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Why inter-agency operations break down: US counterterrorism in comparative perspective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 May 2016

Frank Foley
Frank Foley*
Affiliation:
Lecturer in International Relations, Department of War Studies, King’s College London
*
*Correspondence to: Frank Foley, Lecturer in International Relations, Department of War Studies, King’s College London, Strand, London, WC2R 2LS. Author’s email: frank.foley@kcl.ac.uk
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Abstract

While US counterterrorism has improved in many respects since the attacks of 11 September 2001, there have still been turf battles and many cases of inadequate coordination between security agencies, which have had damaging effects on intelligence work and operations against terrorist groups. Why, more than 14 years after 9/11, do US inter-agency operations still break down in this manner? By comparing the United States with the United Kingdom, this article provides a new explanation for the deficiencies in the American response. It shows how US inter-agency conflict has negative operational consequences and draws a contrast with the British security agencies, which tend to be more closely integrated and refrain from engaging in major turf battles. I argue that the differences between the cases stem from a combination of distinct institutions and different organisational routines in the US and UK. In the United States, divided national institutions and the informal routines of its security agencies have proved problematic for joint operations and intelligence work. The article also critiques some influential existing accounts of US inter-agency counterterrorism, which emphasise bureaucratic politics or organisational culture, and shows how such perspectives can produce unrealistic policy recommendations. A focus on the deep-seated routines and institutions of the United States leads one to be more sceptical about the prospects for meaningful organisational reform.

Keywords

CounterterrorismUnited StatesBritainSecurityIntelligence
Type
Research Article
Information
European Journal of International Security , Volume 1 , Issue 2 , July 2016 , pp. 150 - 175
Copyright
© British International Studies Association 2016 

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References

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58 By ‘core’ agencies, I mean those agencies that have the authority and capability to play a leading role in domestic counterterrorist intelligence or law enforcement activities.

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62 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, §1022.

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69 Foley, ‘Reforming counterterrorism’, p. 447. Outside London, a network of provincial Special Branches also had a mandate to gather terrorism intelligence, but their resources and involvement paled in comparison to that of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch.

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95 Ibid., pp. 69–70; 9/11 Review Commission, The FBI, p. 89.

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97 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, §1022.

98 ‘Defence bill passes House’, BBC (15 December 2011), available at: {http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-16192472}.

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102 The NYPD’s capability and relationship with the FBI is not representative of other, smaller state and local police forces. Still, it is important to examine whether the NYPD, as one of the most capable domestic counterterrorist agencies in the US, fits in with the broader federal effort to protect New York, which is widely regarded as the nation’s leading terrorist target.

103 Interview with an FBI counterterrorist agent (US-K), Washington, DC, 11 December 2008.

104 Interview with a former senior FBI counterterrorist agent (US-J), Northern Virginia, 11 December 2008.

105 Johnston and Rashbaum, ‘New York Police fights with U.S.’.

106 Pakistan sent him back to the US at the FBI’s request. For more details, see Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo, ‘Consequences for security as NYPD-FBI rift widens’, Associated Press (21 March 2012), available at: {http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2012/Consequences-for-security-as-NYPD-FBI-rift-widens}.

107 Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey, ‘Letter to Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly’ (31 October 2008), p. 5. This leaked letter is available at: {http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122715458871943891.html}.

108 Sheehan, Crush the Cell, p. 185; David Johnston and William K. Rashbaum, ‘New York Police fights with U.S. on Surveillance’, New York Times (20 November 2008).

109 Dahl, ‘The plots that failed’, pp. 633–4; Senate Committee, A Ticking Time Bomb, p. 55.

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114 The NYPD provides an example of this. See Sheehan, Crush the Cell, pp. 171–5.

115 Sheehan, Crush the Cell, pp. 176–8, 194. See also Dina Temple-Raston, ‘G-Man’s job is to keep the peace – with N.Y. cops’, NPR (9 December 2008), available at: {http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=97986537}.

116 Johnston and Rashbaum, ‘New York police fights with US’.

117 Goldman and Apuzzo, ‘Consequences for security as NYPD-FBI rift widens’.

118 Interview with a former senior FBI counterterrorist agent (US-J), Northern Virginia 11 December 2008.

119 Dickey, ‘Ray Kelly’s NYPD battles with FBI’; Christopher Dickey, ‘The FBI cut the NYPD out of the loop about the Tsarnaev brothers’ plans’, Daily Beast (27 April 2013).

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122 Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror, pp. 81–92. A Director of National Intelligence was also introduced.

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125 DeYoung, ‘A fight against terrorism – and disorganization’.

126 Interview with a former senior FBI and NCTC official (US-N), Northern Virginia, 21 September 2009.

127 Due to space constraints, this section on Britain is shorter than the preceding section on the US. Further details on the British case can be found in Foley, Countering Terrorism in Britain and France, pp. 129–67.

128 Foley, ‘Reforming counterterrorism’, pp. 462–3.

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134 Foley, ‘Reforming counterterrorism’, p. 472.

135 Interview with a senior Metropolitan Police (Special Branch/Counter Terrorism Command) officer (UK-K), London, 5 July 2007; Foley, Countering Terrorism in Britain and France, p. 171.

136 Foley, Countering Terrorism in Britain and France, pp. 158–63.

137 On these plots, see Andrew, Christopher, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London: Penguin, 2010), pp. 816–839Google Scholar.

138 Foley, Countering Terrorism in Britain and France, pp. 156–7.

139 Peter Taylor, ‘7/7: No more locked doors’, Guardian (6 May 2011).

140 Foley, Countering Terrorism in Britain and France, pp. 158–62.

141 Lady Justice Hallett, Coroner’s Inquiry into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005 (6 May 2011), p. 26, available at: {http://7julyinquests.independent.gov.uk}.

142 Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2006–2007, Cm 7299 (London, TSO, 2008), p. 10.

143 For details, see Foley, Countering Terrorism in Britain and France, pp. 159–61.

144 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Report on the Intelligence Relating to the Murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby, HC 795 (London, HMSO, 2014), pp. 50–1.

145 See, for example, Zegart, Spying Blind, pp. 43, 45, 48.

146 These conditions are also absent in the case of France; see Foley, ‘Reforming counterterrorism’. Future research on other problematic cases, such as Belgium, could identify whether such countries match, or fail to match, these conditions that are favourable to good coordination outcomes.

147 Project on National Security Reform, Towards Integrating Complex National Missions, pp. 123, 152. See also Markle Foundation and the NYU Center on Law and Security, Reforming the Culture of National Security: Vision, Clarity, and Accountability (New York, April 2009), pp. 5–6Google Scholar, 12.

148 Interview with a former senior FBI and NCTC official (US-N), Northern Virginia, 21 September 2009.

149 The opposition would be particularly strong against giving the federal government greater power over state and local law enforcement.

150 Zegart, ‘September 11 and adaptation failure’, pp. 110–11.