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The Influence of the Polish School in Logic on Mathematical Philosophy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 January 2015

Leon Horsten
Leon Horsten*
Affiliation:
School of Arts, University of Bristol, 43 Woodland Road, Bristol BS81UU, UK. E-mail: Leon.Horsten@bristol.ac.uk
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Abstract

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Type
Focus: Logic and Philosophy in Poland
Information
European Review , Volume 23 , Issue 1 , February 2015 , pp. 150 - 158
Copyright
© Academia Europaea 2015 

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References

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