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Beyond tit-for-tat in cyberspace: Political warfare and lateral sources of escalation online

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2020

Christopher Whyte Open the ORCID record for Christopher Whyte [Opens in a new window]
Christopher Whyte*
Affiliation:
Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, Virginia
*
*Corresponding author. Email: cewhyte@vcu.edu
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Abstract

At present, most scholarship on the potential for escalation in cyberspace couches analysis in terms of the technological dynamics of the domain for relative power maneuvering. The result has been a conceptualisation of the logic of operation in cyberspace as one of ‘tit-for-tat’ exchanges motivated by attribution problems and limited opportunity for strategic gain. This article argues that this dominant perspective overlooks alternative notions of how cyber tools are used to influence. This, in turn, has largely led scholars to ignore second-order effects – meaning follow-on effects triggered by a more direct outcome of an initial cyber action – on domestic conditions, institutions, and individual stakeholders. This article uses the case of cyber-enabled political warfare targeting the United States in 2016 to show how escalation can occur as a second-order effect of cyber operations. Specifically, the episode led to a re-evaluation of foreign cyber strategy on the part of American defence thinkers that motivated an offensive shift in doctrine by 2018. The episode also directly affected both the political positions taken by important domestic actors and the attitude of parts of the electorate towards interference, both of which have reinforced the commitment of military planners towards assertive cyber actions.

Keywords

EscalationCyberPolitical Warfare
Type
Research Article
Information
European Journal of International Security , Volume 5 , Issue 2 , June 2020 , pp. 195 - 214
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 2020

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References

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7 This term is often used interchangeably within discussions of cyber conflict alongside others such as active measures, hybrid warfare, irregular warfare, and information warfare. For work on hybrid or political warfare as it intersects with cyber operations in the recent Russian context, see, among others, Monaghan, Andrew, ‘The “war” in Russia's “hybrid warfare”’, Parameters, 45:4 (2016), pp. 65–74Google Scholar; Lanoszka, Alexander, ‘Russian hybrid warfare and extended deterrence in eastern Europe’, International Affairs, 92:1 (2016), pp. 175–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Renz, Bettina, ‘Russia and “hybrid warfare”’, Contemporary Politics, 22:3 (2016), pp. 283–300CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Christopher S. Chivvis, ‘Understanding Russian hybrid warfare’, Rand Corporation (2017); and Jensen, Benjamin, ‘The cyber character of political warfare’, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 24 (2017), p. 159Google Scholar.

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9 Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness, Cyber Strategy, p. 117.

10 Ibid., p. 49.

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12 Perhaps the best discussion of this is found in Schelling, Thomas C., ‘Arms and influence’, in Strategic Studies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 96–114Google Scholar and in Kahn, Herman, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017)Google Scholar.

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14 Libicki, Crisis and Escalation in Cyberspace, p. 75.

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19 Such as the literatures on the marketplace of ideas (Snyder, Jack and Ballentine, Karen, ‘Nationalism and the marketplace of ideas’, International Security, 21:2 (1996), pp. 5–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kaufmann, Chaim, ‘Threat inflation and the failure of the marketplace of ideas: The selling of the Iraq War’, International Security, 29:1 (2004), pp. 5–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Thrall, Trevor A., ‘A bear in the woods? Threat framing and the marketplace of values’, Security Studies, 16:3 (2007), pp. 452–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar) and the democratic peace (Owen, John M., ‘How liberalism produces democratic peace’, International Security, 19:2 (1994), pp. 87–125CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Layne, Christopher, ‘Kant or cant: The myth of the democratic peace’, International Security, 19:2 (1994), pp. 5–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kinsella, David and Russett, Bruce, ‘Conflict emergence and escalation in interactive international dyads’, The Journal of Politics, 64:4 (2002), pp. 1045–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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28 Henry Farrell and Bruce Schneier, ‘Common-Knowledge Attacks on Democracy’, Berkman Klein Center Research Publication 2018–7 (2018); Breitenbauch, Henrik and Byrjalsen, Niels, ‘Subversion, statecraft and liberal democracy’, Survival, 61:4 (2019), pp. 31–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Zilincik, Samuel, Myklin, Michael, and Kovanda, Petr, ‘Cyber power and control: A perspective from strategic theory’, Journal of Cyber Policy, 4:2 (2019), pp. 290–301CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29 See Pierce, Joseph and Williams, Olivia R., ‘Against power? Distinguishing between acquisitive resistance and subversion’, Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography, 98:3 (2016), pp. 171–88Google Scholar. Subversion is a concept that has received some significant focus in the past two years by scholars seeking to better understand how both state and non-state actors have employed cyber instruments in their efforts to spread or gain influence. Subversion differs from coercion insofar as it is a strategy that does not aim to degrade power in direct relational power terms, but rather by the challenging and derailing of authority. Subversion involves disruption of process and the normative degradation of symbols of the status quo so as to disempower a foe and create opportunities for more conventional forms of contestation. For more work on subversion, see Kahin, Audrey and Kahin, George McTurnan, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997)Google Scholar; Beilenson, Laurence W., Power through Subversion (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1972)Google Scholar; Rosenau, William, Subversion and Insurgency, Vol. II (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007)Google Scholar; Christopher Whyte, ‘Out of the Shadows: Subversion and Counterculture in the Digital Age’ (PhD dissertation, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, 2017); Breitenbauch and Byrjalsen, ‘Subversion, statecraft and liberal democracy’; and Zilincik, Myklin, and Kovanda, ‘Cyber power and control’.

30 This is a common assertion of policy theory on democratic process, particularly focused on the marketplace of ideas. See, among others, Kaufmann, ‘Threat inflation and the failure of the marketplace of ideas’ and Thrall, ‘A bear in the woods?’. For a recent assessment of democratic vulnerability to ‘hacking’ that makes the same overarching assertion, see Farrell and Schneier, ‘Common-knowledge attacks on democracy’.

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35 It is important to recognise here that political warfare is a term often used interchangeably and with some degree of conceptual confusion along with terms like active measures, hybrid warfare, irregular warfare, and information warfare. Political warfare is seminally described as efforts that ‘range from such covert actions as political alliances, economic measures, and white propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support to friendly foreign elements, black psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states'; see Policy Planning Staff Memorandum, available at: {https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d269}. For George Kennan, political warfare simply represented states’ attempts to politick in conflictual fashion outside times of declared hostilities. Given the maintaining peace in such times is paramount, this means using all available mechanisms of approach beyond (though sometimes involving) military ones and avoiding actions that might be seen as provocative. For work on political warfare prosecuted by the Russian Federation, as is the main focus of this section, see, among others, Monaghan, ‘The “war” in Russia's “hybrid warfare”’; Lanoszka, ‘Russian hybrid warfare and extended deterrence in eastern Europe’; Renz, ‘Russia and “hybrid warfare”’; and Chivvis, ‘Understanding Russian hybrid warfare’.

36 For one of the most up to date summaries of the episode to date, see Scott Shane and Mark Mazetti, ‘The plot to subvert an election: Unraveling the Russia story so far’, New York Times (2018).

37 Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness, Cyber Strategy; M. Mazzetti and K. Benner, ‘12 Russian agents indicted in Mueller investigation’, The New York Times (13 July 2018), available at: {https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/13/us/politics/mueller-indictment-russian-intelligence-hacking.html}.

38 Thomas Rid, ‘Disinformation: A primer in Russian active measures and influence campaigns’, Hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, 30 (2017).

39 Eric Lipton, David E. Sanger, and Scott Shane, ‘The perfect weapon: How Russian cyberpower invaded the US’, The New York Times (2016).

40 David E. Sanger and Rick Corasaniti, ‘DNC says Russian hackers penetrated its files, including dossier on Donald Trump’, The New York Times (2016).

41 Johan Farkas and Marco Bastos, ‘IRA Propaganda on Twitter: Stoking Antagonism and Tweeting Local News’, Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Social Media and Society (2018), pp. 281–5; Brandon C. Boatwright, Darren L. Linvill, and Patrick L. Warren, ‘Troll Factories: The Internet Research Agency and State-Sponsored Agenda Building’, Resource Centre on Media Freedom in Europe (2018).

42 Farkas and Bastos, ‘IRA Propaganda on Twitter’; Farwell, James P., ‘Countering Russian meddling in US political processes’, Parameters, 48:1 (2018), pp. 37–47Google Scholar. Also see Whyte, Christopher, ‘Of commissars, cults and conspiratorial communities: The role of countercultural spaces in “democracy hacking” campaigns’, First Monday, 25:4 (2020)Google Scholar.

43 Raphael Satter, Jeff Donn, and Chad Day, ‘Inside story: How Russians hacked the Democrats’ emails’, APNews. com (2017).

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46 Sarah Posner, ‘What Facebook can tell us about Russian sabotage of our election’ (2017), available at: {https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2017/09/27/what-facebook-can-tell-us-about-russian-sabotage-of-our-election/}.

47 Valeriano, Benjamin M. Jensen, and Ryan C. Maness, Cyber Strategy.

48 Karoun Demirjian, ‘Republican lawmakers move to restrain President-Elect Trump on Russia’, The Washington Post (16 November 2016).

49 Katina, Michael, ‘Bots trending now: Disinformation and calculated manipulation of the masses’, IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, 36:2 (2017), pp. 6–11Google Scholar; Keller, Tobias R. and Klinger, Ulrike, ‘Social bots in election campaigns: Theoretical, empirical, and methodological implications’, Political Communication, 36:1 (2019), pp. 171–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

50 Satter, Donn, and Day, ‘Inside story’.

51 Heikkilä, Niko, ‘Online antagonism of the alt-right in the 2016 election’, European Journal of American Studies, 12:12–2 (2017)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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53 See, for instance Sanger and Corasaniti, ‘DNC Says Russian Hackers Penetrated Its Files’, with the description of the Obama administration's paralysis given uncertain circumstances determined by both unprecedented assault and the context of domestic political processes unfolding.

54 Ibid.

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56 Chart inspired by that found in Mallory, King, New Challenges in Cross-Domain Deterrence (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2018)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

57 Nina Kollars and Jacquelyn Schneider, ‘Defending forward: The 2018 cyber strategy is here’, War on the Rocks (20 September 2018), available at: {https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/defending-forward-the-2018-cyber-strategy-is-here/}; Jeff Kosseff, ‘The Contours of “Defend Forward” under International Law’, 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon) (IEEE, 2019), pp. 1–13.