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When Economics Met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 April 2015

PATRICE BOUGETTE ,
MARC DESCHAMPS  and
FRÉDÉRIC MARTY
PATRICE BOUGETTE
Affiliation:
Patrice Bougetteis an Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Nice Sophia Antipolis. He is a member of the CNRS Law, Economics, and Management Research Group (GREDEG) and also a LAMETA Research Associate. Contact information: GREDEG CNRS, 250 rue Albert Einstein, 06560 Valbonne, France. Phone: +33 493 954 105, Fax: +33 493 653 798. E-mail: patrice.bougette@gredeg.cnrs.fr.
MARC DESCHAMPS
Affiliation:
Marc Deschampsis a post-doctoral research fellow in economics. He is a University of Lorraine, BETA and GREDEG CNRS Associate. E-mail: marc.deschamps@univ-lorraine.fr.
FRÉDÉRIC MARTY
Affiliation:
Frédéric Martyis a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) at GREDEG and Research Associate at Sciences-Po OFCE. E-mail: frederic.marty@gredeg.cnrs.fr.
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Abstract

In this article, the authors interrogate legal and economic history to analyze the process by which the Chicago School of Antitrust emerged in the 1950s and became dominant in the United States. They show that the extent to which economic objectives and theoretical views shaped the inception of antitrust law. After establishing the minor influence of economics in the promulgation of U.S. competition law, they highlight U.S. economists’ caution toward antitrust until the Second New Deal and analyze the process by which the Chicago School developed a general and coherent framework for competition policy. They rely mainly on the seminal and programmatic work of Director and Levi (1956) and trace how this theoretical paradigm became collective—that is, the “economization” process in U.S. antitrust. Finally, the authors discuss the implications and possible pitfalls of such a conversion to economics-led antitrust enforcement.

Type
Articles
Information
Enterprise & Society , Volume 16 , Issue 2 , June 2015 , pp. 313 - 353
Copyright
Copyright © The Author 2015. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Business History Conference. All rights reserved. 

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References

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Director, Aaron. “Review of Charles E. Lindblom, Unions and Capitalism.” University of Chicago Law Review 18 (1950): 164–167.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Director, Aaron, and Levi, Edward H.. “Law and the Future: Trade Regulation.” Northwestern University Law Review 51 (1956): 281–296.Google Scholar
Drexl, Josef. “On the (a)Political Character of the Economic Approach to Competition Law.” In Competition Policy and the Economic Approach. Foundations and Limitations, edited by Drexl, Josef, Kerber, W., and Podszun, R., 312–336. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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Elhauge, Einer. “Harvard, Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent Supreme Court Decisions.” Competition Policy International 3, no. 2 (2007): 59–77.Google Scholar
Fox, Eleanor M. “The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making: Antitrust as a Window.” New York University Law Review 61 (1986): 554–588.Google Scholar
Friedman, Milton. “The Business Community’s Suicidal Impulse.” Cato Policy Report 21, no. 2 (1999): 6–7.Google Scholar
Ginsburg, Douglas H. “Originalism and Economic Analysis: Two Case Studies of Consistency and Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 33 (2010): 217.Google Scholar
Giocoli, Nicola. “Old Lady Charm: Explaining the Persistent Appeal of Chicago Antitrust.” Working Paper (2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2070666.Google Scholar
Greenspan, Alan. “Antitrust.” In Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, edited by Rand, Ayn, 63–71. New York: Signet, 1967.Google Scholar
Gressley, Gene M. “Thurman Arnold, Antitrust, and the New Deal.” Business History Review 8, no. 2 (1964): 214–231.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hamilton, Walton H. “The Institutional Approach to Economic Theory.” American Economic Review 9, no. 1 (1919): 309–318.Google Scholar
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Holmes, Oliver Wendell, “The Path of Law.” Harvard Law Review 10 (1897): 457.Google Scholar
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Hovenkamp, Herbert J. “A Preface to Neoclassical Legal Thought.” Working Paper (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1873471.Google Scholar
John, R. R. “Robber Barons Redux: Antimonopoly Reconsidered.” Enterprise and Society 13, no. 1 (February 15, 2012): 1–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jullien, Bruno, Rey, Patrick, and Saavedra, Claudia. “The Economics of Margin Squeeze.” CEPR Discussion Papers No 9905 (2014), http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP9905.asp.Google Scholar
Kitch, Edmund W. “The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago, 1932–1970.” Journal of Law and Economics 26, no. 1 (1983): 163–234.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Knight, Frank H. “The Newer Economics and the Control of Economic Activity.” Journal of Political Economy 40, no. 4 (1932): 433–476.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kobayashi, Bruce H., and Muris, Timothy J.. “Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Beyond: Time to Let Go of the 20th Century.” Antitrust Law Journal 78, no. 1 (2013): 147.Google Scholar
Kolasky, William J. “Senator John Sherman and the Origin of Antitrust.” Antitrust 24, no. 1 (2009): 85–89.Google Scholar
Kovacic, William E. “The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix.” Columbia Business Law Review (2007): 1–80.Google Scholar
Kovacic, William E., and Shapiro, Carl D.. “Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, no. 1 (2000): 43–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kovacic, William E., and Winerman, Marc. “Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.” Antitrust Law Journal 76, no. 3 (2010): 929–950.Google Scholar
Lande, Robert H. “Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged.” Hastings Law Journal 34, no. 1 (1982): 65–151.Google Scholar
Lande, Robert H. “Chicago’s False Foundation: Wealth Transfers (Not Just Efficiency) Should Guide Antitrust.” Antitrust Law Journal 58, no. 2 (1989): 631–644.Google Scholar
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