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Game theoretic applications to environmental and natural resource problems

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 2009

USSIF RASHID SUMAILA ,
ARIEL DINAR  and
JOSE ALBIAC
USSIF RASHID SUMAILA
Affiliation:
Associate Professor and Director of the Fisheries Economics Research Unit, Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia, 2202 Main Mall, Vancouver, B.C., CanadaV6T 1Z4. Tel: 1.604.822.0224. Email: r.sumaila@fisheries.ubc.ca
ARIEL DINAR
Affiliation:
Lead Economist at the Development Research Group of the World Bank, Washington, DC
JOSE ALBIAC
Affiliation:
Research Fellow at CITA, Government of Aragon, Zaragoza, Spain
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Abstract

Game theory has been useful as an analytical framework for assessing environmental and resource regulations and policies. The papers in this volume provide the latest methodological and applied works in game theory to a wide range of natural and environmental resource problems such as fishing, grazing, pollution, climate change, water allocation, and stochastic production processes. The findings in the papers suggest that game theory is an effective tool for the analysis of the efficient use of shared natural resources; it can be used to identify stable agreements between parties to a resource conflict, and show how non-cooperation over global public goods/bads has a high social cost tag.

Type
Research Article
Information
Environment and Development Economics , Volume 14 , Issue 1: GAME THEORY, NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT , February 2009 , pp. 1 - 5
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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