Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gbm5v Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T11:32:26.012Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Economic performance and institutions: capturing the dependent variable

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2011

Barbara Vis ,
Jaap Woldendorp  and
Hans Keman
Barbara Vis
Affiliation:
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, VU University, De Boelelaan, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Jaap Woldendorp*
Affiliation:
Lecturer, Department of Political Science, VU University, De Boelelaan, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Hans Keman
Affiliation:
Professor, Department of Political Science, VU University, De Boelelaan, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
*
* E-mail: j.j.woldendorp@vu.nl.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In the debate about the relationship between institutions and overall economic performance, the dependent variable has received scant attention – in contrast to the independent variable(s). This paper tries to enhance the understanding of the link between institutions and performance by presenting and assessing a substantively grounded conceptualization and operationalization of overall economic performance based on economic growth, employment, and public debt. A fuzzy-set ideal-type analysis of performance of 19 OECD countries between 1975 and 2005 reveals substantial variation across countries and over time that cannot sufficiently be accounted for by two key institutional features: corporatism and consensus democracy. Corporatism and consensus democracy may account for policy formation and implementation, but hardly for economic performance.

Keywords

economic performanceinstitutionscorporatismconsensus democracycase-based research
Type
Research Article
Information
European Political Science Review , Volume 4 , Issue 1 , 08 February 2012 , pp. 73 - 96
Copyright
Copyright © European Consortium for Political Research 2011

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Alvarez, R.M., Garret, G.Lange, P. (1991), ‘Government partisanship, labor organisation, and macroeconomic performance’, American Political Science Review 85(2): 539–556.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Anderson, L. (2001), ‘The implications of institutional design for macroeconomic performance: reassessing the claims of consensus democracy’, Comparative Political Studies 34(4): 429–452.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Armingeon, K.A. (2002), ‘The effects of negotiation democracy: a comparative analysis’, European Journal of Political Research 41(1): 81–105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Armingeon, K.A., Leimgruber, P., Beyeler, M.Menegale, S. (2009), Comparative Political Dataset I, Berne: University of Berne.Google Scholar
Baccaro, L. (2003), ‘What is alive and what is dead in the theory of corporatism’, British Journal of Industrial Relations 41(4): 683–706.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barton, A.H. (1955), ‘The concept of property-space in social research’, in P.F. Lazarsfeld and M. Rosenberg (eds), The Language of Social Research, Glencoe, IL: Free Press, pp. 40–53.Google Scholar
Becker, U. (2009), Open Varieties of Capitalism: Continuity, Change and Performances, London: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Becker, U.Schwartz, H. (eds) (2005), Employment ‘Miracles’: A Critical Comparison of Dutch, Scandinavian, Swiss, Australian and Irish Cases Versus Germany and the US, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.Google Scholar
Bennett, A.Elman, C. (2006), ‘Qualitative research: recent developments in case study methods’, Annual Review of Political Science 9: 455–476.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Calderón, C.Fuentes, R. (2006), ‘Complementarities between institutions and openness in economic development: evidence for a panel of countries’, Cuadernos de Economia 43(Mayo): 49–80.Google Scholar
Calmfors, L.Driffill, J. (1988), ‘Bargaining structure, corporatism and macroeconomic performance’, Economic Policy 3(6): 13–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Castles, F.G. (2004), The Future of the Welfare State: Crisis Myths and Crisis Realities, Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Compston, H. (2003), ‘Beyond corporatism: a configurational theory of policy concertation’, European Journal of Political Research 42(6): 787–809.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crépaz, M.M.L. (1992), ‘Corporatism in decline? An empirical analysis of the impact of corporatism on macroeconomic performance and industrial disputes in 19 industrialized democracies’, Comparative Political Studies 25(2): 139–168.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crépaz, M.M.L. (1996), ‘Consensus versus majoritarian democracy. Political institutions and their impact on macroeconomic performance and industrial disputes’, Comparative Political Studies 29(1): 4–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Czada, R. (1987), ‘The impact of interest politics on flexible adjustment policies’, in H. Keman, H. Paloheimo and P.F. Whiteley (eds), Coping with the Economic Crisis. Alternative Responses to Economic Recession in Advanced Industrial Societies, London: Sage, pp. 20–54.Google Scholar
Delsen, L. (2002), Exit Polder Model? Socioeconomic Changes in the Netherlands, Westport: Praeger.Google Scholar
Flanagan, R.J. (1999), ‘Macro-economic performance and collective bargaining’, Journal of Economic Literature 37(3): 1150–1175.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Franzese, R.J. (2002), Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Democracies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Franzese, R.J.Hall, P.A. (2000), ‘Institutional dimensions of coordinating wage-bargaining and monetary policy’, in T. Iversen, J. Pontusson and D. Soskice (eds), Unions, Employers and Central Banks: Wage Bargaining and Macroeconomic Policy in an Integrating Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 173–205.Google Scholar
Hall, P.A.Franzese, R.J. (1998), ‘Mixed signals: central bank independence, coordinated wage bargaining, and European Monetary Union’, International Organization 52(3): 505–535.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hall, P.A., Gingerich, D.W. (2004). ‘Varieties of capitalism and institutional complementarities in the macroeconomy: an empirical analysis’. MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/5, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne.Google Scholar
Hancké, B.Rhodes, M. (2005), ‘EMU and labor market institutions in Europe. The rise and fall of social pacts’, Work and Occupations 32(2): 196–228.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hassel, A. (2006), Wage Setting, Social Pacts and the Euro. A New Role for The State, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hibbs, D.A. (1977), ‘Political parties and macroeconomic policy’, American Political Science Review 71(December): 1467–1487.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hicks, A.Kenworthy, L. (1998), ‘Cooperation and political economic performance in affluent democratic capitalism’, American Journal of Sociology 103(6): 1631–1672.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hsing, Y.Smyth, D.J. (1995), ‘In search of an optimal debt ratio for economic growth’, Contemporary Economic Policy 13(4): 51–59.Google Scholar
Hudson, J.Kühner, S. (2009), ‘Towards productive welfare? A comparative analysis of 23 OECD countries’, Journal of European Social Policy 19(1): 34–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
IMF (2009). ‘Chapter 3: Lessons for Monetary Policy from Asset Price Fluctuations’, World Economic Outlook. Sustaining the Recovery. Retrieved 15 March 2011 from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/pdf/text.pdfGoogle Scholar
Iversen, T. (1998), ‘Wage bargaining, central bank independence, and the real effects of money’, International Organization 52(3): 469–504.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Iversen, T.Soskice, D. (2006), ‘New macroeconomics and political science’, Annual Review of Political Science 9: 425–453.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Keman, H. (2003), ‘Explaining miracles: third ways and work and welfare’, West European Politics 26(2): 115–135.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kenworthy, L. (2001). Wage-setting coordination scores. Retrieved 17 June 2001 from http://www.emory.edu/SOC/lkenworthyGoogle Scholar
Kenworthy, L. (2002), ‘Corporatism and unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s’, American Sociological Review 67(3): 367–388.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kenworthy, L. (2003), ‘Quantitative indicators of corporatism’, International Journal of Sociology 33(3): 10–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kenworthy, L. (2006), ‘Institutional coherence and macroeconomic performance’, Socio-Economic Review 4: 69–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kvist, J (1999), ‘Welfare state reform in the Nordic countries in the 1990s: using fuzzy-set theory to assess conformity to ideal types’, Journal of European Social Policy 9(3): 231–252.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lane, J.-E.Ersson, S.O. (2000), The New Institutional Politics: Performance and Outcomes, London: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lange, P.Garrett, G. (1985), ‘The politics of growth: strategic interaction and economic performance in the advanced industrial democracies, 1974–1980’, The Journal of Politics 47(3): 792–827.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Layard, R., Nickell, S.Jackman, R. (1994), The Unemployment Crisis, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lijphart, A. (1999), Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Lijphart, A.Crépaz, M.M.L. (1991), ‘Corporatism and consensus democracy in eighteen countries: conceptual and empirical linkages’, British Journal of Political Science 21(2): 235–246.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Molina, O.Rhodes, M. (2002), ‘Corporatism: the past, present, and future of a concept’, Annual Review of Political Science 5: 305–331.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Natali, D.Pochet, P. (2009), ‘The evolution of social pacts in the EMU era: what type of institutionalization?’, European Journal of Industrial Relations 15(2): 147–166.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
OECD (2005a), Central Government Debt: Statistical Yearbook 1994–2003, Paris: OECD.Google Scholar
OECD (2005b), OECD Economic Outlook Database, Paris: OECD.Google Scholar
Ragin, C.C. (2000), Fuzzy-Set Social Science, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Ragin, C.C. (2006), ‘Set relations in social research: evaluating their consistency and coverage’, Political Analysis 14(3): 291–310.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ragin, C.C. (2008), Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rihoux, B.Ragin, C.C. (eds) (2009), Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques, Los Angeles: Sage.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roller, E. (2005), The Performance of Democracies, Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roubini, N.Sachs, J. (1989), ‘Government spending and budget deficits in the industrial democracies’. NBER Working Paper No. 2919. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.Google Scholar
Sachs, J.D.Warner, A. (1995), ‘Economic reform and the process of global integration’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1: 1–118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schmidt, M.G. (1982), ‘Does corporatism matter? Economic crises, politics and rates of unemployment in capitalist democracies in the 1970s’, in G. Lembruch and P.C. Schmitter (eds), Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making, London: Sage, pp. 237–258.Google Scholar
Schneider, C.Q.Wagemann, C. (2006), ‘Reducing complexity in qualitative comparative analysis (QCA): remote and proximate factors and the consolidation of democracy’, European Journal of Political Research 45(5): 751–786.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schneider, C.Q.Wagemann, C. (2010), ‘Standards of good practice in qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and fuzzy-sets, Comparative Sociology 9(3): 397–418.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Siaroff, A. (1999), ‘Corporatism in 24 industrial democracies: meaning and measurement’, European Journal of Political Research 36(2): 175–205.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Soskice, D. (2007), ‘Macroeconomics and varieties of capitalism’, in B. Hancké, M. Rhodes and M. Thatcher (eds), Beyond Varieties of Capitalism. Conflict, Contradictions, and Complementarities in the European Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 89–122.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Traxler, F. (2004), ‘The metamorphoses of corporatism: from classical to lean patterns’, European Journal of Political Research 43(4): 571–598.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Traxler, F.Kittel, B. (2000), ‘The bargaining system and performance: a comparison of 18 OECD countries’, Comparative Political Studies 33(9): 1154–1190.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Traxler, F., Blaschke, S.Kittel, B. (2001), National Labour Relations in Internationalized Markets: A Comparative Study of Institutions, Change, and Performance, Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vergunst, N.P. (2004). The institutional dynamics of consensus and conflict: consensus democracy, corporatism and socio-economic policy-making and performance in twenty developed democracies (1965–1998). PhD dissertation, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.Google Scholar
Vis, B. (2007), ‘States of welfare or states of workfare? Welfare state restructuring in 16 capitalist democracies, 1985–2002’, Policy & Politics 35(1): 105–122.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vis, B., Woldendorp, J.Keman, H. (2007), ‘Do miracles exist? Analyzing economic performance comparatively’, Journal of Business Research 60(5): 531–538.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Visser, J.Hemerijck, A. (1997), A Dutch Miracle: Job Growth, Welfare Reform, and Corporatism in the Netherlands, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wagemann, C.Schneider, C.Q. (2010), ‘Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and fuzzy-sets: agenda for a research approach and a data analysis technique’, Comparative Sociology 9(3): 376–396.Google Scholar
Wagschal, U. (1996), Staatsverschuldung. Ursachen im Internationalen Vergleich, Opladen: Leske and Budrich.Google Scholar
Wilensky, H.L. (2006), ‘Trade-offs in public spending finance: comparing the well-being of big spenders and lean spenders’, International Political Science Review 27(4): 333–358.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Woldendorp, J. (1997), ‘Neo-corporatism and macroeconomic performance in eight small West European countries (1970–1990)’, Acta Politica 32(1): 49–79.Google Scholar
Woldendorp, J. (2005), The Polder Model: From Disease to Miracle? Dutch Neo-corporatism 1965–2000, Amsterdam: Thela Thesis.Google Scholar
Woldendorp, J.Delsen, L. (2008), ‘Dutch corporatism: does it still work? Policy formation and macroeconomic performance 1980–2005’, Acta Politica 43(2–3): 308–333.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Woldendorp, J.Keman, H. (2010), ‘Dynamic institutional analysis: measuring corporatist intermediation’, Quality and Quantity 44(2): 259–275.CrossRefGoogle Scholar