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New governance and the displacement of Social Europe: the case of the European Semester

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 March 2018

Mark Dawson
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Abstract

Has the European Semester led to a displacement of Social Europe, or to the development of social policy through fiscal processes and actors? – Potential for Semester to increase soft law’s binding effects or ‘socialise’ EU policy-making – Positive effects severely limited by the Semester’s overall goals: fiscal stabilisation and the creation of increasingly uniform economic policies – Dilemma for Social Europe: how can an autonomous EU social policy be (re) established without risking marginalisation?

Type
The Displacement of Social Europe – Special Section
Information
European Constitutional Law Review , Volume 14 , Issue 1 , March 2018 , pp. 191 - 209
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2018 

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Footnotes

*

Hertie School of Governance, Berlin.

References

1 Rhodes, M., ‘Lisbon: Europe’s Maastricht for Welfare?’, 13(3) ECSA Review (2000) p. 2 Google Scholar.

2 Note that the intention of this article is to discuss the topic of displacement vis-à-vis those states participating in the European Semester - economic policy coordination via the Semester currently involves all Member States bar Greece (for Greece, and other programme countries during their respective periods of financial assistance, economic policy coordination has been conducted directly via the Troika institutions).

3 Zeitlin, J. and Vanhercke, B., ‘Economic Governance in Europe 2020: Socialising the European Semester against the Odds?’, in D. Natali and B. Vanhercke (eds.), Social Policy in the European Union: State of Play 2015 (ETUI and OSE 2015)Google Scholar.

4 See Trubek, D. and Mosher, J., ‘New Governance, Employment Policy and the European Social Model’, in D. Trubek and J. Zeitlin (eds.), Governing Work and Welfare in a New Economy (Oxford University Press 2004)Google Scholar; Dawson, M., ‘The Ambiguity of Social Europe in the Open Method of Coordination’, 34(1) European Law Review (2009) p. 55 Google Scholar.

5 Zeitlin, J., ‘Social Europe and Experimentalist Governance: Towards a New Constitutional Compromise?’, in G. de Búrca (ed.), EU Law and the Welfare State: in Search of Solidarity (Oxford University Press 2005)Google Scholar; de Búrca, G., ‘The Constitutional Challenge of New Governance in the European Union’, 28(6) European Law Review (2003) p. 814 Google Scholar.

6 Scharpf, F., ‘The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity’, 40(4) Journal of Common Market Studies (2002) p. 645 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Barnard, C., ‘EU Social Policy: From Employment Law to Labour Market Reform’, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press 2011) p. 641 Google Scholar.

7 Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 23-24 March 2000. Available at <www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm>, visited 27 December 2017.

8 See Ferrara, M., The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection (Oxford University Press 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 See e.g. the restatement of the idea of the ‘social market economy’ in the Commission’s most recent communication on social rights: ‘Action at EU level reflects the Union’s founding principles and builds on the conviction that economic development should result in greater social progress and cohesion and that, while ensuring appropriate safety nets in line with European values, social policy should also be conceived as a productive factor, which reduces inequality, maximises job creation and allows Europe’s human capital to thrive.’ Commission Communication, ‘Launching a Consultation on a European Pillar of Social Rights’, COM (2016) 127.

10 On the evolution of this process, see Barcevicius, E. et al., ‘Tracing the Social OMC from its Origins to Europe 2020’, in Assessing the Open Method of Coordination: Institutional Design and National Influence of EU Social Policy (Palgrave MacMillan 2014)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 Commission Communication, ‘Realising the European Union's Potential: Consolidating and Extending the Lisbon Strategy’, COM (2001) 79.

12 Both of these processes carried a much firmer legal basis (in what are now Arts. 121(1)-(2) and 153(2) TFEU respectively), establishing a further initial inequality between social and other forms of policy coordination.

13 See The Kok Report, ‘Facing the Challenge: The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Employment’ (Office for Official Publications of the EU 2004)Google Scholar.

14 Commission Communication, ‘Working Together, Working Better: A New Framework for the Open Coordination of Social Protection and Social Inclusion Policies in the EU’, COM (2005) 706. ‘Feeding in and feeding out’ refers to the idea of two processes (in this case the social inclusion Open Method of Coordination and integrated guidelines respectively) that would mutually take into account the priorities and goals of the other.

15 See Dawson, M., ‘Learning from Past Failures? New Governance in the European Union from Lisbon 2000 to Lisbon 2020’, 17(2) Maastricht Journal of European & Comparative Law (2010) p. 107 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16 Commission Communication, ‘Lisbon 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth’, COM (2010) 2020 final, at 5.

17 On the failures of ‘feeding in and feeding out’, see Zeitlin, J., ‘Strengthening the Social Dimension of the Lisbon Strategy’, La Follette Working Papers 22 (2007); M. Dawson, New Governance and the Transformation of European Law (Cambridge University Press 2011) p. 215 Google Scholar.

18 Daly, M. and Copeland, D., ‘Poverty and Social Policy in Europe 2020: Ungovernable and Ungoverned’, 42 Policy and Politics (2014) p. 351 Google Scholar.

19 See The explanations provided in the Commission Press Release, ‘The European Semester: A New Architecture for the New EU Economic Governance’, 12 January 2011, MEMO/11/14.

20 ‘Vagueness’ remains an issue concerning country specific recommendations. To give one of many examples, see the Commission Recommendation for a country specific recommendation to be issued to the Czech Republic in the 2017 round to ‘ensure the long-term sustainability of public finances, in view of the ageing population’: see European Commission, Council Recommendation on the 2017 National Reform Programme of the Czech Republic, COM (2017) 503 final, at 1.

21 On these ‘effectiveness’ critiques, see e.g. Eckhardt, M., ‘The Open Method of Coordination on Pensions: an Economic Analysis of its Effects on Pension Reforms’, 15 Journal of European Social Policy (2005) p. 247; Lodge, M., ‘Comparing Non-Hierarchical Governance in Action: The Open Method of Coordination in Pensions and Information Society’, 45(2) Journal of Common Market Studies (2007) p. 343 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Buchs, M., New Governance in European Social Policy: The Open Method of Coordination (Palgrave MacMillan 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22 There is some evidence this phenomenon has carried over to the Semester process. See references in n. 59 below.

23 See Bekker, S., ‘The EU’s Stricter Economic Governance: A step towards a more binding coordination of social policies?’, WZB Discussion Paper 501 (2013)Google Scholar.

24 See European Commission, Council Recommendation on the 2017 National Reform Programme of Austria, COM (2017) 519 final; Council Recommendation on the 2017 National Reform Programme of Bulgaria, COM (2017) 502 final.

25 See Annex 1, para. 2 of Regulation (EU) 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and Council.

26 European Commission, ‘Establishing a European Pillar of Social Rights’, COM (2017) 250, at 10.

27 See, as an example of this, albeit one unlikely to have positive social effects, the integration of recommendations to Spain and Portugal to correct excessive deficits in the 2016 CSR Communication with country specific recommendations regarding the sustainability of spending in the health and pensions sectors (‘reducing the reliance of the pension system on budgetary transfers’). See Commission Communication, ‘2016 European Semester: Country Specific Recommendations’, COM (2016) 321 at 12. Council Recommendation of 12 July 2016 on the 2016 National Reform Programme of Portugal and delivering a Council opinion on the 2016 Stability Programme of Portugal (2016/C 299/26) at 1.

28 The idea of a ‘shadow of hierarchy’ refers not to direct changes in actor behaviour in anticipation of penalty but to the altered political and negotiating context that the possibility of penalty implies. See Héritier, A. and Rhodes, M. (eds.), New Modes of Governance in Europe: Governing in the Shadow of Hierarchy (Palgrave MacMillan 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schelkle, W., ‘EU Fiscal Governance: Hard Law in the Shadow of Soft Law?’, 13 Columbia Journal of European Law (2007) p. 705 Google Scholar.

29 European Commission, ‘Making the Best Use of Flexibility Within the Existing Rules of the Stability and Growth Pact’, COM (2015) 12.

30 Ibid., at 3.1.

31 Ibid., at 3.2. ‘At the point of examining whether an Excessive Deficit Procedure needs to be opened for a given Member State, the Commission analyses carefully all relevant medium-term developments regarding the economic, budgetary and debt positions. These “relevant factors” include the implementation of structural reforms in the context of the European Semester’.

32 See Zeitlin and Vanhercke, supra n. 3.

33 Ibid., p. 69-70.

34 Ibid., at p. 83.

35 European Commission, ‘Social Scoreboard’, SWD (2017) 200 final.

36 Zeitlin and Vanhercke, supra n. 3, p. 67. NB: this statement was, of course, prior to the 2017 reforms.

37 European Commission, ‘Strengthening the Social Dimension of Economic and Monetary Union’, COM (2013) 0690.

38 Copeland, P. and Daly, M., ‘Social Europe: From Add-on to Dependence upon Economic Integration’, in A. Crespy and G. Menz, Social Policy and the Euro Crisis (Palgrave MacMillan 2015) p. 154 Google Scholar.

39 See <ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Europe_2020_indicators_-_poverty_and_social_exclusion>, visited 27 December 2017.

40 O’Brien, C., ‘Civis Capitalist Sum: Class as the New Guiding Principle of EU Free Movement Rights’, 53(4) Common Market Law Review (2016) p. 937 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

41 On the Roma-related country specific recommendations, see Commission Communication, ‘Report on the Implementation of the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies’, COM (2015) 299 final, at 3.

42 According to Eurostat, ‘the at-risk-of-poverty rate before social transfers measures a hypothetical situation where social transfers are absent (pensions not being considered as a social transfer). Comparing this with the standard at-risk-of-poverty rate (after social transfers) shows that such transfers have an important redistributive effect that helps reducing the number of people who are at-risk-of-poverty’ supra n. 39.

43 Commission Communication, ‘Annual Growth Survey 2016: Strengthening the Recovery and Fostering Convergence’, COM (2015) 690, at 12.

44 Bekker, S., ‘European Socio-Economic Governance in Action: Coordinating Social Policies in the Third European Semester’, OSE Paper Series 19 (2015) p. 14 Google Scholar.

45 2016 CSR Communication, supra n. 27, 9-10.

46 See the competence restrictions, for example, of Art. 168(5) TFEU.

47 Baeten, R. and Vanhercke, B., ‘Inside the Black Box: The EU’s Economic Surveillance of National Healthcare Systems’, 15(3) Comparative European Politics (2017) p. 478 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

48 Ibid., at 8. This number has slightly receded in the recent Semester rounds, in which 9 (2016) and 12 (2017) health-related CSRs were issued. See <ec.europa.eu/info/files/2017-european-semester-policy-areas-covered-csrs_en>, visited 27 December 2017.

49 European Commission, ‘Identifying Fiscal Sustainability Challenges in the Areas of Pensions, Healthcare and Long-term Care Policies’, European Economy Occasional Papers 201 (2014)Google Scholar.

50 Employment Committee and Social Protection Committee, ‘Assessment of the 2016 CSRs and the Implementation of the 2015 CSRs’, 9 June 2016, 9684/16, at 11.

51 Bekker, supra n. 44, p. 12.

52 Azzopardi-Muscat, N. et al., ‘EU Country-Specific Recommendations for Health Systems in the European Semester Process: Trends, Discourse and Predictors’, 19(3) Health Policy (2015) p. 375 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

53 Ibid., p. 379.

54 Ibid., p. 380.

55 Supra n. 50, at 3.

56 See Bekker 2013, supra n. 44, p. 15-16; Dawson, M., ‘The Legal and Political Accountability Structure of “Post-Crisis” EU Economic Governance’, 53(5) Journal of Common Market Studies (2015) p. 976 at p. 985CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

57 Supra n. 50, at 4.

58 Ibid., at 6.

59 See European Parliament, ‘Country-Specific Recommendations for 2015 and 2016: A Comparison and Overview of Implementation’. Available at <www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/497766/IPOL_STU(2016)497766_EN.pdf>, visited 27 December 2017. See also M. Hallerberg et al., ‘An Assessment of the European Semester’, European Parliament Directorate General for Internal Policies Study (2012). Available at <www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/econ/dv/studybruegel_/studybruegel_en.pdf>, visited 27 December 2017.

60 Bekker, supra n. 44, p. 9.

61 See ‘Speaking Points by Vice-President Olli Rehn’, 2 June 2014, available at <europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-419_en.htm>, visited 27 December 2017.

62 Employment Committee and Social Protection Committee, ‘Assessment of the 2017 Country-Specific Recommendations and the Implementation of the 2016 CSRs’, 7 June 2017, 9653/17, at p. 9.

63 ‘The package presents a more balanced and welcome perspective on health policy reforms than in previous years.’ Ibid., p. 9.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid., p. 2.

66 On the history of this concept, see A. Somek, ‘Antidiscrimination and Decommodification’, (2005) University of Iowa College of Law Research Paper Series.

67 On this effect in the OMC SPSI, see Dawson, supra n. 17, p. 192-195.

68 On the limits of social partner involvement in the Semester, see Sabato, S. and Vanhercke, B., ‘Listened to but not Heard? Social Partners’ Multilevel Involvement in the European Semester’, OSE Paper Series 35 (2017)Google Scholar.

69 I am grateful for a conversation with Jonathan Zeitlin on this point.

70 Supra n. 26.

71 See Schiek, D., ‘Towards More Resilience for a Social EU – The Constitutionally Conditioned Internal Market’, 13(4) EuConst p. 611 Google Scholar.

72 See the article by Sacha Garben in this issue.

73 See supra n. 26, p. 9.

74 On the wider prevalence of policy coordination as a central mechanism of EU policy ‘after’ the Euro crisis, see Armstrong, K., ‘The Open Method of Coordination: Obstinate or Obsolete?’, University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Papers 45 (2016)Google Scholar; Dawson, M., ‘New Governance in the EU After the Euro Crisis: Retired or Reborn?’, in M. Cremona and C. Kilpatrick (eds.), EU Legal Acts: Challenges and Transformations (Oxford University Press forthcoming 2018)Google Scholar.