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Dealing with the Challenge of Evidence–based Decision–making in Situations of Uncertainty and Emergency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Marie–Valentine Florin
Marie–Valentine Florin*
Affiliation:
International Risk Governance Council
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Abstract

Collection and provision of scientific information for policy and decision-making is particularly important during emergencies or when uncertainty and ambiguity creates situation of fear and anxiety. This article offers two suggestions for addressing natural or technology risks, leveraging research by the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) and project contributors. The first advice is that concepts and instruments for risk governance be recognised and used as intermediation between evidence and policy. The second is that the role of the Chief Scientific Adviser in public sector organisations includes those of the Chief Risk Officer. These suggestions could help address the challenge for policymakers to deal with uncertainty and emergency, when little or contradictory evidence is available.

Type
Symposium on the EU's Chief Scientific Advisor
Information
European Journal of Risk Regulation , Volume 5 , Issue 3 , September 2014 , pp. 303 - 308
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014

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References

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* The author wishes to thank Prof. Ortwin Renn, member of the Scientific and Technical Council of the International Risk Governance Council for his is expert advice on governance and insights, particularly about the role of Chief Science Advisers in government.