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MEMBERSHIP AND KNOWLEDGE. SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AS A GROUP ACTIVITY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 June 2014

Silvia Tossut
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Abstract

Much scientific research is characterized by a high degree of multidisciplinarity and interdependence between the experts. In these cases research may be described as a group activity, and as such analysed in terms of the intentions of the participants. In this paper I apply Bratman's notion of shared intentionality to explain the relations between social and epistemic elements in groups with a truth-oriented common goal. I argue that in truth-oriented activities the disposition to help – which is a constitutive part of Bratman's notion of shared intentionality – takes the form of a commitment not to lie, and that mutual knowledge of this commitment gives the members an entitlement to rely on other members' testimonies. Thus, in truth-oriented group activities, common knowledge of the disposition toward mutual support gives epistemic relevance to cooperation. Scientific research is shaped by the coexistence of social and epistemic elements: social relations influence knowledge attributions, and the epistemic goal of the activity confers a particular character to these relations.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 11 , Issue 3 , September 2014 , pp. 349 - 367
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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