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INTERPERSONAL COORDINATION AND EPISTEMIC SUPPORT FOR INTENTIONS WITH WE-CONTENT

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 October 2010

Olivier Roy
Olivier Roy*
Affiliation:
University of Groningen
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Abstract

In this paper I study intentions of the form ‘I intend that we . . .’, that is, intentions with a we-content, and their role in interpersonal coordination. I focus on the notion of epistemic support for such intentions. Using tools from epistemic game theory and epistemic logic, I cast doubt on whether such support guarantees the other agents' conditional mediation in the achievement of such intentions, something that appears important if intentions with a we-content are to count as genuine intentions. I then formulate a stronger version of epistemic support, one that does indeed ensure the required mediation, but I then argue that it rests on excessively strong informational conditions. In view of this I provide an alternative set of conditions that are jointly sufficient for coordination in games, and I argue that these conditions constitute a plausible alternative to the proposed notion of epistemic support.

Type
Essay
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 26 , Issue 3 , November 2010 , pp. 345 - 367
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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