The Challenges of Employee-Appointed Board Members for Corporate Governance: The Danish Evidence

Abstract

This article presents some evidence concerning the nature of co-determination using a sample of Danish employee-appointed board members. Even though Danish employee representatives only occupy one third of the seats and by design are always in a minority, they argue that they have a relatively high degree of influence on the decision-making process. This is especially profound in listed firms, where nearly 30 per cent state that they have much influence on the decision-making process, compared to 7 per cent who argue that they have no influence at all. For reasons that remain unclear, the results also document that male employee representatives claim a higher degree of influence than their female colleagues. It is shown that employee representatives have a dispersed educational background and that their occupations vary greatly in both listed and non-listed firms. The many different legal faces of European co-determination are also described. Finally, the article demonstrates that Danish employee representatives say that they care less about shareholder value compared to the supervisory board as a whole.