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Protection of the Rule of Law and ‘Competence Creep’ via the Budget: The Court of Justice on the Legality of the Conditionality Regulation

ECJ Judgments of 16 February 2022, Cases C-156/21, Hungary v Parliament and Council and C-157/21, Poland v Parliament and Council

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 June 2022

Marco Fisicaro Open the ORCID record for Marco Fisicaro [Opens in a new window]
Marco Fisicaro*
Affiliation:
Research Fellow, University of Rome Unitelma Sapienza, Italy, email: marco.fisicaro@unitelmasapienza.it.
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European Constitutional Law Review , Volume 18 , Issue 2 , June 2022 , pp. 334 - 356
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© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of European Constitutional Law Review

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Footnotes

The author wishes to thank the Editors, as well as Professors Enzo Cannizzaro, Roberto Cisotta and Nicola Napoletano for their constructive and helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. The contribution is part of the research project ‘ExTemPoRe: Exceptionally Bad Times. Memory, Policy and Regulation of Transnational Crisis’ (2020-2022), financed by the University of Catania, Law Department.

References

1 ECJ 16 February 2022, Case C-156/21, Hungary v Parliament and Council; ECJ 16 February 2022, Case C-157/21, Poland v Parliament and Council.

2 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget. On which see T. Tridimas, ‘Editorial Note: Recovery Plan and Rule of Law Conditionality: A New Era Beckons?’, 16 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy (2020) p. VII; J. Łacny, ‘The Rule of Law Conditionality Under Regulation No 2092/2020 – Is it all About the Money?’, 13 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law (2021) p. 79; N. Kirst, ‘Rule of Law Conditionality: The Long-Awaited Step Towards a Solution of the Rule of Law Crisis in the European Union?, 6 European Papers (2021) p. 101; B. Nascimbene, ‘Il rispetto della rule of law e lo strumento finanziario. La “condizionalità”’, 8 Eurojus (2021) p. 172.

3 On the notion of ‘rule of law backsliding’, see L. Pech and K.L. Scheppele, ‘Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU’, 19 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2017) p. 3.

4 European Council, Conclusions of 10-11 December 2020, EUCO 22/20. On which see, among others, A. Alemanno and M. Chamon, ‘To Save the Rule of Law You Must Apparently Break It’, Verfassungsblog, 11 December 2020, ⟨https://verfassungsblog.de/to-save-the-rule-of-law-you-must-apparently-break-it/⟩ visited 30 May 2022; K.L. Scheppele et al., ‘Compromising the Rule of Law While Compromising on the Rule of Law’, Verfassungsblog, 13 December 2020, ⟨https://verfassungsblog.de/compromising-the-rule-of-law-while-compromising-on-the-rule-of-law/⟩ visited 30 May 2022; E. Cannizzaro, ‘Editorial: Neither Representation nor Values? Or, “Europe’s Moment” – Part II’, 5 European Papers (2020) p. 1101; A. Hinarejos, ‘Editorial: Budget and Recovery Funds Rule of Law and an Unfortunate Standoff’, 45 European Law Review (2020) p. 775; ‘Editorial Comments: Compromising (on) the General Conditionality Mechanism and the Rule of Law’, 58 CMLRev (2021) p. 267.

5 European Council, supra n. 4, point 2(c).

6 Commission Communication C(2022) 1382 final of 2 March 2022, Guidelines on the application of the Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget.

7 The start of the procedure against Hungary was announced by Commissioner Johannes Hahn on his Twitter profile on 27 April 2022, ⟨https://twitter.com/JHahnEU/status/1519260302201737218⟩ visited 30 May 2022.

8 J. Morijn, ‘A Closing of Ranks’, Verfassungsblog, 14 October 2021, ⟨https://verfassungsblog.de/a-closing-of-ranks/⟩ visited 30 May 2022.

9 Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden.

10 It is sufficient to remember that the Parliament sued the Commission before the Court for failure to act under the conditionality regulation: see pending case C-657/21, Parliament v. Commission.

11 European Parliament resolution P9_TA(2022)0074 of 10 March 2022 on the rule of law and the consequences of the ECJ ruling.

12 See, in particular, ECtHR 7 May 2021, No. 4907/18, Xero Flor w Polsce sp. z o.o. v. Poland. On the reforms affecting the independence of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, see T.T. Koncewicz, ‘The Capture of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and Beyond: Of Institution(s), Fidelities and the Rule of Law in Flux’, 43 Review of Central and East European Law (2018) p. 116; W. Sadurski, ‘Polish Constitutional Tribunal Under PiS: From an Activist Court, to a Paralysed Tribunal, to a Governmental Enabler’, 11 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law (2019) p. 63.

13 Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Case K 1/22, pending.

14 On which see P. Leino-Sandberg, The Politics of Legal Expertise in EU Policy-Making (Cambridge University Press 2021).

15 The expression ‘spending conditionality’ was first used by V. Viţă, ‘Revisiting the Dominant Discourse on Conditionality in the EU: The Case of EU Spending Conditionality’, 19 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2017) p. 116.

16 See, albeit with different positions, M.J. Rangel de Mesquita, ‘European Union Values, Rule of Law and the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027: The Commission’s Proposal to Protect the EU Budget against Threats to the Rule of Law’, 19 ERA Forum (2018) p. 287; I. Goldner Lang, ‘The Rule of Law, the Force of Law and the Power of Money in the EU’, 15 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy (2019), p. 1; M. Fisicaro, ‘Rule of Law Conditionality in EU Funds: The Value of Money in the Crisis of European Values’, 4 European Papers (2019) p. 695; A. Circolo, ‘È la rule of law a proteggere il bilancio dell’Unione o viceversa? La nuova proposta di regolamento “sulle carenze generalizzate riguardanti lo Stato di diritto”’, 24 Il Diritto dell’Unione europea (2019) p. 295; A. von Bogdandy and J. Łacny, ‘Suspension of EU Funds for Breaches of the Rule of Law – a Dose of Tough Love Needed?’, SIEPS 2020:7epa.

17 For recent contributions, see S. Marinai, ‘Considerazioni in merito all’introduzione, “a Trattati invariati”, di nuovi meccanismi per il rispetto della rule of law’, 15 Studi sull’integrazione europea (2020) p. 69; A. von Bogdandy, ‘Principles of a Systemic Deficiencies Doctrine: How to Protect Checks and Balances in the Member States’, 57 CMLRev (2020) p. 705.

18 R.L. Watts, The Spending Power in Federal Systems: A Comparative Study (Queen’s University 1999) p. 47.

19 S. Weatherill, ‘Competence Creep and Competence Control’, 23 Yearbook of European Law (2004) p. 1.

20 S. Garben, ‘Competence Creep Revisited’, 57 Journal of Common Market Studies (2019) p. 205.

21 The main manifestation of this is the key, albeit controversial, role played by the Heads of state or government, sitting in the European Council, in the design of the Multiannual Financial Framework and of the essential elements of EU spending policies: see R. Crowe, ‘The European Council and the Multiannual Financial Framework’, 18 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2016) p. 69.

22 R. Crowe, ‘An EU Budget of States and Citizens’, 26 European Law Journal (2020) p. 331.

23 On the use of the budget as a bargaining tool, see in particular M.A. Pollack, ‘Creeping Competence: The Expanding Agenda of the European Community’, 14 Journal of Public Policy (1994) p. 95. On the dual nature of the Multiannual Financial Framework, and of the EU budget in general, see S. Lehner, ‘The Dual Nature of the EU Multiannual Financial Framework’, in B. Laffan and A. De Feo (eds.), EU Financing for Next Decade: Beyond the MFF 2021-2027 and the Next Generation EU (European University Institute 2020) p. 41.

24 See, for instance, the so-called ‘safeguard clauses’ included in the acts of accession since the 2004 enlargement round: M. Cremona, ‘EU Enlargement: Solidarity and Conditionality’, 30 European Law Review (2005) p. 3.

25 Council Regulation (EC) 1164/94 of 16 May 1994 establishing a Cohesion Fund, Art. 6.

26 See the Protocol on economic and social cohesion attached to the Maastricht Treaty (OJ C 191/93 of 29 July 1992).

27 U. von der Leyen, State of the Union Address, 15 September 2021, SPEECH/21/4701.

28 See T. Nguyen, ‘How Much Money is a Lot of Money?’, Verfassungsblog, 17 September 2021, ⟨https://verfassungsblog.de/how-much-money-is-a-lot-of-money/⟩.

29 See inter alia M. Ioannidis, ‘EU Financial Assistance Conditionality after “Two Pack”’, 74 ZaöRV (2014) p. 61; A. Baraggia, ‘Conditionality Measures within the Euro Area Crisis: A Challenge to the Democratic Principle?’, 4 Cambridge International Law Journal (2015) p. 268; A. Viterbo, ‘Legal and Accountability Issues Arising from the ECB’s Conditionality’, 1 European Papers (2016) p. 501; A. Poulou, ‘Financial Assistance Conditionality and Human Rights Protection: What is the Role of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights?’, 54 CMLRev (2017) p. 991; C. Pinelli, ‘Conditionality and Economic Constitutionalism in the Eurozone’, 11 Italian Journal of Public Law (2019) p. 22.

30 On the expansion of spending conditionality, see Viţă, supra n. 15.

31 Commission Communication COM(2010) 250 of 12 May 2010, ‘Reinforcing economic policy coordination’, p. 5.

32 R. Bieber and F. Maiani, ‘Enhancing Centralized Enforcement of EU Law: Pandora’s Toolbox?’, 51 CMLRev (2014) p. 1057.

33 For instance, this happened with the use of human rights clauses in development cooperation agreements and with pre-accession conditionality in the 2004-2007 enlargement rounds, on which see, respectively, E. Cannizzaro, ‘The Scope of EU Foreign Power: Is the EC Competent to Conclude Agreements with Third States Including Human Rights Clauses?’, in E. Cannizzaro (ed.), The European Union as an Actor in International Relations (Kluwer 2002) p. 297; and D. Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality: Pre-Accession Conditionality in the Fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law (Kluwer 2008) p. 80-82.

34 A. Poulou, ‘Austerity and European Social Rights: How Can Courts Protect Europe’s Lost Generation?’, 15 German Law Journal (2014) p. 1145; S. Garben, ‘The Constitutional (Im)balance between “the Market” and “the Social” in the European Union’, 13 EuConst (2017) p. 23.

35 Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on the protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States, COM(2018) 324, 2 May 2018.

36 G. Halmai, ‘The Possibility and Desirability of Rule of Law Conditionality’, 11 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law (2019) p. 171.

37 A chart showing EU spending and revenue per country is available at ⟨https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/eu-budget/long-term-eu-budget/2014-2020/spending-and-revenue_en⟩ visited 30 May 2022.

38 See the references supra n. 16.

39 Goldner Lang, supra n. 16; Fisicaro, supra n. 16.

40 Council Legal Service, Opinion on ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States – Compatibility with the EU Treaties’, doc. 13593/18, 25 October 2018.

41 For instance, according to Art. 4(3) of the proposal (supra n. 35), the measures taken should be proportionate to the ‘nature, gravity and scope of the generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law’, instead of being based on their budgetary implications. Also, as for Art. 6(2), the measures could be lifted only ‘once the generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law […] cease[d] to exist in full or in part’, being insufficient to show that the deficiencies ceased to affect the sound financial management of the EU budget or the financial interests of the Union.

42 Council Legal Service, supra n. 40. The opinion was criticised by K.L. Scheppele et al., ‘Never Missing an Opportunity to Miss an Opportunity: The Council Legal Service Opinion on the Commission’s EU Budget-related Rule of Law Mechanism’, Verfassungsblog, 12 November 2018, ⟨https://verfassungsblog.de/never-missing-an-opportunity-to-miss-an-opportunity-the-council-legal-service-opinion-on-the-commissions-eu-budget-related-rule-of-law-mechanism/⟩ visited 30 May 2022.

43 See the Council Presidency’s compromise presented on 29 September 2020 (‘Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-2027 and Recovery Package – Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget’, doc. 11045/1/20 REV1).

44 This emerged clearly with the Draft Conclusions of President Charles Michel of 14 February 2020 (doc. 5846/20, paras. 22-25) and was later confirmed in the Conclusions of December 2020, supra n. 4, paras. 2(a) and (e).

45 For an accurate account of the evolution of the mechanism throughout the legislative process, see A. Baraggia and M. Bonelli, ‘Linking Money to Values: The New Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation and Its Constitutional Challenges’, 23 German Law Journal (2022) p. 131, at p. 133-141.

46 Regulation 2020/2092, supra n. 2, Art. 4(1).

47 See, especially, Arts. 4(2), 5(3) and 7.

48 See Cannizzaro, supra n. 4.

49 Baraggia and Bonelli, supra n. 45, p. 146-150.

50 AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona, Opinions of 2 December 2021 on Hungary v Parliament and Council, Case C-156/21, and Poland v Parliament and Council, Case C-157/21.

51 See Hungary’s first and second pleas, and Poland’s first, second, fifth, sixth and eleventh pleas.

52 Hungary, supra n. 1, paras. 98-105; Poland, supra n. 1, paras. 112-119.

53 See also ECJ 3 December 2019, Case C-482/17, Czech Republic v Parliament and Council, para. 31.

54 Hungary, supra n. 1, para. 119. Similarly in Poland, supra n. 1, para. 137.

55 AG Opinion on Hungary, supra n. 50, paras. 164-166.

56 See, in particular, Hungary, supra n. 1, paras. 111-114; Poland, supra n. 1, paras. 125-128.

57 Hungary, supra n. 1, para. 113; Poland, supra n. 1, para. 127.

58 As noticed by Viţă, supra n. 15, p. 122, the key difference between spending conditionality and any other condition attached to spending (e.g. administrative burdens) is that ‘the conduct prescribed by a conditionality must pursue a policy objective which goes beyond the primary purpose of spending’.

59 See inter alia Czech Republic v Parliament and Council, supra n. 53, para. 31: ‘If examination of the measure concerned reveals that it pursues a twofold purpose or that it has a twofold component and if one of those is identifiable as the main or predominant purpose or component, whereas the other is merely incidental, that measure must be founded on a single legal basis, namely that required by the main or predominant purpose or component’.

60 ECJ 20 April 2021, Case C-896/19, Repubblika v Il-Prim Ministru. On which see M. Leloup et al., ‘Opening the Door to Solving the “Copenhagen Dilemma"”? All Eyes on Repubblika v Il-Prim Ministru’, 46 European Law Review (2021) p. 692.

61 Hungary, supra n. 1, paras. 124-126; Poland, supra n. 1, paras. 142-144 (emphasis added).

62 See also Hungary, supra n. 1, para. 231; Poland, supra n. 1, paras. 169, 201, 282 and 284.

63 On the concept of ‘mutual membership’, see ‘Editorial Comments: Hungary’s New Constitutional Order and “European Unity”’, 49 CMLRev (2012) p. 871. More recently, F. Casolari, ‘Lo Stato di diritto preso sul serio’, in P. Manzini and M. Vellano (eds.), Unione europea 2020 (Kluwer-CEDAM 2021) p. 285.

64 Hungary, supra n. 1, para. 127; Poland, supra n. 1, para. 144

65 V. Reding, ‘Safeguarding the Rule of Law and Solving the “Copenhagen Dilemma”: Towards a New EU-Mechanism’, 22 April 2013, SPEECH/13/348.

66 For first comments, see P. Faraguna and T. Drinóczi, ‘Constitutional Identity in and on EU Terms’, Verfassungsblog, 21 February 2022, ⟨https://verfassungsblog.de/constitutional-identity-in-and-on-eu-terms/⟩ visited 30 May 2022; P. Pohjankoski, ‘The Unveiling of EU’s Constitutional Identity’, EU Law Live, Weekend Edition No. 91 of 26 February 2022, ⟨https://eulawlive.com/weekend-edition/weekend-edition-no91/⟩; M. Bonelli, ‘Has the Court of Justice embraced the language of constitutional identity?’, Diritti Comparati, 26 April 2022, ⟨https://www.diritticomparati.it/has-the-court-of-justice-embraced-the-language-of-constitutional-identity/⟩ visited 30 May 2022.

67 Hungary, supra n. 1, para. 128; Poland, supra n. 1, para. 145 (emphasis added).

68 Poland, supra n. 1, para. 268 (emphasis added).

69 As previously suggested in literature by Cannizzaro, supra n. 4, p. 1102–1104.

70 Hungary, supra n. 1, para. 128; Poland, supra n. 1, para. 145.

71 AG Opinion in Hungary, supra n. 50, para. 110.

72 ECJ 15 July 2021, Case C-848/19 P, Germany v Poland, para. 38. On which see P. Mengozzi, ‘Le regole comuni per il mercato interno del gas naturale ed il principio di solidarietà energetica’, 26 Il Diritto dell’Unione europea (2021) p. 285.

73 Hungary, supra n. 1, para. 129; Poland, supra n. 1, para. 147.

74 On which see, most recently, J. Bachtler and C. Mendez, ‘Cohesion and the EU’s Budget: Is Conditionality Undermining Solidarity?’, in R. Coman et al. (eds.), Governance and Politics in the Post-Crisis European Union (Cambridge University Press 2020) p. 121.

75 ECJ 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, particularly at paras. 135-137. Contrary to AG Kokott, the Court does not explicitly rely on solidarity, but in the end accepts a restrictive interpretation of Art. 125 TFEU so as to allow the EU to grant financial assistance subject to conditionality. On the point, see R. Cisotta, ‘Disciplina fiscale, stabilità finanziaria e solidarietà nell’Unione europea ai tempi della crisi: alcuni spunti ricostruttivi’, 20 Il Diritto dell’Unione europea (2015) p. 57 at p. 82-86.

76 M. Ioannidis, ‘Europe’s New Transformations: How the EU Economic Constitution Changed during the Eurozone Crisis’, 53 CMLRev (2016) p. 1237.

77 H. Schepel, ‘The Bank, the Bond, and the Bail-out: On the Legal Construction of Market Discipline in the Eurozone’, 44 Journal of Law and Society (2017) p. 79.

78 Spending conditionality clauses are indeed linked with a wide array of EU policy domains – from state aid rules and antitrust to fundamental rights and social inclusion – and not only with the EU fiscal rules.

79 See M. Ioannidis, ‘Between Responsibility and Solidarity: COVID-19 and the Future of the European Economic Order’, 80 ZaöRV (2020) p. 773.

80 Hungary, supra n. 1, paras. 134-153; Poland, supra n. 1, paras. 152-182.

81 See, in particular, Hungary, supra n. 1, paras. 140-145.

82 Poland, supra n. 1, para. 221 (emphasis added). See also para. 163 and Hungary, supra n. 1, para. 145.

83 D. Kochenov, ‘Busting the Myths Nuclear: A Commentary on Article 7 TEU’, EUI Working Paper Law 2017/10.

84 ‘Editorial Comments: Safeguarding EU Values in the Member States – Is Something Finally Happening?’, 52(3) CMLRev (2015) p. 619 at p. 626-627. See also AG Tanchev, Opinion of 11 April 2019 in Case C-619/18, Commission v Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême), paras. 48-51.

85 On which see L. Pech, ‘The Rule of Law’, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca, The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press 2021) p. 307.

86 For a recent overview, see L. Pech and D. Kochenov, ‘Respect for the Rule of Law in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice: A Casebook Overview of Key Judgments since the Portuguese Judges Case’, SIEPS 2021:3.

87 European Council, supra n. 4, point 1 (emphasis added).

88 Among them, it is worth reminding that the Commission’s adoption of the ‘Rule of Law Framework’ was criticised by the Council Legal Service in a controversial opinion of 27 May 2014 (‘Commission’s Communication on a new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law’, doc. 10296/14). For a sensible critique of the opinion, see D. Kochenov and L. Pech, ‘Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU: Rhetoric and Reality’, 11 EuConst (2015) p. 512; R. Baratta, ‘Rule of Law “Dialogues” Within the EU: A Legal Assessment’, 8 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law (2016) p. 357.

89 Hungary, supra n. 1, para. 159; Poland, supra n. 1, para. 195.

90 Hungary, supra n. 1, para. 167; Poland, supra n. 1, para. 206.

91 Hungary, supra n. 1, para. 168; Poland, supra n. 1, para. 207.

92 The leading case is ECJ 7 February 1979, Cases 15/76 and 16/76, France v Commission, which concerned the Commission’s clearance of accounts under the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund. The approach was later extended to the financial corrections procedure in the management of structural funds: see ECJ 11 July 1996, Case C-325/94 P, An Taisce and WWF UK v Commission; ECJ 11 January 2001, Case C-247/98, Greece v Commission.

93 France v Commission, supra n. 92, para. 26.

94 Greece v Commission, supra n. 92, para. 14.

95 See Hungary, supra n. 1, paras. 169-179 and Poland, supra n. 1, paras. 208-218, where the Court draws a clear line between the two procedures, analysing the respective purpose and scope, the conditions for initiating the procedures and for adopting and lifting measures, as well as the nature of the measures that may be adopted.

96 This is the case for the vast majority of spending conditionality clauses, which are typically laid down in the Common Provisions Regulation on European Structural and Investment Funds or in the funds-specific regulations.

97 On the risks of using conditionality as a sanctioning tool, see V. Viţă, ‘The Reinforced Conditionality Approach of the 2021-27 MFF’, in B. Laffan and A. De Feo (eds.), EU Financing for Next Decade: Beyond the MFF 2021-2027 and the Next Generation EU (European University Institute 2020) p. 101; see also Baraggia and Bonelli, supra n. 45, p. 152-154.

98 Hungary, supra n. 1, paras. 147, 176, 244, 267; Poland, supra n. 1, paras. 165, 179, 215, 288, 299.

99 See also Commission, supra n. 6, para. 33.

100 Hungary, supra n. 1, para. 262; Poland, supra n. 1, para. 299.

101 Hungary, supra n. 1, paras. 278 and 283-287; Poland, supra n. 1, paras. 285-287 and 339-343.

102 On the limits of the Court of Justice’s scrutiny, see J. Alberti, ‘Adelante, presto, con juicio. Prime considerazioni sulle sentenze della Corte di giustizia che sanciscono la legittimità del “Regolamento condizionalità”’, 9 Eurojus (2022) p. 25 at p. 35-36.

103 For comparative analyses between the use of conditionality in the EU and in federal systems, particularly in the United States, see V. Viţă, ‘The Rise of Spending Conditionality in the EU: What Can EU Learn from the U.S. Conditional Spending Doctrine and Policies?’, EUI WP LAW 2017/16; A. Baraggia, ‘Potestas v. Potentia: l’utilizzo della condizionalità in ordinamenti compositi’, 50 DPCE Online (2022) p. 1333.

104 See Watts, supra n. 18, p. 49-50.

105 For instance, the US Supreme Court has spelled out a set of limitations to the use of the spending power by the Congress, most importantly in South Dakota v Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), and NFIB v Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). See, among others, A.J. Rosenthal, ‘Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution’, 39 Stanford Law Review (1987) p. 1103; D.E. Engdahl, ‘The Spending Power’, 44 Duke Law Journal (1994) p. 1; T. Sky, To Provide for the General Welfare: A History of the Federal Spending Power (University of Delaware Press 2008); most recently, see the comments on the case NFIB v Sebelius in 37 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy (2014) p. 71-99; and D.S. Cohen, ‘A Gun to Whose Head? Federalism, Localism and the Spending Clause’, 123 Dickinson Law Review (2019) p. 421.