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TWO QUESTIONS, ONE ANSWER: UNAMBIGUOUS RATIONALITY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Andy Mueller
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Abstract

Timothy Williamson recently argued that the notion of epistemic rationality is ambiguous between a Content-oriented schema and a Disposition-oriented schema. I argue that the Disposition-oriented schema suggested by Williamson is not faithful to the main idea behind it and that it should be replaced with the Disposition-Manifestation schema. This replacement suffices for avoiding Williamson's ambiguity thesis.

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Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 18 , Issue 1 , March 2021 , pp. 111 - 121
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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References

REFERENCES

Schroeder, M. 2012. ‘Stakes, Withholding, and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge.’ Philosophical Studies, 160: 265–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, T. 2017. ‘Ambiguous Rationality.’ Episteme, 14: 263–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar