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EPISTEMOLOGY IN GROUP AGENCY: SIX OBJECTIONS IN SEARCH OF THE TRUTH

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 October 2012

Fabrizio Cariani
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Abstract

List and Pettit's Group Agency is an extremely important book, spearheading a new wave of work on the metaphysics, epistemology and ethics of group agents. In this article, I focus on the epistemological thread in their discussion. After introducing the apparatus they use in analyzing the epistemic performance of groups, I criticize some elements and point to some ways in which the very same apparatus could be redirected to address them.

Type
Symposium on Christian List and Phillip Pettit, Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents
Information
Episteme , Volume 9 , Issue 3 , September 2012 , pp. 255 - 269
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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