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The politics of blame avoidance in complex delegation structures: the public transport crisis in Berlin

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 October 2019

Tobias Bach Open the ORCID record for Tobias Bach [Opens in a new window]  and
Kai Wegrich
Tobias Bach*
Affiliation:
Professor of Public Policy and Public Administration, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, P.O. Box 1097 Blindern, Oslo, Norway
Kai Wegrich
Affiliation:
Professor of Public Administration and Public Policy, Hertie School, Friedrichstr. 180, Berlin, Germany
*
*E-mail: tobias.bach@stv.uio.no
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Abstract

The article analyses the public attribution of blame and the use of presentational strategies of blame avoidance in complex delegation structures. We theorize and empirically demonstrate that complex delegation structures result in the diffusion of blame to multiple actors so that a clear allocation of responsibility becomes more difficult. The article shows that public attribution of blame follows a distinct temporal pattern in which politicians only gradually move into the centre of the blame storm. We also find that blame-takers deploy sequential patterns of presentational management and use blame shifting to other actors as a dominant strategy. However, the analysis suggests that complex delegation structures impose limitations on blame-takers’ use of blame avoidance strategies, and that sequential presentational management becomes less useful over time. The article uses media content analysis to study blame games during a major crisis of the public transport system in Berlin, Germany.

Keywords

blame avoidancedelegationinstitutional designcrisis managementregulatory state
Type
Research Article
Information
European Political Science Review , Volume 11 , Issue 4 , November 2019 , pp. 415 - 431
Copyright
© European Consortium for Political Research 2019 

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