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The Italian Constitutional Court and Balancing the Budget

Judgment of 9 February 2015, no. 10 Judgment of 10 March 2015, no. 70

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 April 2016

Chiara Bergonzini
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Abstract

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Keywords

balanced budgetCorte Costituzionale
Type
Case Notes
Information
European Constitutional Law Review , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , May 2016 , pp. 177 - 191
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2016 

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Footnotes

*

Post-Doc Research Fellow in Constitutional Law, Ferrara University.

References

1 Constitutional court, ‘Le sentenze della Corte costituzionale e l’art. 81 u.c. della Costituzione’ [The Judgments of the Constitutional Court and art. 81, last paragraph, of the Constitution]. Proceedings of the seminar held in Rome, Palazzo della Consulta, on 8 and 9 November 1991 (Giuffrè 1993).

2 Onida, V., ‘Giudizio di costituzionalità delle leggi e responsabilità finanziaria del Parlamento’ [Opinion on the Constitutionality of Laws and the Financial Responsibilities of Parliament], in Constitutional court, supra n. 1, p. 30Google Scholar.

3 See Bin, R. and Pitruzzella, G., Diritto costituzionale [Constitutional Law] (Giappichelli 2015) p. 459-516Google Scholar. We must also point out that in this particular matter, another kind of judgment is highly relevant: I mean controversies over competencies between territorial and functional bodies of the State (principaliter proceedings), involving, for example, expenditure for health care services and the coordination of public finance. However, this kind of judgment is different from those at issue, because it primarily concerns the division of powers between the central state and the territorial autonomies, as provided for by Arts. 117 and 119 of the Constitution: see again Bin and Pitruzzella, p. 293-301 and p. 425-440.

4 The English translation of the Italian Constitution is available at <www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf>, visited 19 February 2016.

5 The Fiscal Compact and the Two Pack did not introduce a legal obligation to amend the Constitution, but recommended the introduction of a balanced budget rule ‘preferably at the constitutional level’. On this point see Tosato, G. L., La riforma costituzionale del 2012 alla luce della normativa dell’Unione: l’interazione fra i livelli europeo e interno [The constitutional reform of 2012 in light of EU legislation: the interaction between European and domestic levels], report presented at the seminar held in Rome, Palazzo della Consulta, on 22 November 2013, available at <www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/convegni_seminari/Seminario2013_Tosato.pdf>>Google Scholar, visited 19 February 2016.

6 Fitoussi, J-P., Il teorema del lampione [The Streetlamp Theorem] (ed. it. Einaudi 2013)Google Scholar.

7 Although the Court has never expressly taken a stand on this point, it is necessary to clarify that, despite the fact that constitutional law no. 1/2012 was adopted some years after the approval of law decrees (2008-2011), it was nevertheless still in force at the time of the judgments of the Court. In 2015 the ‘balanced budget clause’ (Art. 81, new version) was hence a constitutional parameter and the Court was constrained to deal with it, as it is a standard for review. This kind of situation is not so unusual in the Italian system of constitutional justice, where access to the Court is prevalently indirect: the leading case is judgment no. 1/1956, where the Court scrutinised the validity of laws which entered into force prior to the Italian Constitution of 1948 (see Bin and Pitruzzella, supra n. 3, p. 476-477).

8 This assessment is almost unanimously shared by legal scholars and economists. On the procedure for approval of the reform, reference may be made to Bergonzini, C., Parlamento e decisioni di bilancio [Parliament and Budget Decisions] (Franco Angeli 2014) p. 161-193Google Scholar.

9 Cf. Lieto, S. and Pasquino, P., ‘Metamorfosi della giustizia costituzionale in Italia’ [Metamorphosis of Constitutional Justice in Italy], 2 Quaderni costituzionali (2015) p. 351Google Scholar at p. 368-376.

10 The full text of the judgment is available at <www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionPronuncia.do>, visited 19 February 2016. English translation at www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download/doc/recent_judgments/S10_2015_en.pdf, visited 19 February 2016.

11 See, for example, the papers by Anzon, A., Antonini, L., Pin, A. and Longo, E. at <www.forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/?p=6585>>Google Scholar, visited 19 February 2016.

12 The opinion is shared by a large majority of legal scholars: see the numerous contributions published at <www.giurcost.org/decisioni/2015/0010s-15.html>, visited 19 February 2016 and <www.forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/?p=6585>, visited 19 February 2016, and particularly R. Romboli, ‘L’“obbligo” per il giudice di applicare nel processo a quo la norma dichiarata incostituzionale ab origine: natura incidentale del giudizio costituzionale e tutela dei diritti’, 6 April 2015 at <www.forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/nota_10_2015_romboli.pdf>, visited 19 February 2016.

13 Morelli, A., ‘Principio di totalità e «illegittimità della motivazione»: il seguito giurisprudenziale della sentenza della Corte costituzionale sulla Robin Tax [Principle of Totality and ‘illegitimacy of the reasons’: developments in case-law following the judgment of the Constitutional Court on the Robin Tax] (with regard to the Provincial Tax Commission of Reggio Emilia, 12 May 2015, n. 217/3/15)’, 28 May 2015 at <www.giurcost.org/studi/morelli3bis.pdf>>Google Scholar.

14 See supra.

15 For the contents of the letter (sent as confidential but disclosed after the news was leaked to the newspaper Corriere della Sera), 29 September 2011, see <www.corriere.it/economia/11_settembre_29/trichet_draghi_inglese_304a5f1e-ea59-11e0-ae06-4da866778017.shtml>, visited 19 February 2016. See also L. Phillips, ‘Hurling democracy into the volcano to appease the market gods’, 16 August 2011 at <www.euobserver.com/opinion/113326>, visited 19 February 2016.

16 The full text of the judgment is available at <www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionPronuncia.do>, visited 19 February 2016. English translation at <www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download/doc/recent_judgments/S70_2015_en.pdf1>, visited 19 February 2016.

17 It is worth highlighting that Judgment no. 316/2010 (on a problem similar to the one being considered, but which in that case had ‘saved’ the law) was expressly cited by the Court as a ‘warning’ (‘unheeded’: point 10, Conclusions), and it was further noted that ‘this Court has set out a consistent framework for the legislator with the aim of preventing the adoption of non-uniform and unreasonable measures’ (point 8, Conclusions).

18 The variety of criticisms and stances clearly emerges from the contributions to the main online publications, in particular: Forum dei Quaderni costituzionali, Section on ‘Giurisprudenza’, <www.forumcostituzionale.it/wordpress/?p=6585>, visited 19 February 2016; Federalismi.it, ‘Interventi al seminario a porte chiuse sulla sentenza n. 70 del 2015’ [Presentations at the closed seminar on Judgment no. 70 of 2015], <www.federalismi.it/nv14/articolo-documento.cfm?Artid=29519&content=%3Cdiv+align=%27center%27%3EInterventi+al+Seminario+a+porte+chiuse+sulla+sentenza+n.+70/2015+organizzato+da+%3Ci%3Efederalismi%3C/i%3E%3C/div%3E&content_author>, visited 19 February 2016; Rivista AIC, Notes section, www.rivistaaic.it/note.html, visited 19 February 2016.

19 See the scathing report presented by Enrico Morando, Deputy Minister of Economy and Finance, at the seminar of Rivista federalismi.it, cited supra, n. 18.

20 A. Cazzullo, ‘La difesa dei giudici della Corte’ [Defence of the Judges of the Court], Corriere della Sera, 21 May 2015, p. 1, 10.

21 Cf. hearing of the Parliamentary Budget Office (regarding which, see infra, par. succ.) on the report presented by the Government to the Parliament, at <en.upbilancio.it/hearing-on-the-governments-report-to-parliament/>, visited 19 February 2016.

22 Cf. Senate Budget Service ‘Notes on interpretation S.A. 1993’, at <www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/17/dossier/929732/index.html#>, visited 19 February 2016.

23 Bogo, F. and Fubini, F., ‘Padoan: la Consulta doveva valutare i costi della sentenza sulle pensioni’ [Padoan: the Court should have assessed the costs of the judgment on pensions]Google Scholar, la Repubblica, 22 May 2015, p. 2-3.

24 The two examined judgements seem to accentuate the ‘sometime ambiguous stance’ of the Italian Constitutional Court already highlighted by Tega, D., ‘Welfare Rights in Italy’, in C. Kilpatrick and B. De Witte (eds.), Social Rights in Times of Crisis in the Eurozone: The Role of Fundamental Rights’ Challenges, EUI Working Paper Law 2014/2015, p. 57Google Scholar at <cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/31247/LAW%20WP%202014%2005%20Social%20Rights%20final%202242014.pdf?sequence=1>, visited 19 February 2016.

25 As I complete this paper (July 2015), a new judgment, no. 178/2015, has just been published; it relates to the block on collective bargaining in the public sector, introduced with law decree no. 78/2010 and subsequently extended. The decision arrived in a heated political climate, with rumours circulating in the press about the potential costs (as much as €35 billion), dispelled by the Court with a judgment of unconstitutionality which would produce effects as of the date of publication. Unlike in judgment no. 10, however, the limitation of the effects derives from arguments of a substantive nature, rather than a stretching of procedural rules. There is another fundamental difference from the previous judgments: in this case the Court has declared the block on collective bargaining to be unconstitutional, without imposing automatic mechanisms in regard to any arrears. Thus the only consequence that is certain at present is that the Government will not be able to extend the block and will have to allow negotiations with trade unions to resume in 2015: only when the result of bargaining is known will it be possible to estimate the costs of the entire operation.

26 See n. 19, n. 20 and n. 23 supra.

27 The introduction of an independent fiscal council was provided for in Council Directive 2011/85/EU (Six Pack), in relation to national budgetary frameworks. For an overview of international literature, see European Central Bank, ‘Monthly Bulletin February 2013’, p. 73 <www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/mobu/mb201302en.pdf>, visisted 19 February 2016.

28 The website is <en.upbilancio.it>, visited 19 February 2016.

29 See n. 20 supra.

30 See n. 27 supra.

31 Such obligation was included in the Italian Constitution since its enactment in 1948. In the original text, it was provided under section 4 of Art. 81: ‘Any law involving new or increased expenditure shall indicate for the resources to cover such expenditure’. Now, after the constitutional reform of 2012, the obligation is provided under section 3 of the same article and the original wording ‘shall indicate’ has been replaced by the (more rigorous) ‘shall provide’.

32 Senate Act no. 1952, 18th legislature, first signatory Linda Lanzillotta (PD), <www.senato.it/leg/17/BGT/Schede/Ddliter/45737.htm>, visited 19 February 2016. On this point see Favaretto, C., ‘Le conseguenze finanziarie delle decisioni della Corte costituzionale e l’opinione dissenziente nell’A.S. n. 1952: una reazione alla sentenza n. 70 del 2015?’ [The financial consequences of the Constitutional Court decisions and the dissenting opinion in S.A. no 1952: a reaction to the judgement no. 70/2015?], 2 Osservatorio sulle fonti (2015)Google Scholar at <www.osservatoriosullefonti.it, visited 19 February 2016>.

33 Anzon, A.et al., L’opinione dissenziente [The Dissenting Opinion] (Giuffrè 1995)Google Scholar; Panizza, S., L’introduzione dell’opinione dissenziente nel sistema di giustizia costituzionale [Introduction of the Dissenting Opinion in the Constitutional Justice System] (Giappichelli 1998)Google Scholar; Cassese, S., ‘Una lezione sulla cosiddetta opinione dissenziente’ [A Lesson on the So-called Dissenting Opinion], 4 Quaderni costituzionali (2009) p. 973Google Scholar; D. Tega interview with Silvestri, G., ‘La Corte costituzionale vista da vicino’ [A Close-up View of The Constitutional Court], 3 Quaderni costituzionali (2014) p. 757Google Scholar.