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Wrongful ways to raise the epistemic standard

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 2020

Jumbly Grindrod Open the ORCID record for Jumbly Grindrod [Opens in a new window]
Jumbly Grindrod*
Affiliation:
University of Reading, Reading, UK
*
*Corresponding author. Email: j.grindrod@reading.ac.uk
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Abstract

This paper is concerned with identifying and accounting for cases where the epistemic standard is raised inappropriately. The first section is concerned with identifying a notion of a variable epistemic standard that is neutral regarding a range of theoretical issues. The second section argues that the possibility the epistemic standard could be raised in some epistemic inappropriate way warrants further investigation. The third section outlines and provides a partial explanation of such a case: one in which a climate change denier attempts to raise the epistemic standard in order to shut down inquiry.

Keywords

Epistemic standardepistemic valuecontext-sensitivityepistemic normativity
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 19 , Issue 3 , September 2022 , pp. 455 - 469
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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