Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-xbtfd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-13T12:02:40.966Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

A PUZZLE ABOUT EXPERTS, EVIDENTIAL SCREENING-OFF AND CONDITIONALIZATION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 May 2018

Ittay Nissan-Rozen Open the ORCID record for Ittay Nissan-Rozen [Opens in a new window]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

I present a puzzle about the epistemic role beliefs about experts' beliefs play in a rational agent's system of beliefs. It is shown that accepting the claim that an expert's degree of belief in a proposition, A, screens off the evidential support another proposition, B, gives to A in case the expert knows and is certain about whether B is true, leads in some cases to highly unintuitive conclusions. I suggest a solution to the puzzle according to which evidential screening off is rejected, but show that the price of this solution is either giving up on the mere idea of deferring to expert's opinion or giving up on Bayesian conditionalization.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 17 , Issue 1 , March 2020 , pp. 64 - 72
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Elga, A. 2007. ‘Reflection and Disagreement.’ Noûs, 41: 478–502.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hall, N. 2004. ‘Two Mistakes about Credence and Chance.’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82: 93–111.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Joyce, M. J. 2007. ‘Epistemic Deference: The Case of Chance.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 107: 187–206.CrossRefGoogle Scholar