak and Z. Safra. 2010. Generalized utilitarianism and Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem. Econometrica 78: 1939–1971.Google Scholar
Grant, S., A. Kajii, B. Polak and Z. Safra. 2012a. Equally-distributed equivalent utility, ex post egalitarianism and utilitarianism. Journal of Economic Theory 147: 1545–1571.Google Scholar
Grant, S., A. Kajii, B. Polak and Z. Safra. 2012b. A generalized representation theorem for Harsanyi's (‘impartial’) observer. Social Choice and Welfare 39: 833–846.Google Scholar
Griffin, J. 1986. Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Harsanyi, J. C. 1953. Cardinal utility in welfare economics and in the theory of risk-taking. Journal of Political Economy 61: 434–435.Google Scholar
Harsanyi, J. C. 1955. Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility. Journal of Political Economy 63: 309–321.Google Scholar
Harsanyi, J. C. 1977. Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Harsanyi, J. C. 1982. Morality and the theory of rational behaviour. In Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Sen, A. and Williams, B., 39–62. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Hausman, D. M. and McPherson, M. S.. 2009. Preference satisfaction and welfare economics. Economics and Philosophy 25: 1–25.Google Scholar
Kagan, S. 1992. The limits of well-being. Social Philosophy and Policy 9: 169–189.Google Scholar
Kind, A. 2011. The puzzle of imaginative desire. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89: 421–439.Google Scholar
Köbberling, V. 2006. Strength of preference and cardinal utility. Economic Theory 27: 375–391.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krantz, D. H., Luce, R. D., Suppes, P. and Tversky, A.. 2007. Foundations of Measurement. Vol. 1, Additive and Polynomial Representations. Mineola, NY: Dover.Google Scholar
Kreps, D. M. 1988. Notes on the Theory of Choice. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1979. Attitudes de dicto and de se. Philosophical Review 88: 513–543.Google Scholar
Lowe, E. J. 2002. A Survey of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Mackie, P. 2006. How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Miller, A. 2003. An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Cambridge: Polity Press.Google Scholar
Mongin, P. 2001. The impartial observer theorem of social ethics. Economics and Philosophy 17: 147–179.Google Scholar
Mongin, P. and d’Aspremont, C.. 1998. Utility theory and ethics. In Handbook of Utility Theory, Vol. 1 (Principles), ed. Barberà, S., Hammond, P. J., and Seidl, C., 371–481. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.Google Scholar
Nichols, S. 2008. Imagination and the I. Mind and Language 23: 518–535.Google Scholar
Ninan, D. 2009. Persistence and the first-person perspective. Philosophical Review 118: 425–464.Google Scholar
Nozick, R. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York, NY: Basic Books.Google Scholar
Ooghe, E. and Lauwers, L.. 2005. Non-dictatorial extensive social choice. Economic Theory 25: 721–743.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Overvold, M. C. 1980. Self-interest and the concept of self-sacrifice. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10: 105–118.Google Scholar
Overvold, M. C. 1982. Self-interest and getting what you want. In The Limits of Utilitarianism, ed. Miller, H. B. and Williams, W. H., 186–194. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
Overvold, M. C. 1984. Morality, self-interest, and reasons for being moral. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44: 493–507.Google Scholar
Parfit, D. 1987. Reasons and Persons, reprint with corrections. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Perry, J. 1979. The problem of the essential indexical. Noûs 13: 3–21.Google Scholar
Recanati, F. 2007. Perspectival Thought: A Plea for (Moderate) Relativism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Reynolds, S. L. 1989. Imagining oneself to be another. Noûs 23: 615–633.Google Scholar
Risse, M. 2002. Harsanyi's ‘utilitarian theorem’ and utilitarianism. Noûs 36: 550–577.Google Scholar
Roberts, K. 1997. Objective interpersonal comparisons of utility. Social Choice and Welfare 14: 79–96.Google Scholar
Roca-Royes, S. 2011. Essential properties and individual essences. Philosophy Compass 6: 65–77.Google Scholar
Roemer, J. E. 2008. Harsanyi's impartial observer is not a utilitarian. In Justice, Political Liberalism, and Utilitarianism: Themes from Harsanyi and Rawls, ed. Fleurbaey, M., Salles, M. and Weymark, J. A., 129–135. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Scanlon, T. M. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.Google Scholar
Sen, A. 1970. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. San Francisco, CA: Holden-Day.Google Scholar
Sen, A. 1976. Welfare inequalities and Rawlsian axiomatics. Theory and Decision 7: 243–262.Google Scholar
Sen, A. 1986. Social choice theory. In Handbook of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 3, ed. Arrow, K. J. and Intriligator, M. D., 1073–1181. Amsterdam: North-Holland.Google Scholar
Smith, M. 1994. The Moral Problem. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Smith, M., Lewis, D. and Johnston, M.. 1989. Dispositional theories of value. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary vols.) 63: 89–174.Google Scholar
Sumner, L. W. 1996. Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Suzumura, K. 1996. Interpersonal comparisons of the extended sympathy type and the possibility of social choice. In Social Choice Re-Examined: Proceedings of the IEA Conference held at Schloss Hernstein, Berndorf, Vienna, Austria, vol. 2, ed. Arrow, K. J., Sen, A. and Suzumura, K., 202–229. Houndmills: Macmillan Press.Google Scholar
Velleman, J. D. 1996. Self to self. Philosophical Review 105: 39–76.Google Scholar
Vendler, Z. 1976. A note to the paralogisms. In Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy, ed. Ryle, G., 111–121. Stocksfield: Oriel Press.Google Scholar
Voorhoeve, A. 2014. Book review (M.D. Adler, Well-Being and Fair Distribution). Social Choice and Welfare 42: 245–254.Google Scholar
Walton, K. L. 1990. Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Weymark, J. A. 1991. A reconsideration of the Harsanyi–Sen debate on utilitarianism. In Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being, ed. Elster, J. and Roemer, J. E., 255–320. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Weymark, J. A. 2005. Measurement theory and the foundations of utilitarianism. Social Choice and Welfare 25: 527–555.Google Scholar
Williams, B. 1973. Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956–1972. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar