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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2025
The High Court has not definitively explained the legal status of the constitutionally implied freedom of political association since its existence was first raised in 1992. Tajjour v New South Wales affirmed the majority view that any constitutional protection enjoyed by political association is derived from the freedom of political communication; or, in the words of the Court, a ‘corollary to’ that freedom. In this article, we argue that the High Court should acknowledge the freedom of political association as a free-standing freedom rather than a corollary of political communication. The reasoning that gave rise to the implied freedom of political communication can also be applied to political association. The Court’s approach to the implication of freedom of communication, of building on the text of ss 7, 24 and 128 of the Constitution and the structures they establish, does not appear to be at odds with the implication of freedom of association. Consequently, we argue the Court has erred in favouring the corollary form of political association (pt IV). The corollary freedom has not been justified and appears either entirely unnecessary (being subsumed by political communication) or overly subjective in application. By contrast, the free-standing freedom could adopt the well-established Lange test of validity with only minor adjustments and therefore represent only a modest development of existing jurisprudence.
1. Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 (‘Nationwide News’); Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106 (‘ACTV’).
2. ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 212 (Gaudron J), 231–2 (McHugh J).
3. (2004) 220 CLR 181 (‘Mullholland’).
4. (2011) 243 CLR 181 (‘Wainohu’).
5. (2014) 254 CLR 508 (‘Tajjour’).
6. Mulholland (2004) 220 CLR 181, 234 (Gummow and Hayne JJ); Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181, 230 (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ); Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508, 553–4 (French CJ), 605 (Keane J).
7. Mulholland (2004) 220 CLR 181, 201 (Gleeson CJ), 225–6 (McHugh J), 248–9 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 295, 297 (Callinan J); Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181, 220 (French CJ and Kiefel J), 228–31 (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ); Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508, 553–4, 556 (French CJ), 566 (Hayne J), 575 (Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ), 605 (Keane J).
8. Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508, 576 (Gageler J). His Honour rejected a free-standing freedom of association, instead accepting corollary political association: at 578.
9. (2015) 257 CLR 178 (‘McCloy’).
10. Ibid 226, 229–30 (Gageler J).
11. Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181, 230 (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ); Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508, 553–4 (French CJ), 566 (Hayne J), 575 (Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ), 578 (Gageler J), 605 (Keane J).
12. Mulholland (2004) 220 CLR 181, 277 (Kirby J); see also ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 231–2 (McHugh J).
13. Joo-Cheong Tham, ‘Possible Constitutional Objections to the Powers to Ban “Terrorist” Organisations’ (2004) 27(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 482, 496–7.
14. Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508, 582 (Gageler J).
15. See Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181; Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508.
16. Tham, above n 13, 496; Anthony Gray, ‘Constitutionality of Criminal Organisation Legislation’ (2010) 17(4) Australian Journal of Administrative Law 213, 221; George Williams, ‘Sounding the Core of Representative Democracy: Implied Freedoms and Electoral Reform’ (1996) 20 Melbourne University Law Review 848, 861.
17. ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 212 (Gaudron J), 231–2 (McHugh J); Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 115 (Gaudron J), 142 (McHugh J) (‘Kruger’); Mulholland (2004) 220 CLR 181, 277 (Kirby J).
18. Anthony Gray, ‘Freedom of Association in the Australian Constitution and the Crime of Consorting’ (2013) 32(2) University of Tasmania Law Review 148, 154, citing Tham, above n 13, 495; Jeremy Kirk, ‘Constitutional Implications from Representative Democracy’ (1995) 23 Federal Law Review 37, 55.
19. Mulholland (2004) 220 CLR 181, 234 (Gummow and Hayne JJ); Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181, 230 (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ), 251 (Heydon J); Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508, 566 (Hayne J), 576 (Gageler J), 605 (Keane J).
20. Tham, above n 13, 496–7; see also discussion of Patterson case below.
21. Jami Floyd, ‘The Administration of Psychotropic Drugs to Prisoners: State of the Law and Beyond’ (1990) 78 California Law Review 1243, 1269.
22. Ex parte Walsh & Johnson, In re Yates (1925) 37 CLR 36, 79 (Isaacs J) (‘Ex parte Walsh’).
23. Floyd, above n 21, 1269.
24. Ex parte Walsh (1925) 37 CLR 36, 79 (Isaacs J).
25. 357 US 449 (1958) (‘Patterson’).
26. Ibid 452–3.
27. Ibid 462–3.
28. Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181, 220 (French CJ and Kiefel J), 231 (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan Bell JJ).
29. Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2009 (NSW).
30. Ibid s 26(1).
31. Ibid s 26(5)(a)–(f).
32. Ibid s 26(5).
33. Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181, 230 (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ).
34. See Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2009 (NSW) s 25.
35. Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181, 231 (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ).
36. Admittedly, had a free-standing freedom of association been recognised at the time Wainohu was decided, the law likely would have been valid by reason of being appropriate and adapted to a legitimate end: ibid. Moreover, any extension of protection to membership there would still involve a test linking membership to electoral choice. This is addressed further below in the Freedom Should Not Be Limited to Political Parties section.
37. Reena Raggi, ‘An Independent Right to Freedom of Association’ (1977) 12(1) Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 1, 1.
38. ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 187 (Dawson J) (emphasis added), quoted in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 560 (‘Lange’).
39. See generally commentary on the Abbott government’s attempts to quash environmental advocacy by interfering with, and targeting the structure of, environmental groups: Joan Staples, ‘Step by Step, Conservative Forces Move to Silence NGOs’ Voices’ The Conversation (online), 26 August 2014 <http://theconversation.com/step-by-step-conservative-forces-move-to-silence-ngos-voices-29637>; Peter Burdon, ‘Government Inquiry Takes Aim at Green Charities that “Get Political”’ The Conversation (online), 15 April 2015 <http://theconversation.com/government-inquiry-takes-aim-at-green-charities-that-get-political-40166>.
40. Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181, 230 (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ).
41. Mulholland (2004) 220 CLR 181, 234 (Gummow and Hayne JJ).
42. Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 567. The second part of the test was subsequently reformulated in Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1 to replace the words ‘the fulfilment of’ with ‘in a manner’.
43. Albeit association ‘formed for a purpose of engaging in communication on governmental or political matter’ (Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508, 582 (Gageler J)). The making of such a link was consistent with his Honour’s position that protected association is ‘part and parcel of the protected freedom’, and indeed he made the same reference to the purpose of the association in making that observation (Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508, 578 (Gageler J)). We address the limitation of protection to certain kinds of association below in the Mirroring the Test Laid Down in Lange section.
44. ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 212 (Gaudron J).
45. ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 169 (Deane and Toohey JJ); Kirk, above n 18, 40.
46. ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 227, 232.
47. (1997) 190 CLR 1, 115 (‘Kruger’).
48. Dawson J considered freedom of association at 69 but did not consider it necessary to decide whether it could be implied from the Constitution. Instead, he held (a) that a freedom of association could not be implied from ‘the notion of a free society’ (as suggested by Gaudron J in ACTV) as it was not a legitimate source of constitutional implications and (b) if freedom of association could be implied in some form, that it would not limit the Commonwealth’s powers to make laws for Territories under s 122 of the Constitution.
49. Kruger (1997) 190 CLR 1, 115 (emphasis added).
50. Ibid 120 (emphasis added).
51. Kruger (1997) 190 CLR 1, 91 (emphasis added).
52. Ibid 142.
53. Ibid 156–7.
54. Ibid 157.
55. Adrienne Stone, ‘Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms: The Nature of the Freedom of Political Communication’ (2001) 25 Melbourne University Law Review 374, 378.
56. Mulholland (2004) 220 CLR 181, 225.
57. Ibid, citing Kruger (1997) 190 CLR 1, 91 (Toohey J), 116 (Gaudron J).
58. Mulholland (2004) 220 CLR 181, 306.
59. Ibid 234.
60. See Transcript of Proceedings, Mulholland [2004] HCATrans 7 (11 February 2004) 2226–31 (J B R Beach QC): ‘If you accept that there is an implied freedom of association — which is either a corollary of the freedom of communication, or perhaps it is even anterior to that — freedom to associate, to form a party that can then communicate, then to impinge on the [Democratic Labor Party’s] membership privacy in this way impinges on their freedom of association’ (emphasis added).
61. Mulholland (2004) 220 CLR 181, 277. Note Kirby J’s formulation is centred on political parties, rather than associations with political goals or interests not focused on gaining parliamentary representation or achieving government. ‘Community debate’ would be protected under the corollary freedom, if not already protected by political communication.
62. Ibid 277–8.
63. Ibid 278.
64. Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181, 230.
65. Ibid 220.
66. Ibid 251.
67. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 93X(1)(a). ‘Habitually consort’ is defined in s 93X(2). ‘Consort’ is defined in s 93 W.
68. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 93X(1)(b). ‘Official warning’ is defined in s 93X(3). Six defences are laid out in s 93Y.
69. Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508, 553.
70. Ibid 555.
71. Ibid 553–4.
72. Ibid 566.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid 575.
76. Ibid 578.
77. Ibid 585.
78. Ibid 589.
79. Ibid 576.
80. Ibid 605.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid 606.
84. Ibid 566 (Hayne J), 575 (Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ), 578 (Gageler J), 605 (Keane J).
85. Ibid 575.
86. Ibid 582 (Gageler J).
87. Ibid 578.
88. Ibid 578.
89. Ibid 582.
90. Adrienne Stone, ‘The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure Revisited’ (2005) 28(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 842, 850.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. Adrienne Stone, ‘Insult and Emotion, Calumny and Invective: Twenty Years of Freedom of Political Communication’ (2011) 30(1) University of Queensland Law Journal 79, 90–1.
94. (2015) 257 CLR 178, 234–9.
95. Ibid. McHugh J never expressly clarified which approach he favoured, and Gleeson CJ did not consider association.
96. Ibid; and note further the new approaches introduced in the various judgments in Brown v Tasmania [2017] HCA 43.
97. Adrienne Stone, ‘Australia’s Constitutional Rights and the Problem of Interpretative Disagreement’ (2005) 27 Sydney University Law Review 29, 43; Zoe Robinson, ‘A Comparative Analysis of the Doctrinal Consequences of Interpretative Disagreement for Implied Constitutional Rights’ (2012) 11(1) Washington University Global Studies Law Review 93, 111–13.
98. Robinson, above n 97, 113.
99. See, eg, Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508, 553, 566, 575, 605 (political communication); Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181, 218–20, 229–30 (repugnant to Ch III); Mulholland (2004) 220 CLR 181, 201, 225, 249, 279, 306 (political communication).
100. See, eg, James Allan and Michael Kirby, ‘A Public Conversation on Constitutionalism and the Judiciary between Professor James Allan and the Hon Michael Kirby AC CMG’ (2009) 33(3) Melbourne University Law Review 1032, 1041–2; Robert Woods, ‘Rights Review in the High Court and the Cultural Limits of Judicial Power’ (2013) 41(3) Federal Law Review 585, 587–8, 606–7.
101. (1997) 189 CLR 579 (‘Levy’).
102. Section 299(1)(d)(ii) reads: ‘A person shall not by writing or speech use words calculated to bring a member of the [Australian Industrial Relations] Commission or the Commission into disrepute.’
103. Nationwide News (1992) 177 CLR 1, 63.
104. Ibid 48–9.
105. Ibid 72; See also Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, 172–3 (Deane J) (‘Theophanous’).
106. Justice John Toohey, ‘A Government of Laws, and Not of Men?’ (1993) 4 Public Law Review 158, 170.
107. Ibid 168–9.
108. Political Broadcasts and Political Disclosures Act 1991 (Cth) ss 95B–D.
109. Ibid s 95H(2).
110. Ibid s 95H(1)(b).
111. McHugh J upheld the validity of s 95C, which applied the ban to Territory elections, on the basis there was no limitation or prohibition on s 51(v) of the Constitution in its application to Territories: ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 246.
112. Ibid 138.
113. Ibid 231.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid 210.
116. Ibid.
117. McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140.
118. Ibid 235–6; McHugh J suggested it amounted to an alteration of the Constitution by a means other than that laid out in s 128.
119. Ibid 291.
120. Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 559.
121. Harley G A Wright, ‘Sovereignty of the People — The New Constitutional Grundnorm’ (1998) 26 Federal Law Review 165, 175.
122. Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 561.
123. Wright, above n 121, 176; see also Levy (1997) 189 CLR 579, 606–7 (Dawson J), 610–11 (Toohey and Gummow JJ), 617 (Gaudron J), 622 (McHugh J), 643 (Kirby J).
124. See ‘Political association is practically necessary to the functioning of other aspects of the Constitution’s system of representative and responsible government,’ below.
125. ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 145 (Mason CJ), 174 (Deane and Toohey JJ), 221 (Gaudron J), 237–8 (McHugh J).
126. (1994) 182 CLR 104, 124 (Mason CJ, Toohey & Gaudron JJ).
127. (1997) 189 CLR 520, 571.
128. (2004) 220 CLR 1 (‘Coleman’).
129. Ibid 126 (Heydon J).
130. Coleman (2004) 220 CLR 1, 91 (Kirby J).
131. Levy (1997) 189 CLR 579, 623. See generally Stone, above n 93.
132. 357 US 449 (1958)
133. McCloy (2015) 89 ALJR 857 [124] (Gageler J).
134. Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 560.
135. (1992) 177 CLR 106, 135 (emphasis added).
136. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Constitutional Implications Revisited’ (2011) 30 University of Queensland Law Journal 9, 20.
137. Ibid 27. See contra Patrick Emerton, ‘Political Freedoms and Entitlements in the Australian Constitution — An Example of Referential Intentions Yielding Unintended Legal Consequences’ (2010) 38(2) Federal Law Review 169; Goldsworthy’s rebuttal in Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Constitutional Implications Revisited’ (2011) 30 University of Queensland Law Journal 9.
138. Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 557.
139. Ibid 560. For simplicity we leave referendums under s 128 to one side for the purposes of this analysis.
140. Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.) [1987] 1 SCR 313, 396 (McIntyre J).
141. Alan Ware, Citizens, Parties and the State: A Reappraisal (Princeton University Press, 1988) 80.
142. Ibid; Clayton Barker, ‘The Case for Stronger State Political Parties’ (2016) 25 Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy 289, 289; 292–3.
143. Graeme Orr, The Law of Politics: Elections, Parties and Money in Australia (Federation Press, 2010) 117.
144. Barker, above n 142, 289; 292–3.
145. David Sanders et al, ‘Downs, Stokes and the Dynamics of Electoral Choice’ (2011) 41(2) British Journal of Political Science 287, 288, 290, 301.
146. George Williams and Geraldine Chin, ‘Australia Experiments with Community Initiated CIR for the ACT?’ (1998) 7 Griffith Law Review 274, 291.
147. Orr, above n 143, 117.
148. Kay Lawson, ‘When Linkage Fails’ in Kay Lawson and Peter H. Merkhl (eds), When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations (Princeton University Press, 1988) 34.
149. Barker, above n 142, 292–3; Graeme Orr, ‘Party Primaries for Candidate Selection — Right Question, Wrong Answer’ (2011) 34(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 964, 970–1. Also see generally Nancy L. Rosenblum, ‘Political Parties as Membership Groups’ (2000) 100(3) Columbia Law Review 813.
150. Orr, above n 143, 117.
151. ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 187 (Dawson J).
152. See Patterson, 357 US 449 (1958).
153. See above n 142 and accompanying text.
154. Nationwide News (1992) 177 CLR 1, 74 (Deane and Toohey JJ); ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 138 (Mason CJ); 159 (Brennan J); 231 (McHugh J).
155. Sanders et al, above n 145, 310–12.
156. But see below as to why the restriction of a freedom to parties would be difficult to justify.
157. Jacqueline Lipton, ‘Responsible Government, Representative Democracy and the Senate: Options for Reform’ (1997) 19(2) University of Queensland Law Review 194, 198, citing Paul Kelly, November 1975: The Inside Story of Australia’s Greatest Political Crisis (Allen & Unwin, 1995) 286.
158. Suri Ratnapala, ‘The Case for Adopting the American Model in an Australian Republic’ (1999) 20(2) University of Queensland Law Journal 242, 246. For a practical example of this view, see the 2016 NT election which saw the CLP win fewer seats than Independent members (two seats to five) yet still saw the CLP recognised as the Opposition: James Oaten, ‘Independents won’t be recognised as opposition in NT: official advice’, ABC News (online), 30 August 2016 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-08-30/independents-wil-not-be-recognised-at-opposition-in-nt/7799786>.
159. Peter Loveday, ‘Parties, Federation and Election Resources, 190’ (1977) 33 Labour History 1, 1.
160. ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 142 (Mason CJ); Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520.
161. As is well-known, the Menzies Government attempted to ban the Australian Communist Party and impose sanctions on its members through legislation and at referendum. Kirk believes that, if the challenge to that legislation had been heard forty years later, submissions would likely have centred on breach of freedom of association: see Kirk, above n 20, 38, 55–6.
162. Monis v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 92, 130–1, 133 (French CJ); 160–1 (Hayne J); 212 (Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
163. Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 571.
164. Kruger (1997) 190 CLR 1, 120 (Gaudron J, using ‘subsidiary’ rather than ‘corollary’); Mulholland (2004) 220 CLR 181, 234 (Gummow and Hayne JJ); Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181, 230 (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ); Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508, 566 (Hayne J), 575 (Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
165. Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508, 578 (Gageler J).
166. Australian Law Reform Commission, Freedom Inquiry, Interim Report No 127 (2015) 122, quoting Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2007) 272.
167. See Tajjour (2014) 254 CLR 508, 551–2 (French CJ), 582 (Gageler J).
168. Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 567; Tham, above n 13, 497.
169. See, eg, Keiran Hardy and George Williams, ‘Submission to Australian Law Reform Commission on Issues Paper 46’ Freedoms Inquiry, 15 February 2015, 1–2, 6, 8–9; Alex Reilly, Submission to Australian Law Reform Commission on Issues Paper 46, Freedoms Inquiry 3; Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ss 100–5; Workplaces (Protection from Protestors) Act 2014 (Tas); Vicious Lawless Association Disestablishment Act 2013 (Qld); Criminal Code (Criminal Organisations) Regulation 2013 (Qld).
170. (2014) 254 CLR 508.
171. (2015) 89 ALJR 857 [25] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).