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MEDICAL MECHANISMS AND THE RESILIENCE OF PROBABILITIES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 May 2018

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Abstract

This paper argues that there is an important connection between Inference to the Best Explanation and Bayesianism, in the medical context of the interplay between mechanisms and population studies. It is argued that the criteria for evaluating mechanistic evidence can be used in Inference to the Best Explanation and such use thereby increases the resilience of probabilities in a Bayesian framework. This point grows out of the emerging literature on evidence-based medicine and naturally strengthens McCain and Poston's proposal that explanatory information is evidentially relevant.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 16 , Issue 3 , September 2019 , pp. 322 - 339
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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References

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