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WHEN ALTRUISM LOWERS TOTAL WELFARE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 April 2006

KENNETH S. CORTS
KENNETH S. CORTS
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
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Abstract

Ethical theories grounded in utilitarianism suggest that social welfare is improved when agents seek to maximize others' welfare in addition to their own (i.e., are altruistic). However, I use a simple game-theoretic model to demonstrate two shortcomings of this argument. First, altruistic preferences can generate coordination problems where none exist for selfish agents. Second, when agents care somewhat about others' utility but weight their own more highly, total social welfare may be lower than with selfish agents even in the absence of coordination problems.

Type
Essay
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 22 , Issue 1 , March 2006 , pp. 1 - 18
Copyright
2006 Cambridge University Press

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