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The EC Commission's Modernization of Competition Policy: a Challenge to the Community's Constitutional order

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Mestmäcker Ernst-Joachim
Mestmäcker Ernst-Joachim
Affiliation:
Prof. Dr.jur. Dr.rer.pol. h.c, Director emeritus, Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and Private International Law, Hamburg.
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Extract

The EC Commission's strategy for the modernization of the rules implementing Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty has unfolded in three acts. The focus of the first act, the White Paper of 28 April, 1999, is on Article 81(3). The Commission proposes to abolish the Regulation 17 rules for the implementation of Article 81(3) and its own exclusive power to grant exemptions. In the future, Article 81 is to be interpreted as a directly applicable exception system to be applied by the Commission, national competition authorities, and national courts. A Council regulation will extend the direct applicability so far limited to Article 81(1) to Article 81(3). Consequently, there is no provision for separate exemption decisions and there are no “detailed rules” for the supervision of exempted agreements as called for by Article 83(2b).

Type
Articles
Information
European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR) , Volume 1 , Issue 3 , September 2000 , pp. 401 - 444
Copyright
Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press and the Authors 2000

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References

1 White Paper on Modernization of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, Commission Programme No. 99/027, Brussels 28.4.1999, OJ [1999] C 132 (12.5.1999). Papers and proceedings of the EU Competition Workshop 2000 held in Florence on June 2 and 3, 2000 are in the process of being published. They deal with the White Paper only. It is unfortunate that this international forum had no opportunity to discuss the full Commission proposals and their implications for competition policy. Parts 2 and 3 of this article are amended versions of the author's contribution to the Florence Conference.

2 Communication pursuant to Article 5 of Council Regulation (EEC) 2821/71 of 20 December 1971 on the Application of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty to categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices modified by Regulation (EEC) 2743/72, OJ [2000] C 118/3 (27.4.2000).

3 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Implementation of the Rules of Competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and amending Regulations (EEC) 1017/68, (EEC) 2988/74, (EEC) 4056/86 and (EEC) 3975/87 (“Regulation Implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty”). Article 1 reads: “Agreements, decisions and concerted practices caught by Article 81 (1) of the Treaty which do not satisfy the conditions of Article 81 (3), and the abuse of a dominant position referred to in Article 82, shall be prohibited, no prior decision to that effect being required.”

4 Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079, at p. I-6102, nos. 16 and 21.

5 Case 26/62, [1963] ECR 5,25.

6 Case 127/73 BRT v. SABAM, [1974] ECR 51.

7 European Commission, White Paper on Modernization of the Rules Implementing Arts. 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, Commission Programme No. 99/027, Brussels 28.4.1999.

8 White Paper no. 82; Draft Regulation Article 6.

9 Marenco, , “Does a Legal Exemption System Require an Amendment of the Treaty?” Manuscript EU Competition Workshop (Florence 2000Google Scholar); Schaub, , “Modernisation of EC Competition Law: Reform of Regulation No. 17”, in: 1999 Fordham Corp. L.Inst. (Barry, Hawk ed. 2000) 143, at p. 155.Google Scholar

10 See references in notes 36–39 hereunder.

11 Wils, , “Notification, Clearance and Exemption in EC Competition Law: An Economic Analysis”, 24 ELRev. (1999) 139, 156.Google Scholar

12 Schaub, , “Modernization of EC Competition Law: Reform of Regulation No. 17”, 23 Fordham Int'l. LJ (2000) 752, 764.Google Scholar

13 White Paper no. 90.

14 For an excellent analysis of the early development see Handler, , A study of the Construction and Enforcement of the Federal Antitrust Laws, Temporary National Economic Committee, Monograph no. 38 (Washington D.C.: US GPO 1941) pp. 9–8.Google Scholar

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16 Ibid., pp. 126–138.

17 Ibid., p. 125.

18 For a detailed account see: Mestmäcker, , “Offene Märkte im System unverfälschten Wettbewerbs in der EWG”, in: Coing, / Kronstein, / Mestmäcker, (eds.), Wirtschaftsordnung und Rechtsordnung. Festschrift für Franz Böhm zum 70. Geburtstag am 16. Februar (Karlsruhe: Müller 1965) pp. 345–391, at pp. 349–352.Google Scholar

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20 Report of Governments' Committee, established following the Conference of Messina (May 1955), presented to the Foreign Ministers of the Six in Brussels on 21 April 1956, at pp. 57–61.

21 German Parliament (Bundestag), Stenographic Reports, Plenary Protocol 2nd Election Period, 76th Session.

22 Bork, , Robert, H., The Antitrust Paradox. A Policy at War with Itself, 2nd ed. (New York: Free Press 1993) p. 54Google Scholar

23 National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 US 679, 690 (1978).

24 National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regions of the University of Oklahoma, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2962 (1984). For a comprehensive analysis see Areeda, , Antitrust Law. An analysis of antitrust principles and their application, Vol. VII (Boston: Little, Brown 1986) para. 1502.Google Scholar

25 119 S. Ct. 1604, 1617 (1999); for a comprehensive analysis see Areeda, / Hovenkamp, , Antitrust Law 2000 Supplement, para. 1511.1.Google Scholar

26 White Paper no. 48. For a critical review of the assumptions on which the proposed switch to a system of ex post control is based, namely the assumption that sufficient legal certainty has been gained, see: Forrester, , “Modernization of EC Competition Law”, 23 Fordham Int'l L.J. (2000) 1028, at pp. 1040–1041.Google Scholar

27 White Paper no. 78.

28 Cases 43/82 and 63/82 VBVB and VBBB, [1984] ECR 19, no. 52.

29 Case T-17/93 Martha Hachette, [1994] ECR II-595, at p. II-625, no. 85.

30 Academic Advisory Council of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, Reform of European Antitrust Policy, Document no. 480 (August 2000) p. 3.

31 For different evaluations of such “self-governance” see: Mersing, , “The Modernization of EC Competition Law – The Need For a Common Competition Culture”, in: 1999 Fordham Corp.L.Inst. (Barry, Hawk ed. 2000) 259, at p. 262Google Scholar, and Schaub, , “EC Competition System – Proposals for Reform”, 22 Fordham Int'l L.J. (1999) 853, 874Google Scholar, on the one hand; Möschel, , “Systemwechsel im Europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht”, JZ (2000) 61, 63Google Scholar, on the other hand.

32 Cases 56 and 58/64 Grundig/Consten [1966] ECR 322, at pp. 396–397.

33 An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (General Editors: A.H., Campbell and A.S., Skinner) (Oxford: OUP 1976) p. 456.Google Scholar

34 Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos, [1963] ECR 5, 26.

35 See: Wolf, , “Comment on the White Paper on the Reform of EC Competition Law”, in: 1999 Fordham Corp.L.Inst. (Barry, Hawk ed. 2000) 307, at p. 311Google Scholar; Todino, , “Modernisation from the Perspective of National Competition Authorities: Impact of the Reform on Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law”, ECLR (2000) 348,350–351Google Scholar; Kon, , “The Commission's White Paper on Modernisation: The Need for Procedural Harmonisation”, in: 1999 Fordham Corp.L.Inst. (Barry, Hawk ed. 2000) 233, at pp. 236–252.Google Scholar

36 Möschel, , supra n. 31Google Scholar; Rittner, , “Zurück zum Missbrauchsprinzip im EG-Kartellrecht?”, Der Betrieb (1999) 1485Google Scholar; Mestmäcker, , “Versuch einer kartellpolitischen Wende in der EU”, EuZW (1999) 523–529Google Scholar; Deringer, , “Stellungnahme zum Weissbuch der Europäischen Kommission über die Modernisierung der Vorschriften zur Anwendung der Artt. 85 und 86 EGVertrag [Artt. 81, 82 EG]”, EuZW (2000) 5–11Google Scholar; Paulweber, / Kögel, , “Das europäische Wettbewerbsrecht am Scheideweg. Die Reformvorhaben der Kommission zur Modernisierung des europäischen Kartellverfahrens in der Kritik”, AG (1999) 500–515.Google Scholar

37 Kartellpolitische Wende in der EU? Zum Weissbuch der Kommission v. 28. April 1999: Sondergutachten 28 (Baden-Baden, Nomos 1999).Google Scholar

38 Wolf, supra n. 35, at p. 308; Böge, Das deutsche Kartellrecht in der europäischen Wettbewerbsordnung, FIW-Symposion “Zukunft der Wettbewerbsordnung und des Kartellrechts” 9.-11. March 2000, Innsbruck (not yet published, available on the website of the Bundeskartellamt <www.bundeskartellamt.de/diskussionsbeitraege.html> last updated on Nov. 24,2000).

39 Reform of European Antitrust Policy, Document no. 480 (August 2000).

40 Monti, , “A European Competition Policy for today and tomorrow”, 23(2) Journal of World Competition (2000) 1.Google Scholar

41 Case 48/72 Brasserie de Haecht/Wilkin, [1973] ECR 77, at pp. 86–87, no. 6.

42 In addition to the authors referred to above, see Wesseling, , “The Commission White Paper on Modernization of EC Antitrust Law: Unspoken Consequences and Incomplete Treatment of Alternative Options”, ECLR (1999) 420–433Google Scholar; approving the Commission's proposals without going into the details of Treaty compatibility are Geiger, , “Das Weissbuch der EG-Kommission zu Article 81, 82 EG – eine Reform, besser als ihr Ruf”, EuZW (2000) 165Google Scholar; Deselaers, / Obst, , “Weissbuch zum Europäischen Kartellrecht — Rechtssicherheit adé”? Europäisches Wirtschafis- und Steuerrecht (EWS) (2000) 41–46Google Scholar; Bartosch, , “Von der Freistellung zur Legalausnahme — was geschieht mit der Rechtssicherheit?”, WuW (2000) 462–473Google Scholar; Schaub, / Dohms, , “Das Weissbuch der Europäischen Kommission über die Modernisierung der Vorschriften zur Anwendung der Artt 81 und 82 EG-Vertrag. Die Reform der Verordnung Nr. 17ȝ, WuW (1999) 1055–1070.Google Scholar

43 Deringer, supra n. 36, at pp. 5–6.

44 Emphasized by: Schaub, supra n. 9, at p. 154. For the consequences to be drawn from this finding, see: Möschel, supra n. 31, at p. 62.

45 Schulze, , Reiner, / Hoeren, , Thomas, (eds.), Dokumente zum europäischen Recht Bd. III: Kartellrecht (bis 1957) (Berlin: Springer 2000).Google Scholar

46 To this effect, however: Schaub, , Alexander, , Die Zukunft des europäischen Kartellrechts (Zentrum für europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht Nr. 112) (Bonn : Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Univ., 2000) p. 28.Google Scholar

47 Document no. 70; Document no. 75, Article 43.

48 For a detailed summary of the negotiations see Schulze/ Hoeren, supra n. 45.

49 Document no. I I I, Comment and Analysis by the German Ministry of Economics on the Commission's Proposal for a First Regulation Implementing Article 85 and Article 86 EC Treaty of 31 st May, 1961, presented to the Economic Council of the German Bundestag.

50 Schaub, supra n. 9, at p. 147.

51 White Paper no. 89.

52 Case 48/72, [1973] ECR 77, at pp. 86–87, no. 6.

53 Case 127/73 BRT/SABAM, [1974] ECR 51, 62, nos. 15–17.

54 Case 37/79 Marty/Lauder, [1980] ECR 2481, 2500, no. 13.

55 Schaub, supra n. 9, at p. 155.

56 Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos, [1963] ECR 5, 25.

57 Case 106/77 Simmenthal, [1978] ECR 629, 643–644, nos. 14–16.

58 Cases 43 and 46/82 VBVB and VBBB, [1984] ECR 19, 68, no. 52; Case T-17/93 Martha Hachette, [1994] ECR II-595, II-631, no. 104.

59 Cases 56 and 58/64 Grundig/Consten, [1966] ECR, 322, 396.

60 Case T-29/92 SPO, [1995] ECR II-289, II-382, no. 288, confirmed by: Case C-137/95 P Vereniging van Samenwerkende Prijsregelende Organisaties in de Bouwnijverheid v. EC Commission, [1996] ECR I-1611, I-1624, nos. 39-41. Cases T-39/92 and T-40/92 CB and Europay, [1994] ECR II-49,II-90, no. 109.

61 Schaub/ Dohms, supra n. 42, especially p. 1064; Schaub, supra n. 9, at p. 152.

62 Case C-234/89 Delimitis, [1991] ECR I-935, I-991, no. 44.

63 Braakman, (ed.), Die Anwendung der Article 85 und 86 des EG-Vertrages durch die Gerichte der Mitgliedstaaten (Brussels 1997) p. 125, no. 875.Google Scholar

64 This distinction has been suggested by Schaub, supra n. 12, at p. 765, n. 16; Case T-9/93 Schoeller [1995] ECR II-1611, II-1662–1663 nos. 139–40, quoted in support of this proposition, applies, however, both of these rules simultaneously, proving that they are not at variance and not mutually exclusive.

65 CD., Ehlermann, “The Modernization of EC Antitrust Policy: A Legal and Cultural Revolution”, 37 CMLRev (2000) 537, 559.Google Scholar

66 An example is Section 71, para. 5 clause 2 of the German Act against Restraints of Competition of 26 August, 1998, BGBl. I, p. 2546. Judicial review of cartel authority decisions: “The appraisal by the cartel authority of general economic situations and trends shall not be subject to review by the Court.”

67 See also: Wolf, supra n. 35, at p. 311; Möschel, supra n. 31, at p. 62; Wissmann, , “Decentralised Enforcement of EC Competition Law and the New Policy on Cartels”, 23(2) Journal of World Competition (2000) 123, 138–141.Google Scholar

68 Wesseling, supra n. 42, at p. 424.

69 White Paper no. 100.

70 Jeremy, Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in: J.H., Burns and H.L.A., Hart (Eds.) (Oxford: Clarendon 1970) pp. 165–170.Google Scholar

71 White Paper no. 78.

72 See Kon, supra n. 35, at pp. 243–244 with references regarding the standard of proof for a breach of Articles 81 and 82 in the UK, in Germany and in Spain. According to Kon (p. 247) and Todino, supra n. 35, at p. 351 no. 12, one of the major difficulties for plaintiffs in antitrust disputes in the UK and Italy is to prove the existence of a causal link between the loss suffered and the alleged breach of competition rules. Kon (p. 241) and Todino (p. 351) also point to the differences in national disclosure and discovery rules which may result in Articles 81 and 82 being differently enforced in different jurisdictions.

73 BGHZ 53, 304 308; OLG Stuttgart, October 2, 1992 Gaststättengrundstück ‘Blume’, WuW/E OLG 5073, 5081. For further references see: Braakman (ed.), supra n. 63, at pp. 209–210.

74 See: Kon, supra n. 35, at p. 236, with further discussion on pp. 237–252; Todino, supra n. 35, at p. 350.

75 White Paper no. 91.

76 In a case where a cartel was successful in driving an outsider from the market, the German Reichsgericht, in 1931, found a breach of unfair competition law and awarded damages – Reichsgericht, December 19, 1931, RGZ 134, 342; for details see Mestmäcker, Der verwaltete Wettbewerb (Tübingen: Mohr 1984) 162. This landmark case gave rise to a revision of the traditionally privileged status of cartels under German law.

77 For an overview of the different rules that govern these aspects in different Member States see: Kon, supra n. 35, at pp. 241–246. Also: Braakman, , “The Application of the Modernized Rules Implementing Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty in Injunction Proceedings: Problems and Possible Solutions”, in: 1999 Fordham Corp.L.lnst. 161, 169–170 (Rules on Evidence) and 170–172 (Rules on Damages).Google Scholar

78 See also: Wolf, supra n. 35, at p. 308; Todino, supra n. 35, at p. 350.

79 For details see Jones, , Clifford, A., Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the EU, UK and USA (Oxford: OUP 1999) pp. 79–88Google Scholar; the author, however, is more optimistic concerning a transfer of US experience to the Community.

80 Emphasized by: Kon, supra n. 35, at p. 247.

81 Loeb v. Eastman Kodak, 183 F 704 (3d. Cir. 1910); referred to by Jones, Clifford A., supra n. 79, at p. 160.

82 BGH, May 12, 1998 Depotkosmetik, WuW DE-R 206, 207.

83 For details see Whish, , “The Enforcement of EC Competition Law in the Domestic Courts of Member States”, 15 ECLR (1994) 60, 63.Google Scholar

84 See: Ehlermann, supra n. 65, at p. 548; Mersing, supra n. 31, at p. 268. For a critical evaluation see: Möschel, supra n. 31, at pp. 66–67.

85 OJ [2000] C 118/3 (27.4.2000).

86 See part 1, p. 402

87 It should not be necessary to mention that this conclusion is based upon the nature of the problems to be solved and the structure of the judicial process without any reflection on the individual ability of judges. This position, however, is implied in the Commission's proposal to educate judges in the interpretation of Community competition rules.

88 Jones, Clifford A., supra n. 79, at p. 78.

89 Case 158/80 REWE/Hauptzollamt Kiel, [1981] ECR 1805, 1838, no. 44.

90 Joint Cases C-6/90 C-9/90 Francovich, [1991] ECR I-5357, I-5414, no. 35.

91 See Kon, supra n. 35, at p. 249.

92 Commission comment on Draft Regulation Article 3. Also see Monti, supra n. 40, at p. 2. This thesis was first advanced by Schaub in his paper presented at the Fordham International Antitrust Law & Policy Conference in 1998 – Schaub, supra n. 12, at pp. 853, 877–878. In his paper presented at the Conference one year later, Schaub's comment on the issue was more cautious and merely pointed to an increased “convergence pressure”. See Schaub, supra n. 9, at p. 154. For an account of the problems of “dual control” in antitrust, see: Salord, , “Concurrent Application, the April 1999 White Paper and the Future of National Laws”, ECLR (2000) 128, 131–137.Google Scholar

93 Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm, [1969] ECR 1, 13–15, nos. 4–9.

94 Cases 253/78 and 1–3/79 Giry and Guerlain, [1980] ECR 2327, 2375, no. 18.

95 First case 56/65, Société Technique Minière, [1966] ECR 281,303. The Court uses this formula consistently, see Case 42/84 Remia and others, [1985] ECR 2545, 2572, no. 22. For a comprehensive account of the case law see Bellamy/Child, Common Market Law of Competition, 4th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1993) Article 81, 2–129.Google Scholar

96 Case 8/72 Cementhandelaren v. Commission, [1972] ECR 977, 991, no. 28/30; Case 161/84 Pronuptia de Paris, [1986] ECR 353, no. 26; Case 42/34 Remia v. Commission, [1985] ECR 2545, 2572, no. 22. In Cases C 215/96 and C 216/96 Bagnasco et al., [1999] ECR 1–35, I-79-80 nos. 50-53, the Court found that the uniform banking conditions of the Italian Banking Association in relation to the opening of current account credit facilities were not liable to affect trade between Member States. The special facts of the case do not permit the conclusion that the Court reversed its position on the Trade Clause in general. And the case was not decided by the full Court. Some commentators assume nevertheless that the “interstate trade test” is undergoing a major change. Salord, supra n. 92, at pp. 135-136; Wissmann, supra n. 67, at p. 126; Todino, supra n. 35, at p. 352.

97 Case 322/81 Michelin v. Commission, [1983] ECR 3461, 3522, no. 103.

98 Cases 6 and 7/73 Commercial Solvents Corporation v. Commission, [1974] ECR 223,254, no. 33; see also Case 27/76 United Brands v. Commission, [1978] ECR 207, 299, no. 202. For a combination of the standards of “pattern of trade” and “structure of competition” see Case 22/78 Hugin v. Commission, [1979] ECR 1869, 1899, no. 17. For details see Bellamy/ Child, supra n. 95, Article 81, 2-131.

99 See: Todino, supra n. 35, at p. 353.

100 Todino, ibid., at p. 353; Kon, supra n. 35, at pp. 252-253.

101 See Brown, , “The Open Economy: Mr Justice Frankfurter and the Position of the Judiciary”, 67 Yale Law Journal (1957) 219, 220.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

102 For a comprehensive analysis see Gavil, , “Reconstructing the Jurisdictional Foundation of Antitrust Federalism”, 61 George Washington Law Rev. (1993) 657.Google Scholar

103 Hovenkamp, , “State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme”, 58 Indiana Law Journal (1983) 375, 379.Google Scholar

104 For details see Thorelli, , Hans, B., Federal Antitrust Policy. Origination of an American Tradition (Stockholm 1954) pp. 96–107.Google Scholar

105 46 US 504, 573 Licence Cases.

106 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth, 476 US 573,579 (1986).

107 Exxon Corp. v. Gov. of Maryland, 437 US 117 (1978).

108 Hovenkamp, supra n. 103, at p. 385.

109 Parker v. Brown, 317 US 350 (1943).

110 California v. ARC America Corp., 450 US 93, 101 (1989); also see Hovenkamp, supra n. 103, at p. 389.

111 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 435 US 720 (1977). For a detailed analysis of the case law see Areeda/ Hovenkamp, supra n. 25, para. 216, p. 294.

112 For details see Gavil, supra n. 102, at pp. 661-662; Rose, , “State Antitrust Enforcement, Mergers, and Politics”, 41 Wayne Law Review (1994) 71, 78–81.Google Scholar

113 For an overview see Wegman, Burns, “Embracing Both Faces of Antitrust Federalism: Parker and ARC America Corp.”, 68 Antitrust Law Journal (2000) 29Google Scholar. The standing of states to bring cases against infringements of the federal antitrust laws must of course be distinguished from the enforcement of state antitrust laws dealt with ante 4.3.1.

114 California v. American Stores, 110 S.Ct. 275 (1990); Hawai v. Standard Oil Co., 405 US 251 (1972).

115 Wegman Burns, supra n. 113, at p. 30.

116 Case C234/89 Delimitis, [1991] ECR I-935, I-992, no. 47.

117 Schaub, supra n. 9, at p. 148.

118 See the critical commentary by Rittner, , “Kartellpolitik und Gewaltenteilung in der EG”, EuZW (2000) 129.Google Scholar

119 Commission Regulation (EC) 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, OJ [1999] L 336/21 (29 December 1999).

120 See n. 2.

121 Case C 234/89 Delimitis, [1991] ECR I-935, I-991, no. 44. See also n. 62

122 Case 161/84 Pronuptia, [1986] ECR 353, 383-384, no. 24; Regulation 4087/88 for Certain Bilateral Service Franchise Agreements.

123 See: Siragusa, , “A Critical Review of the White Paper on the Reform of the EC Competition Law Enforcement Rules”, 23 Fordham Int'l L.J. (2000) 1089, 1097–1099Google Scholar; Forrester, , “Modernization of EC Competition Law”, 23 Fordham Int'l L.J. (2000) 1028, 1044–1045.Google Scholar

124 Proposed by: Siragusa, ibid., at p. 1103. Also advocated by Deselaers/ Obst, supra n. 42, at pp. 43-46; Bartosch, supra n. 42, at p. 472.

125 See Schaub, supra n. 9, at p. 159: “(…) it will be vital for the success of our reform, and in particular our ability to concentrate on the serious infringements and to set our own agenda, that the Commission retains full discretion about whether and to what extent to react to individual requests for opinions”. Similar: Ehlermann, supra n. 65, at pp. 568–569.

126 Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89 of 21st December, 1989 on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, OJ [1989] L 395/1. Corrected version published in: OJ [1990] L 257/14. Amendments introduced by Council Regulation (EC) 1310/97 of 30 June 1997, OJ [1997] L 180/1.

127 See: Todino, supra n. 35, at p. 352; Kon, supra n. 35, at p. 252.

128 Comment on Article 11 Draft Regulation. See also: Siragusa, supra n. 123, at p. 1107, strongly advocating such a system in order to ensure the uniform application of EC law.

129 See also: Forrester, supra n. 123, at p. 1053: “(…) the Commission seems to be preparing for the worst by giving itself specific powers to reclaim cases from national handling”.

130 In this respect similarly: Schütz, , “Zur Änderung des Kartellverfahrens gemäss Artikel 81 EGV”, WuW (2000) 686, 693.Google Scholar

131 Proposed by the German Federal Government and the German Federal Cartel Authority in: Tätigkeitsbericht des Bundeskartellamts (1997/98) BT-Drs. 14/1139,25 June 1999, p. V and VII; for similar proposals see Möschel, supra n. 31, at p. 67; Mestmäcker, supra n. 36, at p. 529.