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When civilian control is civil: Parliamentary oversight of the military in Belgium and New Zealand

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 September 2018

Philippe Lagassé  and
Stephen M. Saideman
Philippe Lagassé*
Affiliation:
Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University
Stephen M. Saideman
Affiliation:
Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University
*
*Corresponding author. Email: philippe.lagasse@carleton.ca
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Abstract

This study introduces a new type of oversight in civil-military and executive-legislative relations: community policing. Building on principal-agent theory, this type of oversight emphasises trust rather than confrontation. To illustrate how community policing functions, the study examines how legislative oversight of military affairs operates in Belgium and New Zealand. Legislative defence committees in both countries rely on trust when overseeing the executive’s handling of defence affairs. This allows these committees to perform their oversight function at low cost in terms of time and effort, but with a high degree of access to information. Community policing therefore combines the strengths of recognised ‘police patrol’ and ‘fire alarm’ oversight, while avoiding their respective weaknesses. However, since it relies on a higher degree of trust and cooperation between the principal and agent, community policing is inherently fragile.

Keywords

MilitaryLegislatureOversightCivil-Military RelationsBelgiumNew Zealand
Type
Research Article
Information
European Journal of International Security , Volume 4 , Issue 1 , February 2019 , pp. 20 - 40
Copyright
© British International Studies Association 2018 

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References

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19 Lagassé and Saideman, ‘Public critics or secretive monitors’.

20 We return to the scope of this approach in the conclusion.

21 Interview with Mouvement Réformateur political advisor, 17 November 2016.

22 Interview with Sébastian Pirlot, Parti Socialiste, 16 November 2016; interview with defence policy advisors, Office of the Belgian Defence Minister, 16 November 2016.

23 Interview with defence policy advisors, Office of the Belgian Defence Minister.

24 On Belgium as a ‘partitocracy’, see De Winter, Liven, ‘Parliament and government in Belgium: Prisoners of patitocracy’, in Philip Norton (ed.), Parliaments in Contemporary Western Europe (London: Frank Crass, 1998)Google Scholar and Dewachter, Wilfred, De Mythe van Parlementaire Democratie (Leuven: Acco, 2003)Google Scholar.

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26 Belgium does not have a civilian defence department.

27 Interview with Lieutenant General Philippe Grosdent, Belgian Military Representative to NATO, 15 November 2016.

28 The prime minister and deputy prime ministers, however, ultimately decide the most sensitive matters among themselves. Interview with Mouvement Réformateur political advisor.

29 Interview with Luc Peetermans, Committee secretariat, Chambre des représantants, 17 November 2016; interview with Major General Rudy Debaene, Director General Material Resources, 18 November 2016.

30 The choice to staff official positions in the office with civilians or military officers belongs with the minister and has varied. Interview with Grosdent.

31 For an overview of the decision-making procedures for operations, see Cour des Comptes, ‘Tier des enseignements des operations militaires à l’étranger’, November 2010; interview with Colonel Christophe Closset, Head of Defence Policy, 16 November 2016.

32 Interview with Professor Alexander Mattelaer, 16 November 2016.

33 Interview with defence policy advisors, Office of the Belgian Defence Minister.

34 Interview with Pirlot.

35 Opposition parties recently attempted to pass legislation that would make the Chief of Defence appear before the national defence committee on a regular basis. It failed to pass.

36 Interview with Grosdent.

37 Interview with Mouvement Réformateur political advisor.

38 Interview with defence policy advisors, Office of the Belgian Defence Minister.

39 Ibid.

40 Interview with Pirlot.

41 Craig R. Whitney, ‘Belgium convicts 12 for corruption on military contracts’, The New York Times (24 December 1998).

42 Interview with Debaene.

43 Interview with Peter Buysrogge, Niuew-Vlaamse Alliantie, 17 November 2016.

44 Interview with Pirlot; interview with Buysrogge.

45 Interview with Benoit Hellings, Ecolo-Groen, 14 November 2016.

46 Interview with Debaene.

47 Interview with Peetermans.

48 Interview with Grosdent.

49 Interview with Pirlot; interview with Debaene.

50 Interview with Debaene.

51 Interview with Buysrogge.

52 Ibid.

53 Interview with Debaene.

54 Interview Pirlot.

55 Interview with Debaene and interview with Buysrogge.

56 Interview with Hellings.

57 Interview with Pirlot.

58 Interview with Debaene.

59 Interview with Pirlot.

60 Interview with Hellings.

61 Ibid.

62 Interview with Francis Delpérée, Centre démocrat humaniste, 16 November 2016.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

65 Interview with Delpérée; interview with Grosdent.

66 Interview with Delpérée.

67 The Cour des Comptes noted that the government could provide better justifications for the initiation of operations. See Cour des Comptes, ‘Tier des enseignements des operations militaires à l’étranger’, p. 23.

68 Reykers, Yf and Fonck, Daan, ‘Who is controlling whom? An analysis of the Belgian federal parliament’s executive oversight capacities towards the military interventions in Libya (2011) and Iraq (2014–1015)’, Studia Diplomatica, 68:2 (2015), pp. 91–110 Google Scholar.

69 Interview with Delpérée.

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71 Interview with Hellings; Interview with Delpérée; Reykers and Fonck, ‘Who is controlling whom?.

72 Interview with Hellings.

73 Interview with Mouvement Réformateur political advisor.

74 Interview with Hellings and interview with Pirlot.

75 Interview with Hellings.

76 Fonck and Reykers, ‘Parliamentarisaion as a two-way process’; Reykers and Fonck, ‘Who is controlling whom?’.

77 Interview with Gerry Brownlee, Minister of Defence, 11 August 2016.

78 Interview with Wayne Mapp, former FADT member and defence minister, 10 August 2016.

79 Interview with Mapp; Interview with General (rtd) Rhys Jones, former Chief of Defence Force, 12 August 2016.

80 Interview with Jones.

81 Ibid.

82 Greener, Peter, Timing is Everything: The Politics and Processes of New Zealand Defence Acquisition Decision Making (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2009)Google Scholar

83 Ibid., ch. 7.

84 Interview with Brownlee.

85 Ibid.

86 Interview with auditors from the Office of the Auditor-General, 12 August 2016.

87 Interview with senior Ministry of Defence official, 10 August 2016.

88 Interview with senior Ministry of Defence officials, 9 August 2016; Transparency International Government, Defence, Anti-Corruption Index: New Zealand 2015 Country Summary (2015).

89 Interview with Mapp.

90 Interview with former FADT analyst, 11 August 2016.

91 Ibid.

92 Interview with Mapp.

93 Interview with Ron Mark, New Zealand First MP, 10 August 2016.

94 Interview with Mark Mitchell, National MP and Chair of FADT, 9 August 2016; interview with Kennedy Graham, Green Party MP, 9 August 2016; interview with Mark.

95 Interview with David Shearer, Labour Party MP, 10 August 2016; interview with Mark Mitchell, National MP and Chair of FADT, 9 August 2016.

96 Interview with Shearer; interview with Mitchell; interview with Mark.

97 Interview with Shearer.

98 Interview with John Thomson, Clerk of FADT, 10 August 2016.

99 Interview with Mitchell.

100 Interview with Air Vice-Marshall Kevin Short, Vice Chief of Defence Force, 8 August 2016.

101 Interview with Defence officials, 9 August 2016.

102 Interview with Thomson; interview with senior Defence officials.

103 Interview with Short.

104 Interview with David Bennett, National Party MP, 11 August 2016.

105 Interview with Thomson.

106 Interview with Brownlee; interview with Mitchell.

107 Interview with Lieutenant General Tim Keating, Chief of Defence Force, 8 August 2016.

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid.

110 Interview with Short.

111 Interview with Shearer.

112 Ibid.

113 Interview with Mitchell.

114 Interview with Thomson.

115 Interview with Thomson; interview with parliamentary staff, 12 August 2016.

116 Interestingly the CDF held that he would like FADT to have access to classified information in order to be able to better brief and inform them. Interview with Keating.

117 Interview with Mitchell; interview with Bennett.

118 Interview with members of FADT, 10 and 11 August 2016.

119 Interview with Mapp.

120 Interview with auditors from the Office of the Auditor-General, 12 August 2016.

121 Interview with Thomson; interview with Bennett.

122 Interview with Keating.

123 Hoffmann, Arthur and Longhurst, Kerry, ‘German strategic culture and the changing role of the Bundeswehr’, WeltTrends, 22 (1999), pp. 145–162.Google Scholar

124 Stephen Saideman with Takako Hikotani, ‘Japan in a More Dangerous World: Weak Civilian Control and Problematic Military Adaptation’, American Political Science Association conference, 30 August to 3 September 2017, San Francisco, California.

125 We are grateful to one of the reviewers for pointing out this challenge.