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BELIEFS OVER AVOWALS: SETTING UP THE DISCOURSE ON SELF-KNOWLEDGE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 February 2019

Lukas Schwengerer
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Abstract

Wright (1998) and Bar-On (2004) put pressure on the idea that self-knowledge as an explanandum should be identified with privileged belief formation. They argue that setting up the discourse on the level of belief and belief formation rules out promising approaches to explain self-knowledge. Hence, they propose that we should characterize self-knowledge on the level of linguistic practice instead. I argue against them that self-knowledge cannot be fully characterized by features of our linguistic practice. I propose that in some circumstances – disagreements about one's mental states – self-knowledge plays a role, but this role cannot be described in virtue of features of our linguistic practice. I consider three objections to the argument and conclude that we should not conceive self-knowledge solely in terms of linguistic practice.

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Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 18 , Issue 1 , March 2021 , pp. 66 - 81
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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