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EVIDENCE AND FALLIBILITY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2017

Joshua DiPaolo
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Abstract

The “Evidentialist Dictum” says we must believe what our evidence supports, and the “Fallibility Norm” says we must take our fallibility into account when managing our beliefs. This paper presents a problem for the Evidentialist Dictum based in the Fallibility Norm and a particular conception of evidential support. It then addresses two novel Evidentialist responses to this problem. The first response solves the problem by claiming that fallibility information causes “evidence-loss.” In addition to solving the problem, this response appears to explain what's wrong with certain illegitimate dismissals of misleading evidence. However, this explanation opens it up to objections. Next, I consider and pose challenges to an Evidentialist strategy that attempts to solve the problem by converting accounts of fallibility's epistemic significance for rational belief into principles of evidential support. I conclude by sketching a solution that allows us to capture what's true in the Evidentialist Dictum and the Fallibility Norm.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 16 , Issue 1 , March 2019 , pp. 39 - 55
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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