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Implementing REMIT: What a Legal Analysis Tells about the (Regulatory) Role of ACER
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 May 2018
Abstract
The purpose of this contribution is to analyse the role granted to – or assumed by – the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (“ACER”) in relation to the implementation of Regulation 1227/20111 (“REMIT”), with a specific focus on the electricity market. It ultimately calls for a clarification of the status of ACER in the European energy regulatory framework.
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Footnotes
*
Assistant at the University of Saint-Louis (Brussels) and Lawyer at the Brussels bar.
**
Lawyers at the Brussels bar.
1
Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 1227/2011 of 25 October 2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency [2011] OJ L326/1 (“REMIT”).
References
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7 ibid 19; Parliament, “Financial management and control of EU agencies” (Resolution) P6_TA(2009)0274 para. 6.
8 Vos, supra, note 4, 19–20.
9 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/51, Art 4(2) (TFEU).
10 Commission, “European agencies – The way forward”, supra, note 3, 5.
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14 Commission, “European agencies – The way forward”, supra, note 3, 5.
15 Vos, supra, note 4, 40.
16 Case 9/56 Meroni & Co, Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community [1957–1958] ECR 133.
17 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C326/25 Art 17 (TEU).
18 Alberti, supra, note 12, 162.
19 Case 270/12 UK v European Parliament and the Council of the European Union [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:18 para. 26ff.
20 ibid para. 44.
21 ibid para. 45.
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25 ACER Board of Appeal case A-001-2017 17 March 2017 <www.acer.europa.eu>.
26 Commission, “The Internal Energy Market” (Commission Working Document) COM(88) 238 final.
27 Parliament and Council Directive 96/92/EC of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity [1997] OJ L27/20 (“First Electricity Directive”).
28 First Electricity Directive, Arts 13–22.
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30 Parliament and Council Directive 2003/54/EC of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC [2003] OJ L176/37 (“Second Electricity Directive”).
31 Second Electricity Directive, Art 23.
32 The Third Energy Package refers to the following Directives and Regulations (for electricity): Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) 713/2009 of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators [2009] OJ L211/1; Parliament and Council Directive 2009/72/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC [2009] OJ L211/55 and Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) 714/2009 of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 [2009] OJ L211/15.
33 Zinzani, supra, note 29, 130ff; Parliament and Council Directive (EC) 2009/72/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC [2009] OJ L211/55 (“Electricity Directive”) Art 35.
34 This does not suggest that the Commission is to the internal market what the NRAs are to their national markets. However, the Commission’s role in developing and implementing the EU’s energy policy makes it a supranational regulator in the sense that it adopts general regulations within its competencies, and does this at EU level according to its mandate. In particular, the Commission regulates the electricity markets by adopting delegated and implementing acts.
35 Chiti, supra, note 11, 72.
36 Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) 714/2009 of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 [2009] OJ L211/15 (Electricity Regulation).
37 P Sester, “The Regulatory Framework for Cross-Border Electricity Trade in the European Union” in D Buschle, S Hirsbrunner and C Kaddous (eds), European Energy Law (Coll. Dossiers de droit européen, n° 22, Helbing Lichtenhahn 2011) 120–121.
38 Blottin, B, Concurrence, Régulation et Energie : Rôle des Autorités de Concurrence et des Autorités de Régulation Sectorielle (Coll. Droit de l’Union Européenne, Bruylant 2016) 668 Google Scholar; Zinzani, supra, note 29, 106.
39 Chamon, supra, note 2, 105.
40 Zinzani, supra, note 29, 114.
41 Electricity Regulation, Art 2(2)a.
42 This is their quintessential characteristic, according to J-F Furnémont and M Janssen, “Independence of regulatory authorities in the network industries: when (and why) the European lawmaker does the split” (2016) 2 RDIR 160.
43 de Bandt, P and de Bandt, A, “Gouvernance des Régulateurs” (2016) 2 RDIR 132–133 Google Scholar.
44 Electricity Directive, Art 37(4), (5) and (6).
45 Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity” COM(2007) 531 final 9–10.
46 Commission, “Progress in Creating the Internal Gas and Electricity Market” (Report) 2008, 2–3.
47 Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) 713/2009 of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators [2009] OJ L211/1 (“ACER Regulation”).
48 ACER Regulation, Art 1; see also Vos, supra, note 4, 24; E Hofer, “The Future Role of Regulation – More Europe” in Buschle, Hirsbrunner and Kaddous, supra, note 37, 134–135.
49 ACER Regulation, Art 12.
50 ibid Art 14.
51 ibid Art 16.
52 ibid Art 18.
53 ibid Arts 12–13.
54 ibid Arts 14–15.
55 Goldberg, S and Bjornebye, H, “Introduction and Comment” in B Delvaux, M Hunt, K Talus (eds), EU Energy Law and Policy Issues (Coll. ELRF, Vol 3, Intersentia 2012) 24 Google Scholar.
56 According to Haverbeke, Naesens and Vandorpe, the respective competences of the NRAs and ACER have not been clearly defined in many ways. They therefore question whether ACER’s competence will effectively reduce the NRAs’ competences (Zinzani, supra, note 29, citing Haverbeke, Naesens and Vandorpe, “Strengthening Europe Regulatory Powers” (25 January 2010) European Energy Review).
57 ACER Regulation, Art 14(1).
58 Haverbeke, D, Naesens, B and Vandorpe, W, “European Energy Markets and the New Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators” (2010) 28(3) Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 428 Google Scholar.
59 ACER’s Board of Appeal has decided on six appeals so far, see <www.acer.europa.eu>; two were dismissed, as they were deemed inadmissible (an opinion only invites the addressee to follow the Agency’s indications and cannot thus be considered as a ‘formally binding decision with direct and immediate legal consequences’). The four other appeals (consolidated) were made against a decision of ACER and dismissed as inadmissible in one case, and admissible but unfounded in the others.
60 All decision-making agencies (ie ACER, EASA, EBA, EIOPA, SRB, ECHA, ESMA, CPVO, EUIPO, ERA) are assisted by one or more board(s) of appeal; see Chamon, supra, note 2, 340 and Zinzani, supra, note 29, 150.
61 Chamon, M, “Agences Décentralisées et Droit Procédural” (2016) 2 Cahiers De Droit Européen 555 Google Scholar.
62 Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 347/2013 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure and repealing Decision No 1364/2006/EC and amending Regulations (EC) No 713/2009, (EC) No 714/2009 and (EC) No 715/2009 [2013] OJ L115/39; Regulation 347/2013 lays down rules for the timely development and interoperability of trans-European energy networks in order to achieve the energy policy objectives of the TFEU; in this framework, which is not relevant for our purpose, ACER is allocated assistance and monitoring tasks.
63 For further information about this typology, see Chamon, supra, note 2, 18–39; see also Commission, “European agencies – The way forward”, supra, note 3, 2; ACER Regulation Recital 11; Sester, supra, note 38, 123ff.
64 Parliament, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (Resolution) P6_TA(2008)0296 OJ C 286.
65 Chamon, supra, note 2, 208–209.
66 On this classification see Chamon, supra, note 2, 20 citing Busuioc, M, The Accountability of European Agencies: Legal Provisions and Ongoing Practices (Eburon 2010) 26–27 Google Scholar.
67 ACER Regulation, Art 7(1).
68 ACER Regulation, Art 8(1).
69 ACER Regulation, Art 7(7) and Art 8(1); see also ACER Regulation, Art 8(4).
70 ACER Regulation, Art 9(1); Electricity Regulation, Art 17(5); see also Larouche, P and Cserne, P, National Legal Systems and Globalization: New Role, Continuing Relevance (Asser Press 2013) 198 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
71 Electricity Regulation, Art 6 and ACER Regulation, Art 6(4).
72 ACER Regulation, Art 6(2), (3) and (5) and Art 7(2); see also Calandri, L, “L’Emergence d’une Régulation Européenne” in C Boiteau (ed.), Energies renouvelables et marché intérieur (Bruylant 2014) 398 Google Scholar.
73 ACER Regulation, Art 6(2), (5), (6), (7) and (8), Art 11(1) and (2); Electricity Regulation, Arts 7–9.
74 ACER Regulation, Art 6(3)b, Art 6(4) al 1, and Art 9(2); Electricity Regulation, Art 7(1) and Art 8(11).
75 ACER Regulation, Arts 4, 5, 6(1) and (5), 7(3) and 9(2); Electricity Regulation, Art 6(11) al 2 and Art 7(2).
76 ACER Regulation, Art 5 and Art 6(4) al 1.
77 ACER Regulation, Art 7(2), (4) and (6); Electricity Directive, Art 39(1); C Van Den Bergh, “The Relationship Between Sector Specific Regulation and Competition Law in the Energy Sector” in Delvaux, Hunt, Talus, supra, note 55, 201.
78 REMIT, Art 1(1).
79 ibid, Art 2(2) and (3) and Art 5.
80 ibid, Art 3.
81 ibid, Art 4.
82 ibid, Art 4(6).
83 ibid, Arts 13–18.
84 ibid, Art 1(1) and Art 7.
85 ibid, Art 4(2), Art 7(1) and Art 8(1) and (5).
86 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 1348/2014 of 17 December 2014 on data reporting implementing Article 8(2) and Article 8(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency [2014] OJ L363/121 (“REMIT IA”).
87 REMIT, Art 9(1).
88 ibid, Art 9(3).
89 ibid, Art 7(3) al 1.
90 ibid, Art 7(3) al 2–3.
91 ibid, Art 16(5).
92 ibid, Art 16(1).
93 ACER Package documents available at <www.acer-remit.eu/portal/public-documentation> last accessed 18 October 2017.
94 Although the legal nature of such letter is unknown, it emanates from a department of ACER and indicates to the market that ACER will take no action in relation to the enforcement of some applicable provisions of REMIT IA.
95 ACER Open letter on REMIT transaction reporting data quality dated 16 February 2017 and ACER Open Letter dated 17 March 2015.
96 ACER Guidance on the application of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency (4th edn) 7.
97 ACER letter “No-action Relief: List of contracts reportable at request of the Agency” 7 January 2015, 2.
98 In the standard classification of soft law, the ACER Package qualifies as post-legislative soft law, which pursues the objective of accompanying the enacting or application of a norm ( Bertrand, B, “Rapport introductif: Les enjeux de la soft law dans l’Union européenne” (2014) 575 Revue de l’UE 81 Google Scholar; Rassafi-Guibal, H, “De quelques aspects des usages des instruments de soft law comme vecteurs de normativité économique” (2014) 575 Revue de l’UE 87ff)Google Scholar.
99 Chamon, supra, note 23, 152–153 citing Senden, L, Soft Law in European Community Law (Hart 2004) 112 Google Scholar.
100 To the exception, notably, of the Relief Letters, which have been adopted by a department of ACER and therefore not formally approved by NRAs.
101 See Case 410/09 Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa [2011] ECR I-3853, para. 39 cited in Bertrand, supra, note 98, 76.
102 Bertrand, supra, note 98, 76.
103 ibid 77–78.
104 Rassafi-Guibal, supra, note 98, 89ff.
105 Bertrand, supra, note 98, 80.
106 Rassafi-Guibal, supra, note 98, 85ff.
107 Alberti, supra, note 12, 167–168.
108 General Court recently asserted this in case T-671/15 E-Control v Acer [2016] ECLI:EU:T:2016:626 para. 92.
109 See, for instance, case 113-75 Giordano Frecassetti v Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato [1976] ECR 1976-00983 a. o. cited in Bertrand, supra, note 98, 77, n 47.
110 Bertrand, supra, note 98, 77.
111 ACER Board of Appeal decision A-002-2015 16 December 2015 para. 21ff <www.acer.europa.eu>.
112 Case 233/02, French Republic v Commission of the European Communities [2004] ECR I-02759, para. 40.
113 On 30 November 2016, the Commission released a package of proposals released by the Commission on 30 November 2016, titled “Clean Energy for All Europeans”, consisting of both legislative as well as non-legislative initiatives, basically replacing the Third Package.
114 Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the internal market for electricity” COM(2016) 861 final 22.