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Governing Control over Human Genetic Resources: Promises and Risks
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 January 2017
Abstract
The purpose of the paper is to discuss how to regulate the access to and use of biochemical and human genetic material currently considered as part of the market framework. Looking beyond the protection of traditional public goods (such as land or water), the paper emphasizes the debate around the progressive commodification of human genetic resources facilitated by an improper use of intellectual property rights. The discourse around commons is used to evaluate alternative tools and strategies to the issue of private appropriation of human genetic resources and natural compounds
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References
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