In this article, an attempt is made to explain the homogenization of world dress, particularly for men, and at the same time to understand why – in a number of places – that homogenization has been resisted, and specific forms of supposedly local clothing have been used as markers of identity. The argument revolves around two main themes. First, the development of continent, and later worldwide, systems of manufacturing and distribution of clothing, beginning in New York in the middle of the 19th century, allowed the spread of particular forms of dress. Secondly, this dress was seen as being modern. In some cases this led to its enthusiastic, or to its enforced, adoption, in the hope that it would bring about socio-economic modernization. Elsewhere, it was rejected as being a part of imperial domination.

Beginning with a discussion of current debate in France about its own ‘social model’, this articles analyses French interpretations of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model in both a contemporary and historical context. It argues specifically that present-day criticisms of what is taken to be Britain's liberal, free-market model are nothing new and find distinct echoes in a literature that dates back to the late 17th century. Even for its French admirers, England was seen as a country of inequality, whilst for its critics inequality was a reflection of a broader system of poverty and misery inflicted upon the mass of the population. In brief, the parameters of the debate – inequality compared with the virtues of equality, commerce against the claims of justice, individual liberty contrasted with solidarity, the market versus the State – have not changed significantly for over two centuries. The article concludes by referring to current misconceptions in France of policies pursued by the current Labour government.

In memory of Andre Prochasson

‘Morality and slavery’ argues that, as much as detachment and dispassion govern standard historical practice, historians cannot escape making moral judgments. Precisely because slavery is a morally charged subject, its history has been especially prone to changing points of view, traceable, for example, in recent histories of the slave trade and the controversy over Olaudah Equiano's birthplace. Various polar extremes – the structural coerciveness of slavery versus the agency of slaves; the persistence of African ethnicities versus rapid creolization; the spread of slavery versus the rapid growth of anti-slavery in the early republic – are evident in historical interpretations, which necessarily involve complicated value judgments and serious moral ramifications. The essay concludes by suggesting that a measure of balance and fairness has been possible in the study of slavery. Through empathy, historians have been able to recover, in part at least, the hopes and fears, dreams and nightmares, notions of right and wrong among both slaves and masters in previous epochs.

(Translation: Stefan Menhofer, 2004, revised by Peter Burke, 2005)

The question: ‘How to write the history of Europe?’ can only be answered in context. The reply depends on what sort of readership one wants to write for, what ideas one entertains about tasks of exploring and conveying historical studies, how one views the relation of European history to other forms of historiography. The following reflections seek to take up and connect with one another two strands of historiographical discussion which are surprisingly disconnected, namely the discussions about concepts of European history and of global history. Suggestions for a European history in a global context, such as are presented here under the heading ‘exceptionalism’, are based not only on theoretical reflections but also on several attempts to put them into practice over the past few years.

The UN commitment to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015 poses a major challenge. It is, first and foremost, a political challenge to wealthy countries, to provide the necessary transfer of resources, and to developing countries, to make effective use of these transfers. But it is also an intellectual challenge, to economists and other scientists, to better understand the processes by which the MDGs can be achieved. This article focuses on two aspects. On the substantive side, it examines how we can achieve increased funding for development, particularly via new methods of finance, such as global taxes. On the intellectual side, it describes how a new branch of economics is developing – global public finance – that can contribute to the analysis of new sources of funding for the MDGs and of the working of the global economy.

This paper treats of the peculiarity of the Irish case. Professionalization of history came late to Ireland, and when it did happen, it was with a view to overcoming the inter-denominational and inter-communal point scoring that had energized most previous writing of Ireland's history. In tracing the further development of the history profession in Ireland, the paper alludes to the extent to which the posing of new questions and the employment of new methods were motivated by historical developments elsewhere in the western academic world. The outbreak of civil conflict in Northern Ireland inspired a new phase of introspective writing about Irish identity, sometimes given the semblance of universality through the invocation of post-colonial theory. This writing was usually presented in historical format, was composed mostly by academics employed by literature and social science departments, and was severely critical of what they described as the historical revisionism in which most professional historians in Ireland were believed to have engaged. It concludes with a consideration of how historians responded both to the challenge to their integrity and to various pressures to become more judgemental in writing about Ireland's past.

The Nordic or Scandinavian countries represent variations on general European patterns of state and nation-building and political culture. Denmark and Sweden rank among the oldest and most typical of nation-states together with France, Britain and Spain and should be studied with the same questions in mind. Today, however, a sort of trans-state common Nordic identity coexists with independent national identifications among the Scandinavians. Nordic unity is regarded as a viable alternative to European culture and integration by large numbers of the populations. There has never existed a ‘Scandinavian model’ worthy of the name ‘model’. Because of a series of changes in great power politics in the 18th and 19th centuries, the major conflicts in Europe were relocated away from Northern Europe. This resulted in a virtual ‘neutralization’ of the Scandinavian countries north of the Baltic Sea. Today, the much promoted ‘Nordic identity’ reveals itself only through the nation-states. The ‘Association for Nordic Unity’ (Foreningerne Norden) was set up in 1919 only after all five Nordic countries had achieved independent nationhood: Norway in 1905, Finland in 1917, and Iceland in 1918 (the latter only as home rule to be followed by independence in 1944). The very different roads to independent nationhood among the Nordic countries and the idea of a common Nordic identity can be traced back to its beginnings in the 19th century

‘No taxation without representation!’ It was the British Crown's attempt to tax tea that laid the groundwork for the American Revolution in the 18th century and, ultimately, the Declaration of Independence. This was neither the first nor the last example in history, but perhaps the most famous one to demonstrate the close connection between tax sovereignty and the civil nation state. Today, sovereignty in matters of taxation is still regarded as one of the core functions of the nation state. But is it still the nation state's own domain? This essay argues that, at least with respect to the European Union, the answer is no. It shows that the EU tax regime influences national policies in important ways, and imposes significant constraints on national tax sovereignty. It will also show that the lost sovereignty at the national level can be found again at the European level. Is it time to advocate a European Declaration of Dependence?

The fast rate of the globalisation process and huge technological changes are leading to increased uncertainty. Risk (considered either as a threat or as an opportunity) is correlated to uncertainty. That means that the socio-economic environment may be considered as ambiguous, and the reaction of players complex, unforeseeable and difficult to handle. In such conditions one looks for simple formulae or tricks to manage the necessary change in human behaviour, institutional structures, production and trade methods. ‘Flexibility’ seems to be a magic keyword – both a performance driver and an expression of freedom. Labour market flexibility is currently the focus of ideological and political debate. This paper aims to clarify some points in the debate, especially in the European Union context. First, we give some brief information about the EU framework with regard to the labour market flexibility and its performance. Second, we try to understand how labour market flexibility is dependent on decisions of enterprises (in search of competitiveness). But this point of view needs to be enlarged to a more systemic approach; flexibility is only one of the socio-economic performance variables. A flexibility paradigm is related to a new political and humanistic project, and is a serious consideration for a number of industrial and financial companies, scientific associations and bodies.