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Taking uncertainty seriously: Classical realism and national security

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 April 2016

Patrick Porter
Patrick Porter*
Affiliation:
Professor of Strategic Studies, Strategy and Security Institute, University of Exeter
*
*Correspondence to: Patrick Porter, Strategy and Security Institute, University of Exeter, Streatham Drive, Exeter, EX4 4PD. Author’s email: p.porter@exeter.ac.uk
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Abstract

If we can’t reliably predict the future, how can we be wise when preparing for it? Examining the UK’s ‘Strategic Defence and Security Review’ of 2010, I demonstrate that though planners often rightly invoke uncertainty, they also imply a highly certain ideology about Western power and foresight. Modern ‘national security states’ describe the world as dangerously uncertain, yet fall prey to a misplaced confidence in their ability to anticipate and prevent threats. I argue that classical realism, especially that of Clausewitz and Morgenthau, is a valuable resource for handling uncertainty more reflexively. Classical realism counsels that governments should go beyond attempts to improve foresight. They should try to check against the fallibility of their assumptions, marshal their power more conservatively, insure against the likelihood of predictive failure by developing the intellectual capability to react to the unknown, and avoid misplaced confidence in their ability to bring order into chaos.

Keywords

Classical RealismNational SecurityCarl von ClausewitzHans MorgenthauUncertainty
Type
Research Article
Information
European Journal of International Security , Volume 1 , Issue 2 , July 2016 , pp. 239 - 260
Copyright
© British International Studies Association 2016 

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