Member States wishing to cultivate genetically modified organisms (GMOs) have always been a minority in the EU. Only eight out of twenty-seven have experienced transgenic agriculture. Throughout the years, the opposition to this form of farming has become a genuinely transnational phenomenon given that many regions of different European countries declared themselves GMO-free. Moreover, Member States such as Austria, Luxembourg, Greece, Poland and, most recently, Hungary officially banned transgenic agriculture within their borders altogether. France and Germany suspended the cultivation of GM maize MON 810, respectively in 2008 and 2009.

In addition, the EU has previously authorized only two GM crops: GM maize MON 810 (authorization renewed in 2008) and GM potato EH92-527-1 (2010), known as the ‘Amflora potato.’ The cautious approach towards transgenic farming is also witnessed by the long and contested process of renewal of the permit to cultivate GM maize MON 810 and the issue of the authorization for the Amflora potato.

Plant-based meat-like food is increasingly popular, and the meat industry has been opposing the use of terms traditionally used for meat and meat products for plant-based alternatives. Against this background, on 29 June 2022 the Government of France adopted Decree No. 2022-947 on the use of certain names used to designate foodstuffs containing vegetable proteins 1 (hereinafter, Decree No. 2022-947), which prohibits the use of names designating foodstuffs of animal origin to be used to describe, market or promote foodstuffs containing vegetable proteins. This article discusses the new French legislation and looks at the situation at the European Union (EU) level where, differently from dairy terms such as “milk” and “yoghurt”, “meaty” terms such as “burger” and “sausage” are not reserved for meat and meat products. France has become the first EU Member State to impose such a ban, while the EU rejected in 2020 a similar proposal that would have resulted in EU-wide restrictions.

This article, initially discussed at a conference organised in March 2017 by the Belgian Commission for Electricity and Gas Regulation (CREG) on the new governance structures in the EU energy sector, deals with energy governance structures in the EU energy and climate diplomacy and in development cooperation between the EU, its member states and third countries.

It is understood that, at large, the existing tools of EU energy and climate diplomacy create governance structures: bilateral partnerships, trade agreements, regional and multilateral orders are per se instruments to govern the underlying relationship between the EU, its member states and third countries. The focus in this paper revolves around those instruments of EU energy and climate diplomacy which aim at reinforcing energy governance structures (referred to also as institutional and normative energy frameworks) and promoting solid transparent frameworks in the field of energy in partner countries.

In particular, the paper aims at identifying – among the existing tools of the energy and climate diplomacy –instruments and opportunities in favour of African countries which contribute to strengthening those institutional and normative energy frameworks and facilitate investment towards universal energy access and energy transition. To do so, the paper reviews the existing policy and legal instruments of EU external energy action in general and in Africa and concludes proposing policy recommendations on further development cooperation and energy diplomacy initiatives in favour of African countries.

The first section reviews the principles of EU energy and climate diplomacy and their alignment with development objectives, including the emphasis on strengthening institutional and normative frameworks in the energy sector. The second section considers the internal coordination between the EU and its member states which is necessary to carry out the external energy and climate diplomacy as well as development cooperation. The third section describes the existing tools of the EU energy diplomacy that aim to strengthen energy institutions and frameworks in partner countries. The fourth section reviews a selection of existing EU initiatives in favour of African countries and brings forward a proposal for EU action to reinforce energy governance structures of partner countries in Africa.

By making the headlines in the major European newspapers in 2013, the horsemeat scandal impaired consumer confidence in the transparency of the European food chain to a significant extent. In spite of its negative economic impact on the European Union (EU) market, the scandal in question has stimulated an unprecedented reflection in the area of food fraud by the EU institutions, national authorities, other stakeholders as well as by members of academia and the legal profession in general.

On an EU level, the European Commission swiftly responded to the scandal with the adoption of a wide-ranging action plan consisting of targeted policy, legislative and enforcement measures.

This article aims to consider whether classic criminal offences (such as manslaughter) are adequate to reprove the scientists’ behaviour when major calamities are being judged to have caused the death of people and wide destructions. The fundamental problem hinges on the role of risk-assessment and consultancy carried out by the scientists, as well as on the unknown state of major risks. Then, to establish a link of causality between the defendants’ behaviour and the death-events affecting the victims, it must be proved that: a) the scientists “psychically” influenced the victims to leave any safety precaution in relation to the risk; b) the deaths of the inhabitants are not to be considered an “extraordinary” circumstance, even by experts. The difficulties faced by the Judge to fulfil these tasks prompt us to wonder whether other types of criminal charges would be more appropriate for sanctioning scientists who are found to be derelict in their duty of risk-assessment to authorities and citizens.

A visual display ban on tobacco products, imposed by national legislation of an EEA State, such as the one at issue in the case at hand, constitutes a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on imports within the meaning of Article 11 EEA if, in fact, the ban affects the marketing of products imported from other EEA States to a greater degree than that of imported products which were, until recently, produced in Norway. It is for the national court to identify the aims which the legislation at issue is actually intended to pursue and to decide whether the public health objective of reducing tobacco use by the public in general can be achieved by measures less restrictive than a visual display ban on tobacco products (author's headnote).

Until robots and humans mostly worked in fast-paced and yet separate environments, occupational health and safety (OHS) rules could address workers’ safety largely independently from robotic conduct. This is no longer the case: collaborative robots (cobots) working alongside humans warrant the design of policies ensuring the safety of both humans and robots at once, within shared spaces and upon delivery of cooperative workflows. Within the European Union (EU), the applicable regulatory framework stands at the intersection between international industry standards and legislation at the EU as well as Member State level. Not only do current standards and laws fail to satisfactorily attend to the physical and mental health challenges prompted by human–robot interaction (HRI), but they exhibit important gaps in relation to smart cobots (“SmaCobs”) more specifically. In fact, SmaCobs combine the black-box unforeseeability afforded by machine learning with more general HRI-associated risks, towards increasingly complex, mobile and interconnected operational interfaces and production chains. Against this backdrop, based on productivity and health motivations, we urge the encoding of the enforcement of OHS policies directly into SmaCobs. First, SmaCobs could harness the sophistication of quantum computing to adapt a tangled normative architecture in a responsive manner to the contingent needs of each situation. Second, entrusting them with OHS enforcement vis-à-vis both themselves and humans may paradoxically prove safer as well as more cost-effective than for humans to do so. This scenario raises profound legal, ethical and somewhat philosophical concerns around SmaCobs’ legal personality, the apportionment of liability and algorithmic explainability. The first systematic proposal to tackle such questions is henceforth formulated. For the EU, we propose that this is achieved through a new binding OHS Regulation aimed at the SmaCobs age.

The aim of this paper is to review the basic literature on scientific uncertainty in its statistical paradigm in order to provide enlightenment on one pivotal facet of the precautionary principle, i.e. the allocation of the burden of proof to demonstrate that an activity is not harmful to the environment. The purpose is not to explain a new theory of statistical inference, but to show how regulatory policymaking that is properly informed by scientific expertise and designed to avoid one type of error, may actually make other errors more likely and thus expose the public to danger. This problem is explained in terms of the conceptual as well as operational conflicts that arise when knowledge about statistical-inferential methods is applied to policymaking. The paper argues that this issue can be resolved by first reconsidering the burden of proof as a burden of uncertainty.

Due to the astounding revolution sparked off by genetic engineering, the artificial modification of the genome through targeted alterations of DNA and RNA is now competing with the traditional phenotype use of living organisms (selective plant and animal breeding, consumption, manufacturing of products, energy production, etc.). Although until recently these were insurmountable obstacles, interspecies barriers to reproduction are fading away, and it is now possible to transfer genes from one species to the genome of another. In short, the artificial genetic engineering is replacing selective breeding. Furthermore, a new age is dawning – that of synthetic biology – in which man will no longer content himself with modifying existing organisms but, thanks to the radical modification of the genome, will be able to create new cells and new organisms.

This brief opinion piece draws upon behavioural and cognitive research to argue that the Paris Agreement's goal of keeping global temperature change below 2 degrees Celsius sets a psychologically powerful baseline against which future policy failures can be measured. When international law successfully triggers perception of a baseline, it can lead decision makers to perceive deviations from that baseline as “losses.” This implicates loss aversion, which provides an additional motivation to achieve international norms. The psychological impacts of this new status quo may end up being more powerful and more durable than either the unusual structure of the document or the domestic implementation questions that have already attracted so much scholarly debate.

How can one not applaud the renewed better regulation agenda launched by the First Vice President Timmermans? Finally this fuzzy reform field is in the hands of a strong executive politician with the authority to make substantial progress on an agenda that always appeared good on paper, but somehow did not deliver against the expectations it defined for itself. ‘Better regulation for better results’ not only promises tangible results, but it combines this with the ambition of ‘changing how we work at the European level’. This ambition should provide us – as citizens, stakeholders and scholars – with an opportunity to essentially present a scorecard concerning these results in the near future. And, indeed, experts and other stakeholders in the better regulation game do welcome the initiative.

My view on this agenda is that the promise of ‘better results’ will be hard to deliver, whereas the ambition of ‘changing how we work’ is more likely to materialize in one way or another.

This article is a critical legal analysis of the proposed TRIPS waiver under World Trade Organization (WTO) law. It reviews the existing TRIPS flexibilities and the “August 2003 TRIPS waiver”, highlighting the obstacles to achieving the goals of these legal instruments. It demonstrates that numerous critical TRIPS flexibilities, notably TRIPS Article 31bis, are ineffective, prompting some countries to submit a new waiver proposal to the WTO. It highlights several WTO rules that are also quite ambiguous. This paper argues that a WTO clarification might be an alternative to the new TRIPS waiver proposal if it is ultimately rejected due to a lack of consensus among WTO members. Finally, this article emphasises the importance of adopting a balanced approach that may simplify complicated TRIPS rules, decrease the risk of trade-based retaliation and improve collaboration in knowledge transfer and scaling up the manufacture of and access to lifesaving vaccines, pharmaceuticals and healthcare equipment.

Analysts agree that public opposition is one of the main factors that hinder ambition in many countries’ carbon pricing policy agenda. This article argues that motivated reasoning contributes to this opposition by inducing the public to underestimate the effectiveness of carbon pricing to mitigate climate change and yield co-benefits. This article also argues that measures of implicit carbon pricing can help overcome public opposition to carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes due to motivated reasoning. These measures are becoming increasingly available thanks to recent work by the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and private-sector actors, and therefore they offer a potential instrument for reducing public opposition to carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes in various countries. A strength of the approach proposed in this article – compared to some of the mainstream approaches to risk regulation – is that it tries is to keep the regulation of climate risks in line with public attitudes towards these risks.

The importance of effectiveness in lawmaking is acknowledged by scholars and practitioners alike. Yet the concept remains one of the most vague terms in legal vocabulary. The article maintains that effectiveness has concrete content that reflects the systemic coherence and alignment between four fundamental elements of legislation: objectives, content, context and results. From this perspective effective legislation is the result of complex mechanics in the conceptualisation, design and drafting of the law and cannot materialise unless it is a clear concern in the early phases of lawmaking. The article takes a closer look at the fundamental elements of effectiveness and articulates the specific challenges that lawmakers are facing when attempting to design and draft effective rules. The “effectiveness test”, a conceptual tools that adds “effectiveness lenses” to the existing lawmaking toolkit, is developed in more depth to a set of critical questions that lawmakers need to address in order to make conscious decisions on effective drafts.

In the EU, pharmaceuticals are subject to a marketing authorisation requirement that, depending on the type of product concerned, can be obtained either centrally through a Commission decision with EU-wide effects or in the Member States, potentially subject to mutual recognition in composite authorisation procedures. These composite decision-making processes can nowadays be considered a standard way of administrative decision-making in the EU internal market. Yet, judicial supervision remains anchored in the separation of jurisdictions between the national and the EU level, and between national levels. This article explores the challenges posed to judicial review in the case of pharmaceutical marketing authorisations when European administrative composite structures are used.

The infringement process contained in Article 258 TFEU requires the Commission, as guardian of the treaties, to monitor the performance of member states in relation to the implementation and application of EU norms. As the Commission carries out this duty it amasses enormous amounts of data on the realisation of policy objectives through its discovery of (non) implementation of EU norms and the administrative operation of its ‘compliance promoting tools’. This article explores the Commission's duty as guardian of the treaties through the lens of smart regulation and examines the potential for infringement data, and the infringement process more widely, to play a contributory role in executing meaningful evaluation in the policy cycle. The article will explore the extent to which the Commission has included infringement data as part of its policy cycle and in particular the evaluation process. It considers the multiple dimensions of accountability and institutional learning associated with evaluations and how these might be supported by the infringement mechanism. It argues that the infringement process and evaluations can be considered symbiotic with each process contributing to the accountability and institutional learning of the other.

In the coronavirus pandemic that has swept the world, the Finnish Government, like many of its peers, has issued policy measures to combat the virus. Many of these measures have been implemented in law, including measures taken under the Emergency Powers Act, or by ministries and regional and local authorities exercising their legal powers. However, some governmental policy measures have been implemented using non-binding guidelines and recommendations. Using border travel recommendations as a case study, this article critically evaluates governmental soft law-making. The debacle over the use of soft law to fight the pandemic in Finland revealed fundamental misunderstandings about the processes and circumstances under which instruments conceived as soft law can be issued, as well as a lack of attention to their effects from a fundamental rights perspective.