Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 June 2016
Is the revocation of citizenship—a policy increasingly adopted by democratic states—a violation of democratic principles? In an article published in the Spring 2016 issue of this journal, I argued that it is. A true commitment to the best understanding of democratic citizenship does not permit the revocation of some citizens’ status by others. David Miller and Ben Herzog are unconvinced. Elizabeth Cohen agrees that revocation is a violation of democratic principle, but argues that my defense of this claim leaves room for it nevertheless. These thoughtful critiques raise two questions to which I would like to respond: (1) What is the nature of citizenship in democratic states? (2) What can legitimately be done by democracies to protect themselves?
1 However, the recently elected Liberal government in Canada tabled legislation in February 2016 to overturn legislation permitting revocation, and France announced in late March 2016 that it would abandon its attempts to adopt such a power. See Tom Parry, “Liberals Move to Overhaul Rules on Revoking, Granting Citizenship,” CBC News, February 26, 2016, www.cbc.ca/news/politics/john-mccallum-citizenship-act-repeal-bill-1.3463471 and Kim Willsher, “Hollande Drops Plan to Revoke Citizenship of Dual-National Terrorists,” Guardian, March 30, 2016, www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/30/francois-hollande-drops-plan-to-revoke-citizenship-of-dual-national-terrorists.
2 Gray, Benjamin, “From Exile of Citizens to Deportation of Non-Citizens: Ancient Greece as a Mirror to Illuminate a Modern Transition,” Citizenship Studies 15, no. 5 (2011), pp. 565–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar, p. 570.